Sources of Political Instability and Stability in Iran, 1779-1973 by Pishva, Ahmad
University of Tennessee, Knoxville
Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative
Exchange
Masters Theses Graduate School
12-1975
Sources of Political Instability and Stability in Iran,
1779-1973
Ahmad Pishva
University of Tennessee, Knoxville
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses by an authorized administrator of Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information,
please contact trace@utk.edu.
Recommended Citation
Pishva, Ahmad, "Sources of Political Instability and Stability in Iran, 1779-1973. " Master's Thesis, University of Tennessee, 1975.
https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_gradthes/4205
To the Graduate Council:
I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Ahmad Pishva entitled "Sources of Political Instability and
Stability in Iran, 1779-1973." I have examined the final electronic copy of this thesis for form and content
and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of
Arts, with a major in Political Science.
Gill C. Evans, Major Professor
We have read this thesis and recommend its acceptance:
T. Alexander Smith, Harry M. Lindquist
Accepted for the Council:
Carolyn R. Hodges
Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School
(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)
To the Graduate Council: 
I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Ahmad 
Pishva entitled "Sources of Political Instability and 
Stability in Iran, 1779-1973." I recommend that it be 
accepted in partial fulfillment for the degree of Master of 
Arts, with a major in Political Science. 
Gill C. Evans, Major Professor 
Accepted for the Council: 
Vice Chancellor 
Graduate Studies and Research 
SOURCES OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND STABILITY 
IN IRAN, 1779-1973 
A Thesis 
Presented for the 
Master of Arts 
Degree 
rhe University of Tennessee 
Ahmad Pishva 
December 1975 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
The author is grateful to Dr. Gill C. Evans for his 
invaluable guidance and his very constructive suggestions 
in the preparation of this thesis. 
Th� author expresses his appreciation to Dre Te Alexander 
Smith and Dre Harry Me Lindquist for the academic 
encouragement which they have provided throughout the 
author's undergraduate and graduate careers. 
ii 
ABSTRACT 
The purpose o� this study was to define anq examine the 
main sources of political instability and stability which 
existed in Iran between 1779 and 1973. The magnitude of the 
political, social, and economic changes in Iran during this 
period fostered an atmosphere in which the elements of both 
instability and stability prevailed. 
The study dealt with four distinct political periods9 
The first period examined was that of the Qajar Dynasty 
(1779-1925). The second period dealt with was the 
modernization of Iran under Reza Shah (1926-1941) 9 The third 
period discussed was the early segment of the reign of 
Mohammad Reza Shah (1941-1953). The fourth period covered 
was the strengthened rule of Mohammad Reza Shah (1953-1973) a 
The concluding segment of this study summarized the principal 
sources of political instability and stability in Iran which 
prevailed during the aforementioned periods. The conclusion 
also examined the theory of leadership in relation to the 
Shah of Iran� 
It was found that all of the political periods examined 
in this study exhibited a combination of the elements of 
political instability and stability, with the exception of 
the period between 1963 and 1973, which was a truly stable 
period. 
iii 
iv 
It was the conclusion of this thesis that the period 
between 1963 and 1973 was the only period in which signs of 
permanent political stability were exhibited. The 
stabilization of the political arena in this period was 
achieved as a result of the viable leadership of 
Mohammad Reza Shah, and his implementation of the reforms 
of the "White Revolution." 
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis will define and analyze the principal. 
sources of political instability and stability which 
prevailed during the various periods of Iranian political 
history from 1779 to 1973. In defining political stability, 
it is appropriate to examine the concept within each distinct 
political setting,. for it would be impractical to give a 
general definition which would apply to all countries. In 
the case of Iran, the lack of one or more of the following 
characteristics resulted in a certain degree of political 
instability: viable leadership to which the majority of the 
population defers, economic solvency, internal security, and 
internationally respected sovereignty. On the other hand, 
the presence of a combination of these traits created a 
degree of stability. 
The thesis will be divided into four main chapters and 
a concluding chapter. The first chapter will cover the 
period from 1779 to 1925, which encompasses the rise and 
fall of the Qajar Dynasty and the establishment of the 
Pahlavi Dynasty. The second chapter will deal with the 
period from 1926 to 1941, focusing on the modernization of 
the country under Reza Shah. The effects of World War II upon 
Iran and the events which·led to the abdication of Reza Shah 
1 
will be discussed in the latter part of this chapter. The 
third chapter will concentrate on the post-World War II 
period from 1941 to 1953. This chapter will discuss the 
continued occupation of Iran by the Allied forces, the 
separatist movements in the country, the rise and fall of 
Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, and the reassertion of 
2 
the nation's support for Mohammad Reza Shah. The fourth 
chapter will focus on the rule of Mohammad Reza Shah from 
1953. to 1973. The first part of this chapter will discuss 
the ways by which the Shah strengthened his rule between 1953 
and 1962. The second part of the chapter will present the 
decade of the "White Revolution, " 1963-1973, concentrating 
on the reforms referred to as· the "White Revolution" or "The 
Revolution of the Shah and the People, " and their effects 
upon the political, social, and economic structures of Iran. 
The concluding chapter will first summarize the sources of 
instability and those of stability which prevailed in Iran 
during the periods discussed in the thesis. The major part 
of the conclusion will be devoted to the discussion of 
leadership as applied to the present leader of Iran. 
CHAPTER I 
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE QAJAR DYNASTY, 
1779-1925 
The Qajars were a Turkish tribe whose campaigns of 
conquest emanated from the southeastern sector of the 
Caspian Sea, and culminated in the conquest of the Persian 
Empire. The Qajar Dynasty was established as the ruling 
family of Iran by Aga Mohammad Khan in 1779. The first 
Qajar rulers employed force and terror in establishing 
control over the country. Moreover, the founders of the 
Qajar Dynasty were determined to institute a strong central 
government based upon an absolute monarchy as a central force 
capable of maintaining control throughout Iran. The early 
Qajar rulers established the capital in the centrally located 
city of Tehran, for it provided access to the·other regions 
of the country. Along with their initial determination to 
establish a strong central government and exercise effective 
control over the country, the founders of the Qajar Dynasty 
proposed other goals, among them defining the boundaries of 
Iran, requiring all regions of Iran to finance the central 
capital, employing more foreign advisors, and maintaining the 
clergy as intermediaries between the Qajar Throne and the 
3 
people, thereby gaining support for the T�rone, because the 
people respected the advice and authority of the clergy.1 
In the early years of the Qajar period, the regime 
efficiently pursued these goals. With the pass�ge of time 
the Qajar rulers weakened, for, by the beginning of the 
4 
third regime, that of Mohammad Shah (who reigned 1834-1848), 
the rule of the Qajars had begun to decline. Following the 
initial reign of terror of the founders of the Qajar Dynasty, 
the strength.of the central government ebbed, and the country 
reverted to autonomous regions ruled by regional chiefs. 
Although the founders of the Qajar Dynasty had acted to 
establish a strong central government in Iran, subsequent 
Qajar regimes were unable to maintain an effective rule over 
Iran; thus, the Qajar Dynasty suffered a progressive 
deterioration. In this regard, an analysis of the fac�ors 
contributing to the progressive decline of the Qajar Dynasty, 
particularly from the latter part of the nineteenth century 
onward, is appropriate, for such·a review will explain the 
conditions which permitted the rise to power of Reza Khan 
and the establishment of the Pahlavi Dynasty. 
The deterioration of the Qajar's ability to control and 
rule the country was rela·ted to the decay of the moral 
1Peter Avery, Modern Iran (London: Ernest Benn, 1965), 
pp. 26-27. 
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structure of the Throne, for the Qajar rulers became 
increasingly preoccupied with their own comfort and leisure e 
The financially depleted Throne began a practice of relying 
upon methods of acquiring personal revenue which were 
injurious to Iran, economically and politically. For example, 
the Qajar rulers sold concessions to foreign powers for 
unequal returns to Iran; that is, the Qajars sold the natural 
wealth of Iran, such as minerals and the fisheries of the 
Caspian Sea, to concessionaires for less than the value of 
the concession, and the royalties which Iran received were 
relatively small. The Qajars sold the concessions for 
unequal returns to Iran because they wanted funds for their 
own use and they were willing to make quick sales for ready 
t b t. . . 2 payrnen y prospec ive concessionaires. 
While the deterioration of the Qajar administration 
was a continuing trend, by 1848 reforms were attempted by 
Mirza Taqi Khan, Arnir-e Kabir (Great Amir), the Prime 
Minister under Naser al-Din Shah (the fourth Qajar king, who 
reigned 1848-1896). Mirza Taqi Khan attempted to suppress 
regional tribal revolts, to reorganize the armed forces, to 
restrain the influence of the clergy in politics, and to 
revive the strength of the Throne. In addition, Mirza Taqi 
Khan sought to reduce the interference by foreign legations, 
2Ibid. , p. 90. 
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particularly Britain and Russia. 3 Due to his eagerness for 
reforms, and his prominence, Mirza Taqi Khan was envied by a 
number of the Shah's councilors who, in their envy, falsely 
reported that Mirza Taqi Khan intended to build up his own 
position and eventually eliminate t�e Shah. The suspicion 
aroused by the councilors caused Mirza Taqi Khan, Amir-e 
Kabir, to be dismissed in 1851, and in 1852 he was executed. 
Following the death of Mirza Taqi Khan reforms ceased. The 
strength of the Throne declined, while the Qajars increasingly 
relied upon foreign enterprise for revenue, thereby causing 
an increasing amount of damage to Iran, economically, because 
the natural wealth of Iran was being squandered in foreign 
concessions, and politically, because foreign interference 
in Iran weakened the country's independence. 4 
One of the factors contributing to the decline of the 
Qajar Dynasty was its inability to unify the nation, 
especially in terms of inspiring loyalty to the central 
government. The power of the central government waned, and 
as it did so, the various regions of the country ignored the 
authority of the central government and established their own 
rule under regional chiefs. During the declining era of the 
Qajars, the absence of an effective centralization of power 
increasingly injured the position of the Throne. While it 
3Ibid. , p. 51. 4Avery, Modern Iran, p. 67. 
7 
is true that the Qajars were· unable to unify Iran, the 
apparent disunity of the country was characteristic of Iran, 
for Iran was composed of a plural society which lacked a 
true unifying force. The plural society of Iran consisted 
of a variety of ethnic and linguistic groups whose 
differences, in accord with regionalism and conflicting 
group interests, contributed to the disunity of the country e 
Thus, "disunity is a marked tendency in Iranian politics e "S 
Moreover, especially regarding Iran, "no national government 
can be regarded as stable in the absence of a reasonable 
degree of national unity. 11 6 In the past, a sense of national 
unity arose in Iran only when there was an overwhelming 
issue which was felt throughout the entire country, or when 
a strong leader inspired a sense of national unity. 
Another factor contributing to the decline of the Qajar 
administration was the expansive size of Iran, for this added 
to the disunity of the country and to the Qajar's difficulty 
in controlling the realm. The great size of the country as 
well as poor communications seriously limited the control 
which the central government was able to maintain over the 
provinces. Such conditions were conducive to tribal 
upheavals and raids, for the weakened central government was 
unable to control tribal activities. 
5rbid. , p. 210. 
6Joseph M. Upton, The History of Modern Iran (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 35. 
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In essence, the Qajars were confronted with a realm in 
which a sense of unity would have been difficult to bring 
about due to the variety of ethnic and linguistic types, the 
expansive size of the country, and poor conununications. 
Consequently, the sense of disunity prevailed throughout 
Iran. Moreover, the inability of the Qajar rulers to exert 
control over the various regions of the country, especially 
regions of tribal trouble, was a major factor contributing 
to internal insecurity. 
Other factors contributing to the decline of the Qajar 
Dynasty were predominantly weaknesses related to the 
disorganization of the Qajar administration. The Qajars 
were not concerned with introducing proper administrative 
organization due to their own lack of knowledge of 
administrative matters and lack of interest in improving 
Iran. The Qajar administration was arbitrary, and 
administrative positions were occupied by Qajar family 
members who often flouted the authority of the Shah, at times 
by retaining revenue due to the Crown.? Many of the Qajar 
family members regarded their positions as means of 
accumulating wealth, rather than as positions of responsi­
bility to the central government and to the people. The 
Qajar administration was disorganized and functionally chaotic .. 
7 Avery, Modern Iran, p. 24. 
9 
While administrative chaos was characteristic of the 
Qajar period, fear, suspicion, and secrecy prevailed in the 
Qajar Court and society. During the Qajar period the system 
of spy-police was instituted in the cities, and at times, 
village landlords and others were forced to act as 
informants.8 The people lived under conditions of oppression, 
and their economic and social conditions progressively 
worsened during the Qajar period. 
The oppressed people turned to the clergy, who exerted 
influence over the people and political decisions. At times 
the clergy exerted influence upon the ruling class and the 
common people; for example, the 1820s was a period during 
which the clergy manipulated the emotions of the masses and 
influenced the decisions of the rulers.
9 During the period 
1848-1851, Mirza Taqi Khan, Amir-e Kabir, attempted to reduce 
the interference of the clergy in political matters; however, 
the execution of Mirza Taqi Khan allowed the clergy to resume 
their interference. While both the Qajar Court and the 
clergy were politically reactionary, from the 1850s onward 
there was a struggle for political influence between the two 
elements. 
Another factor contributing to the weakness of the 
Qajar administration was the lack of a national unified 
8rbid., p. 112. 9rbid., p. 44. 
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army. Considering the size of Iran and the inadequate 
communications, a national army was needed to control the 
provinces, especially to control the tribal groupse During 
the Qajar period there was no effective centralization of 
military power. The armed forces consisted of separate 
units: the regular army (Nizam), the Persian Cossack Brigade, 
the Gendarroerie, and the South Persian Rifles. In addition 
to being composed of separate entities, the armed units were 
also under different leadership; that is, the Persian Cossack 
Brigade was under Russian leadership, the Gendarmerie under 
Swedish officers, and the South Persian Rifles under British 
influence. Of the four units, only the Nizam, the regular 
army, was effectively an Iranian force. However, the Nizam 
unit was disorganized and ill-equipped, and the loyalty of 
' 1' bl lO ' ' Kh . K b' its troops was unre ia e. Mirza Taqi an, Amir-e a ir, 
had attempted to reform the organization and supply of the 
armed forces, but the attempt was not successful, and little 
change was brought about in the organization and 
effectiveness of the armed forces. Moreover, despite 
attempted reforms in payment and supply of the armed units, 
during the Qajar period no attempts were made to organize 
a unified national army. 
lOibid. , p. 79. 
In view of the disunity prevalent during the Qajar 
period, the lack of .a.national army capable of maintaining 
nationwide·control, intensified the internal insecurity in 
the countrye In addition, the chaos resulting from the 
disorganized Qajar administration was an element of 
instability. 
11 
Of the various factors which contributed to the 
disintegration of the Qajar period, foreign intervention is 
often referred to as a major crippling element. In view of 
such an observation, the actual role of foreign powers in 
Qajar Iran must be analyzed in terms of the possible 
contribution of the foreign powers to instability and/or 
stability during the Qajar period e 
Prior to the eighteenth century, Iran had been of 
interest to foreign states, mainly in terms of trade and 
travel. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
Iran was of political interest primarily to France, Britain, 
and Russiae Western political interest in Iran had become 
apparent in 1807 with Napoleon's proposal that Iran join 
F . t "t ' ' d' ll W'th th d t· f ranee agains Bri ain in In ia. i e re uc ion o 
France's political aspirations in. Iran, Britain and Russia 
held prime interest in Iran. Britain's early interests in 
Iran lay in the use of Iran as a lifeline to India; however, 
Britain soon recognized the economic and political value of 
11william S. Hass, Iran (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1946; rpte New York: AMS Press, 1966), p. 144. 
12 
Iran itself. Russian interests toward Iran.centered 
primarily around strategic concerns, economic interests, and 
12 warm water ports. The interests of these two powers in 
Iran varied from time to time. Of major importance, however, 
is the fact that Britain and Russia were political and 
economic rivals vis-a-vis Iran, and the effects of this 
great power rivalry upon Iran ought to be considered. 
In view of the fact that both Britain and Russia had 
interests in Iran, neither power could dare to establish 
overt control over Iran or to make Iran a colony without 
irritating the other power and chancing the outbreak of a 
war. Thus, it may be said that during the nineteenth 
century, a period of colonization in Asia and Africa, Iran's 
independence was maintained due to a balanced rivalry which 
existed between Britain and Russia� In this respect, at 
least, British and Russian operations in Iran may be viewed 
as beneficial to Iran's independent status.13 
Britain and Russia competed for economic concessions as 
well as political privileges in Iran. The competition 
between them was possible because of the disorganization and 
12Tareq Y. Ismael, Governments and Politics of the 
Contemporary Middle East (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press, 
1970), p. 155., 
13Richard w. Cottam, Nationalism in Iran (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964), p. 158. 
13 
decay of the Qajar administration. The Qajar rulers were 
concerned primarily with acquiring personal funds; therefore, 
borrowing from foreign powers and selling concessions 
provided ready funds for the Qajars to squander upon their 
personal pleasure and leisure. Indeed, it was not the 
British and Russian powers and concessionaires who brought 
about the deterioration of the conditions of Iran, politically 
and economically, during the Qajar period. On the contrary, 
the existing weakness and disintegrating conditions under 
the Qajar rulers allowed the foreign powers to step in and 
take advantage of Iran. Duri�g the Qajar period, the Qajar 
rulers proposed that allowing Europeans to explore Iran for 
prospective economic projects would bring wealth to the 
Iranians. The contracts granted for the concessions, 
however, exemplified the reckless shortsightedness of the 
Qajar rulers, for the concessions provided unequal returns 
for Iran. Moreover, the returns which Iran did receive were 
d d b  h I 14 squan ere y t e QaJars. Unequal contract conditions were 
apparent in the oil concession granted to the British, the 
Caspian fishing concession granted to the Russians, and a 
tobacco concession granted to a British firm; indeed, the 
tobacco concession caused such riotious reactions from those 
14T. Cuyler Young, "The Problem of Westernization in 
Modern Iran, " Middle East Journal, II (January, 1948), 50. 
14 
in the Iranian tobacco industry, and from the Iranian public, 
that the concession was withdrawn. 15 
British and Russian interests involved various facets 
of Iran's economy, such as banks and trade, as well as the 
establishment of capitulation rights. Indeed, the system of 
capitulations, by which foreign nationals residing in Iran 
were immune from Iranian jurisdiction and were subject to 
the judiciary process of their respective nations through 
their consulates in Iran, gave the foreign powers an 
advantage, for they could easily acquit their nationals who 
had committed crimes in Iran. In addition, the practice 
slighted the integrity of Iran's sovereignty. 16 The British 
and Russians were interested in controlling Iran's natural 
resources and the country's foreign trade. Indeed, as the 
Qajar rulers continued granting concessions, a greater 
portion of Iran's economic resources came under foreign 
control; however, the Qajars were unconcerned about the 
political and economic implications of their actions. The 
seriousness of the situation w�s exemplified by the fact 
that by 1906 Russia largely controlled, and received revenue: 
from, Iran's customs administration, for this was granted to 
15Alessandro Bausani, The Persians, trans. J. B. Donne 
{New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971), p. 169. 
16Ismael, Governments and Politics of the Contemporary 
Middle East, p. l55. 
15 
Russia in return for a large loan which Russia had provided 
for Mozaffar al-Din Shah (fifth Qajar king, who reigned 
1896-1907) •17 
In addition to dominating Iran's economic resources, 
the foreign powers possessed great influence in the political 
sphere, for Britain and Russia easily manipulated Iranians 
in strategic ministries, such that particular interests of 
the foreign powers were served. In this regard, Britons and 
Russians would offer compensation to ministers for assuring 
the adoption of policies which favored the respective 
interests of Britain and Russia. The nature of certain 
agreements also favored the interests of the foreign powers. 
For example, in the 1828 Treaty of Turkomanchai between 
Russia and Iran, Russia received all of the Caucasus; Iran 
surrendered its claim to Armenia, and the Araxes River was 
established as Iran's northwestern boundary with Russia; and 
18 the system of capitulations was forced upon Iran. 
Considering the preponderance of British and Russian 
influence in Iran by the end of the nineteenth century, it 
appeared that the sovereignty of Iran was weakening. Such a 
weakening of Iran's position, however, was the result of the 
17cottam, Nationalism in Iran, p. 161. 
18Ismael, Gov�rnments and Politics of the Contemporary 
Middle East, p. Iss. 
16 
internal decay of the Qajar administration. The foreign 
powers exerted pressure upon Iran and took advantage of the 
economic prospects in the country. The central issue, 
however, was that disorganization and disintegration in the 
Qajar administration, and the political chaos throughout 
Iran, allowed the foreign powers to exploit the economic 
resources and to accumulate concessions and privileges to 
the point that foreign influence predominated in the 
political and economic spheres during the late Qajar period. 
The declining position of Qajar Iran disturbed groups 
of Iranian nationalists composed of intellectuals, merchants, 
and members of the clergy. These nationalists objected to 
the activities which were ruining Iran and enriching foreign 
powers. By the end of the nineteenth century, Iranian 
nationalism was on the rise. The nationalists were concerned 
about the unfavorable effects which the administrative 
disintegration and foreign intervention had upon the 
situation of their own group. For example, the clergy and 
merchants were adversely affected by the Qajar's granting 
concessions, such as that of granting state customs revenues 
to Russia, and the intellectuals were disturbed from an 
ideological viewpoint. 19 More importantly, the intellectuals, 
merchants, and members of the clergy, as nationalists, also 
19cottam, Nationalism in Iran, p. 14. 
17 
held a common goal: the establishment of a constitutional 
monarchy by which they hoped to eliminate the absolutism and 
disorganization of the Qajar rulers. The nationalists 
reasoned that by curtailing the absolutism of the Qajar 
Throne, it would be possible to prohibit further foreign 
. t t' 20 in erven ion. This belief was held because it was the 
Qajar rulers who allowed the foreign powers to acquire such 
influence and interests in Iran. Furthermore, according to 
the nationalists, ridding the country of foreign intervention 
would allow the development of Iran for the benefit of 
Iranians. 
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the 
constitutional movement was active. In their struggle for 
the granting of a constitution, the Iranian nationalists 
turned to Britain for support. Requesting such support from 
Britain did not conflict with the goals of the nationalists, 
for the request did not suggest that the nationalists were 
· 11 · t f f ' ' · 21 wi ing o approve o oreign intervention. Indeed, the 
Iranian nationalists sought British support because, to 
them, the British represented the personification of liberal 
democracy; therefore, it was logical to assume that the 
British would support the implementation of a liberal 
20J. C. Hurewitz, Middle East Politics (New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), p. 268. 
21cottam, Nationalism in Iran, p. 162. 
democratic ideology, along with the establishment of a 
constitutional monarchy in Iran. 
18 
The Iranian nationalists envisioned the British as being 
an "ideological messiah. 11
22 Such a viewpoint was revealed 
in period propaganda, such as a statement made in 1901 in the 
liberal nationalist newspaper, Hahl al-Matin: 
Most of the state:smen of the world who have 
studied political science and have written books 
on the subject have concluded that the best form 
of government is one founded upon the same princi­
ples as is the government of England. 23 
Just as the Iranian nationalists sought British support, 
they detested Russia, for Russia represented despotism. 
Furthermore, the nationalists believed that the Qajar Throne 
and Royal Court were under Russian influence. In essence, 
the distinction which the Iranian nationalists made between 
the British and Russian ideologies was an oversimplification, 
based upon the nationalists' naive belief that "liberal 
democracy was good and was personified by the British 
government; absolute monarchy was bad and was personified by 
Russia. 11 24 
The oversimplified beliefs of the Iranian nationalists 
distorted their perception of British and Russian reactions 
22cottam, Nationalism in Iran, pp. 162-63. · 
23Habl al-Matin [n. p. ], May 25, 1901, cited by Cottam, 
Nationalism in Iran, p. 162. 
24 Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, p. 163. 
19 
to the constitutional movement in Iran. In this regard, it 
was naive of the Iranian nationalists to assume that Britain 
would support the constitutionalists simply on the basis of 
their mutual belief in the ideology of democracy. The 
British were not particularly concerned about the form of 
Iran's government; they were concerned, however, with 
Britain's national interests. During the period of the 
Iranian constitutional movement, the British regarded 
internal stability in Iran as important to Britain's national 
interest, for the British believed that internal stability 
in Iran was essential for safeguarding British political and 
economic interests in Iran. In this regard, as it appeared 
that the granting of a constitutional monarchy would foster 
internal stability in Iran, Britain favored the constitutional 
movement. 
The Russians also favored the granting of a constitution 
in Iran. The Russians regarded such a move as one which 
would tend to bring about internal stability i.n Iran, and the 
Russians felt, as did the British, that internal stability 
in Iran was vital to the preservation of their political and 
economic interests in the country. Indeed, both the British 
and Russian legations recognized the danger which the 
disorganization of the Qajar Court presented to stability in 
Iran, and both legations favored the reforms promised by the 
implementation of a constitution. In this regard, the 
British and Russian Ministers urged the Shah to grant a 
t·t t ' 25 cons 1 u ion. Regarding the subject of the Iranian 
constitutional movement, the �ritish and Russians may have 
differed in some respects, but they were "differences of 
degree and not of kind. 11 26 
20 
Despite obstacles which the nationalists had to 
overcome, a constitution was granted by Mozaffar al-Din ·shah 
(fifth Qajar king, who reigned 1896-1907) on August 5, 1906. 
Among other provisions, the constitution provided for a 
national representative assembly (the Majlis), as well as a 
secular legal system and civil courts, under the Fundamental 
Law of 1906. 27 
The mere granting of the constitution did not remedy the 
disintegrating conditions of the Qajar administration, 
however, as had been hoped by the Iranian nationalists, as 
well as the British and Russians. Indeed, opposition to the 
constitution continued on the part of the Qajar Court and 
other reactionaries. The Qajars did not support the 
constitution, nor did they intend to implement the promised 
reforms. Regarding Britain and Russia, their main concern 
was for internal stability to prevail in Iran, and the 
constant struggle between the Qajars and the nationalists 
25Ibid. 26Ibid. 
27Arnin Banani, The Modernization of Iran, . 1921-1941 
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1961), 
p. 69 ·• 
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perpetuated the unstable situation which Britain and Russia 
wished to settle in protecting their own interests in Iran. 
At t�e same time, Britain and Russia were concerned 
with matters in Europe, especially Germany's activities 
during the first decade of the twentieth century. In order 
to attend to their European concerns, Britain and Russia 
decided to minimize their rivalry outside Europe. With this 
intention, Britain and Russia concluded an agreement in 1907, 
the Anglo-Russian Agreement, by which, without the consent 
of Iran, Iran was divided into spheres of influence. The 
northern section of Iran was to be under Russia's influence, 
the southern section under Britain's influence, and there 
was to be a buffer zone between the two sections.
28 An 
important aspect of the Anglo-Russian Agreement, one which 
limited Iran's autonomy, was that Britain and Russia were to 
maintain internal security in their respective spheres of 
influence, particularly in terms of tribal activities by 
suppressing tribal raids and revolts. In this regard, the 
two powers contributed to internal stability in their 
respective spheres of influence, which was important to the 
operation of their interests. 29 
28 . Th P , Bausani, e ersians, p. 171. 
29 t · 1 · ' I 167 Cottam, Na iona ism in ran, p. . 
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The Anglo-Russian Agreement irritated the Iranian 
nationalists. The nationalists were not surprised by such 
an action by Russia, for they had always distrusted Russia. 
Britain's role in the Agreement, however, shattered the 
idealistic image which the Iranian nationalists had 
previously held toward Britain. The Iranian nationalists 
felt that, while democracy prevailed in Britain, the British 
acted hypocritically toward others. Moreover, the 
nationalists believed that Britain took part in the Agreement 
because the British were more concerned about relations with 
Russia than with the political structure of Iran. Thus, the 
Iranian nationalists replaced the myth of Britain as an 
"ideological messiah" with the belief that Britain was 
h . . l 
30 ypocr1t1ca . Britain's purpose, however, had not been to 
support any given ideology, but to guard British interests 
and to contribute to stability in Iran. A representative of 
the British foreign office proclaimed to Iranians that the 
Anglo-Russian Agreement would help guarantee Iran's 
independence, for it would eliminate Anglo-Russian rivalry 
in Iran; however, the Iranian nationalists feared that 
Britain and Russia would actually move to partition Iran. 31 
During the aftermath of the constitutional movement, 
Britain and Russia maintained their hope that the 
3oibid. , p. 165. 31 b' d 164 I 1 . ,  p. • 
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implementation of the constitution would bring about 
stability in Iran. However, Mohammad Ali Shah (sixth Qajar 
king, who reigned 1907-1909) did not support the constitution 
and the nationalists' struggle continued. In 1908 
Mohammad Ali Shah initiated an attack on the Majlis building, 
and at that point, with the aid of the Persian Cossacks led 
by a Russian Colonel, the nationalists were temporarily 
defeated. 32 According to Iranian nationalists, such action 
represented Russian interference against the nationalists, 
despite Russian claims of noninvolvement. 
While Britain and Russia both favored the implementation 
of the constitution as a means of instituting greater 
internal stability in Iran, in April, 1909 Britain rejected 
Russia's suggestion that both powers exert greater pressure 
upon Mohammad Ali Shah in convincing him to comply with the 
constitution. Apparently the British believed that in the 
event that the Shah disregarded British and Russian pressures, 
the two powers would need to depose the Shah in order to 
maintain their position, an action which would-in all 
probability,.have prolonged the instability and injured 
't'  h ' t t ' I 33 Bri is in eres s in ran. At that point, Britain reversed 
its position to support Mohanunad Ali Shah. First, Britain 
32Hurewitz, Middle East Politics, p. 268. 
33 t '  l' ' I 170 Cottam, Na iona ism in ran, p. 
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recognized that the goals of the nationalists conflicted 
with the aims of the traditionalists, causing continued 
struggling and instability; thus, Britain decided to back 
the traditionalists, hoping that the traditional elements 
would be able to bring about internal stability in Iran. 
Second, Britain resented the hostile and antagonistic 
attitudes of the Iranian nationalists toward Britain 
following the 1907 Anglo-Russian Agreement. Indeed, Britain 
regarded the antagonistic nationalists as extremists, and 
decided not to back them.34 
In searching for a stabilizing element, the British 
decided to support the traditionalists. This prospect was 
not feasible, however, because the existing Qajar 
administration was ill-equipped to bring about stability. 
Almost inunediately Britain's strategy was reversed, and 
Russia and Britain arranged the deposition of. Mohanunad Ali 
Shah in the Tripartite Protocol of September 7, 1909. 
Mohanunad Ali was exiled to Odessa, and his twelve year old 
son Ahmad became Shah (last Qajar king, who reigned, 
1909-1925). In his exile, Mohanunad Ali was to receive a 
sizable yearly pension, as stated in the Tripartite Protocol, 
provided that the ex-Shah did not engage in any political 
34Ibid., p. 180. 
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t
i ' t ' I t 35 ac 1v1 ies agains Iran. The disintegrating administration 
under Mohammad Ali did not have the organization or ability 
to bring about internal security in Iran. With the deposition 
of Mohammad Ali and the organization of a new government, as 
well as British and Russian dominance in their respective 
spheres of influence, the two powers hoped that internal 
stability would be b+ought about. In this regard, the most 
suitable government for Iran, according to Britain and 
Russia, would have been a government strong enough to provide 
internal security, but not strong enough to "challenge the 
privileged Anglo-Russian position 1136 in Iran. In 1911 
Mohammad Ali managed to attack Tehran in an attempt to regain 
his position; however, he was defeated. Although Britain 
and Russia disclaimed any involvement with Mohammad Ali's 
attack, the Iranian nationalists regarded the incident as 
connected with Russian interference. Consequently, the 
nationalists felt that by defeating Mohammad Ali, they had 
asserted their position before Russia.37 
The Iranian nationalists were disheartened with the 
unreformed conditions of the postconstitutional period, for 
the constitutional revolution did not remedy Iran's problems, 
35 Avery, Modern Iran, p. 140. 
36 cottam, Nationalism in Iran, p. 168. 
3? Ibid • , p. 172 • 
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nor did it bring the material progress which the·nationalists 
believed was inherent in constitutional systems. The 
disillusioned nationalists blamed the foreign powers and the 
traditionalists in Iran, for the failure of the constitutional 
movement to solve the country's political, economic,.and 
social problems. The nationalists believed that no reforms 
were being made in Iran because the country was controlled 
by Britain and Russia, as was evidenced by the preponderance 
of the foreign powers in their spheres of influence, as well 
as the obvious foreign intervention in political and economic 
matters in Tehran. Interestingly, the Iranian nationalists 
blamed the unreformed situation upon the inadequacy of the 
Western concepts which were introduced by the constitutional 
revolution; however, the nationalists did not take into 
consideration their own inadequate implementation of the 
38 Western ways. Indeed, following the granting of the 
constitution, there was little improvement in government, 
due not so much to foreign interference, but to the 
ineffectiveness of the central government. 
The nationalists, bitter toward British and Russian 
interference, were only concerned about ridding their 
country of the foreign powers, rather than devoting 
themselves to developing the organization and ability needed 
38Young, "The Problem of Westernization in Modern 
Iran," p. 51. 
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for.the proper administration of Iran. British and Russian 
influence remained in Iran, due to the predominance of the 
two powers in their spheres of influence, as well as the use 
of strategic Iranians to foster British/Russian interests. 
Thus, the Iranian nationalists maintained their belief that 
Britain and Russia actually intended.to colonize Iran. 
Regarding Britain's intentions, Britain's main concern was 
the maintenance of internal stability in Iran, for the 
operation of British concessions and privileges in Iran 
depended upon a stable situation in the country. Russia's 
intentions were basically the same as those of Britain; 
however, Russia maintained that, due to turbulence in 
northern Iran, Russia needed to retain troops in its sphere 
f O fl I d I t 1 I t 
39 h I o in uence in or er to ensure in erna securi y. T is 
action made Iranians suspicious about Russia's intentions 
toward Iran. 
With the outbreak of World War I, the Iranians exhibited 
their bitter attitude toward British and Russian interference, 
for in both the British and Russian spheres of influence, the 
Iranian nationalists revealed their pro-German attitudes. 
Among government members in Tehran there was considerable 
pro-German support, which irritated Russia. Russian troops 
marched into Tehran. The Iranian go�ernment resigned and 
39cottam, Nationalism in Iran, pp. 178-79. 
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was succeeded by governments which were easily manipulated 
by Britain and Russia.
40 British and Russian positions in 
Iran were such that Iran's declaration of neutrality was 
ignored and foreign military bases were established in Iran 
during World War I. 
Anglo-Russian interference in the political .and 
economic matters·of Iran continued, for the weak administra­
tion of Iran permitted it, and the privileges and interests 
of the two foreign powers were maintained. The turning 
point was reached, however, with two developments regarding 
Russia and Britain. First, Russian policy toward Iran was 
altered by the Bolshevik Revolution, for in 1918 Soviet 
Russia renounced the concessions and privileges held in Iran 
by Tsarist Russia. Indeed, the Soviets proposed to have a 
new relationship with Iran, and discussions toward a 
Soviet-Persian agreement began by 1920. 
Meanwhile, Britain's influence in Iran increased, and 
culminated in the Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919.41 The 
weak 9entral government of Iran accepted the Anglo-Persian 
Agreement, an action which provided the impetus for the 
revival of the nationalist movement, for the terms of the 
Anglo-Persian Agreement infuriated the Iranian nationalists. 
4oibid., p. 179. 
41 · Th M d 
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The Agreement stipulated that Iran's government services 
would be reorganized by British specialists; the Iranian 
army would be trained by British officers, a loan would be 
provided for Iran, and roads and railroads would be built. 42 
As such, the implementation of the Anglo-Persian Agreement 
would have made Iran a type of British protectorate, for the 
political, military, and economic life of Iran would have 
been overseen by Britain. In view of the acceptance of the 
Anglo-Persian Agreement, the political weakness of the Qajar 
administration was exemplified, as was the preponderance of 
Britain's influence in Iran. 
Regarding the role of foreign powers in Iran during the 
Qajar period, the contribution of Britain and Russia to 
instability/stability during that period may be viewed from 
two angles. First, the two powers were eager for the 
institution of internal stability in Iran in order to 
safeguard their own political privileges and the smooth 
operation of their concessions in the country. The 
preponderance of their political and economic position in 
Iran, however, was a basis for agitation between the 
Qajar Court (which allowed the foreign powers to take 
advantage of Iran's economic resources), and the Iranian 
nationalists (who wanted to develop Iran for Iranians). In 
42cottam, Nationalism in Iran, p. 18. 
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this sense, the.foreign powers contributed to the continual 
struggle in Iran, and consequently, to the prevalence of 
internal instability. 
Secondly, the initial rivalry between Britain and Russia 
provided for the maintenance of Iran's independence, for, 
not wishing to chance a war with the other power, neither 
Britain nor Russia would dare to colonize Iran. In another 
sense, Russia and Britain contributed to internal stability 
in Iran,.following the 1907 Anglo-Russian Agreement, for 
Britain and Russia maintained internal security within their 
respective spheres of influence,.which was necessary as a 
stabilizing element. 
Regarding the position of foreign influence in Iran, 
the 1919 Anglo-Persian Agreement may be viewed as the main 
factor in reviving the resentment of the nationalists toward 
British interference in Iran. Indeed, if Iran were to regain 
its integrity, decisive action was needed at that point. If 
the nationalists allowed the disintegrated Qajar Throne to 
turn Iran over to a foreign power, in effect, the opportunity 
to restore the sovereignty of Iran might never be present 
again. 
While the sting of the Anglo-Persian Agreement was 
sharp enough to revive the nationalists, in order to 
successfully rid the country of the decayed administration 
and foreign dominance, the movement needed a strong leader. 
31 
The man capable of fulfilling this calling was Reza Khan, an 
officer in the-Persian Cossack Brigade, who was ashamed of 
the situation of his once proud country, and who was 
decidedly opposed to the Anglo-Persian Agreement. Reza Khan 
was dissatisfied with the absence of law and order, the 
declining power, effectiveness, and independence of the 
central government, and, as a devoted soldier, he was 
concerned about the military weakness of the country due to 
the absence of a unified national army. Moreover, Reza Khan 
and the other Iranian officers of the Persian Cossack Brigade 
43 resented the foreign domination of their country. 
In this regard, Reza Khan first planned to rid the 
Persian Cossack Brigade of the Russian officers who still 
conunanded the force. By 1920, Reza Khan had accomplished his 
plan, thus making the Brigade a truly Iranian force, and 
Reza Khan gained the conunand of the Brigade. At that point, 
Sayyed Zia al-Din Tabatabai, a nationalist journalist, was 
plapning a coup d'etat to eliminate the ineffective 
government, and Reza Khan was willing to provide the Brigade 
as the necessary force for a successful coup d'etat. On 
February 21, 1921, Reza Khan led the Cossack Brigade into 
Tehran, met little resistance, and occupied the capital. A 
new government was formed, with Sayyed Zia as Prime Minister 
43Ramesh Sanghvi, Ar;g111ehr: The Shah of Iran (New York: Stein and Day, 1968), p. l. 
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and Reza Khan as Conunander of the Armed Forces. The new 
government asserted its position by quickly, and signifi­
cantly, nullifying the 1919 Anglo-Persian
.
Agreement. Next, 
the new government signed a Soviet-Persian Agreement in which 
Soviet Russia, among other provisions, confirmed its 
repudiation of the privileges which had been held in Iran by 
T . t . 44 saris Russia. These decisive moves clarified that Iran 
intended to maintain a position of equality with the foreign 
powers. In addition, they revealed that, internally, the 
control of Iran would be under the new government, while the 
Qajar Throne, which was not removed by the coup d'etat, would 
be accorded only a nominal position. 
Within a short time, the ambitions of Sayyed Zia and 
Reza Khan clashed. Most notable among their differences was 
Sayyed Zia's apparent receptiveness to British influence, 
especially regarding British influence over Iran's armed 
forces. Reza Khan, on the other hand, was determined to 
eliminate foreign interference, to develop Iran, and to make 
the country truly independent. In April, 1921, Sayyed Zia 
was discharged from the position of Prime Minister and exiled 
to Baghdad. At that point Reza Khan could have assumed the 
position of Prime Minister; however, he decided to accept 
the position of Minister of War, and to concentrate his 
44 Avery, Modern Iran, p. 246. 
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efforts on one of his main concerns, namely bringing the 
tribal raids and revolts under control. At that early time, 
Reza Khan was regarded by many as the one person capable of 
establishing internal security in Iran.45 
Understandably, the goals and achievements of Reza Khan 
during the e�rly 1920s, aided in his rise to power. 
Moreover, the policies of Reza Khan were needed by Iran at 
that time. His son, Mohanunad Reza Shah Pahlavi, wrote of his 
father: 
It seems that the era, the people, and the 
pecessities of a nation demand that at a certain 
time the right man be found in a particular 
position: such a man as will profoundly affect the 
fate of a country and modify the course of 
history.46 
Indeed, Reza Khan had begun to bring about changes in Iran. 
One of Reza Khan's early achievements was the 
establishment of a national army, w hich was vital to the 
security of Iran; moreover, many of Reza Khan's 
accomplishments were closely related to the successful 
organization of a unified national army. For example, 
Reza Khan was able to bring about his early achievements by 
establishing martial law, which made the Minister of War the 
45oonald N. Wilber, Contemporary Iran (New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 70. 
46Mohanunad Reza Shah Pahlavi, Mission for My Country 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), p. 38. 
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chief authority in the country. During Reza Khan's rise, 
his suppression of tribal revolts, and his revival of 
governmental authority caused the British to realize that 
Reza Khan was the person capable of bringing about internal 
b ' l ' t . 47 sta 1 1 y in Iran. 
During Reza Khan's term as Minister of War, it was 
apparent that the organizational changes which were brought 
about were the result of Reza Khan's planning and action. 
Ahmad Shah (the last Qajar king), who had always been a 
powerless king, realized that his reign as. Shah might soon 
be ending; thus, in October, 1923 he appointed Reza Khan as 
Prime Minister, and made the Crown Prince regent, and 
Ahmad Shah went to Europe, where he remained. 48 
About the same time, in Turkey Mustafa Kemal and the 
nationalist movement that he led had declared Turkey a 
republic. This development interested Reza Khan and a number 
of reformist intellectuals in Iran,.who discussed the 
possibility of dissolving the Dynasty and·making Iran a 
republic. As the rumor of making Iran.a republic spread, 
favorable as well as unfavorable reactions were voiced. The 
most audible protests came from the clergy who were afraid 
that such a change would do away with their privileged role 
47Avery, Modern Iran, pp. 259-60. 
48Ibid. , p. 264. 
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under the monarchy. The abolition of the Caliphate by the 
Turkish Republic frightened the clergy further, for they 
feared that Iran would follow Turkey's example and become a 
secularized republic. Meanwhile, the rise in Reza Khan's 
popularity was matched by the intense decline in the 
popularity of the Qajars. Thus, on.October 31, 1925, the 
Majlis deposed Ahmad Shah, ended the Qajar Dynasty, and 
placed the control of·the provisional government under 
Reza Khan. 
Discussions concerning the form of government to be 
established in Iran continued. In consideration of the 
clergy's strong protests against the establishment of a 
republic, Reza Khan consulted the high religious dignitaries, 
who, in their fear of possible secularization under a 
republic, advised Reza Khan that a republic would be contrary 
to Islam. In view of this belief, as well as the fact that 
Reza Khan had concluded·that Iran should retain the monarchy, 
the discussion of establishing a republic ended. In 
December,. 1925, the Constituent Assembly revised article 36 
of the Supplement to the Constitution, and designated 
Reza Khan as the Shah of Iran by stating: 
The Constitutional·Monarchy of Iran is vested by 
the Constituent Assembly, on behalf of the nation, 
in the person of his Majesty, the Shaha�§hah . � 
Reza Shah Pahlavi,,and shall remain in his male· 
progeny generation after generation. 49 
36 
Thus ended the disintegrated reign of the Qajar Dynasty 
in Iran. More importantly, with the establishment of the 
new Dynasty, the Pahlavi, came the beginning of a new era in 
Iran. 
In. summarizing the situation of Iran in terms of 
instability/stability during the Qajar period, it is 
important to note that the Qajars were incapable of providing 
a stabilizing force in Iran. First, the country was 
disunified, for throughout the expansive realm, the people 
felt more aligned to their respective ethnic group, tribe, 
or region than to the nation-as a whole or its central 
institutions. Indeed, the disunity overlapped into 
insecurity, for the various tribes raided one another and 
pillaged the villages. The Qajars were unable to inspire 
loyalty to the central government, particularly because the 
Qajars were regarded as Turkish conquerors by the Iranians, 
who felt no loyalty to such rulers. The Qajars were further 
handicapped because they did not have a unified national 
army capable of controlling troublesome activities and 
exerting governmental authority throughout the provinces. 
Thus, the prevalent insecurity contributed to the instability 
49 Iran, .The Constitution of 1906 and Its Su lement 
{Tehran:. [n. n. , n. d. ], p. 29, cite by Banan1, The 
Modernization of Iran, 1921-1941, P� 43. 
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of the period. The Qajars remained on the Throne because 
there was no other force·able to take over, and, because of 
the initial reign of terror of the founding_ Qajars, the 
Iranians feared the atrocities which the Qatar Throne was 
capable of performing. 
A progressive decline took place within the Qajar 
Dynasty, particularly due to the administrative ineptitude 
of the Qajars, for they were not concerned with establishing 
an efficient administrative organization in Iran . Indeed, 
administrative-wise , the country was in chaos during the 
Qajar reign. In view of the political and economic chaos, 
the Qajars looked for other sources of revenue for themselves, 
for they were unable to manage . the development of Iran's 
resources as a means of establishing national financial 
security. Consequently, the Qajars sold concessions in Iran 
to foreign - powers, and received in return funds which they 
used for their own pleasure. Indeed , the Qajars were willing 
to se1ll Iran's valuable resources for returns which were not 
favorable to Iran; however, the Qajars were · satisfied with 
funds that were sufficient for their personal u�e c 
The interference of foreign powers, primarily Britain 
and Russia, became a major source of controversy in Iran , 
for groups of nationalists opposed the Qajars' policy of 
· allowing foreign powers to take advantage of Iran, politically 
and economically. Iran was being sold, piece by piece, to 
. .  
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Britain and Russia, and the preponderance of the two powers 
in the country was overriding. In essence, the sovereignty 
of Iran was weakened and the nationalists feared that 
Britain and Russia might even partition Iran. �y 1918 the 
interference of Russia seemed to be subsiding, for Soviet 
Russia renounced the privileges in Iran held by Tsarist 
Russia. Britain's influence increased, however, culminating 
in the 1919 Anglo-Persian Agreement ·. This action was 
intolerable to Iranian nationalists, who refused to accept 
the Qajars' allowing Iran to become a British protectorate. 
The Qajar administration was too weak to maintain internal 
stability in Iran, and they were unable, or unwilling, to 
guard the sovereignty of Iran before foreign powers . The 
nationalists, however, were unwilling to allow the Qajars 
to destory Iran ; therefore, the nationalists mobilized a 
coup d'etat in 1921, and effectively took control of the 
country. Even this action was not enough, for the Qajars, 
although impotent, remained on the Throne, and the Qajars 
represented the ills brought upon Iran, for the Qajars and 
their supporters had allowed Iran's situation to disintegrate 
politically and economically. The ending of the Qajar 
Dynasty in - October, 1925, was the ending of a deteriorated 
and unstable period in Iran's history. The establishment 
of the Pahlavi Dynasty in December, 1925, was the beginning 
of a new and promising era . for Iran's future. 
CHAPTER II 
THE MODERNIZATION OF IRAN UNDER REZA SHAH, 
1926-1941 
On April 25, 1926, the formal coronation of Reza Shah 
Pahlavi took place, during which Reza Shah crowned himself, 
and his young son, Mohammad Reza was proclaimed Crown Prince. 
From then onward, Reza Shah's philosophy and goals of 
reforming the country became more apparent and increasingly 
implemented in various aspects of government and society. 
The overriding goal of Reza Shah was the reform and 
modernization of his country, such that Iran would be 
deveioped from within, and would - become independent of 
foreign powers. The most outstanding aspects of Reza Shah's 
philosophy which made the reforms possible were secularization 
and nationalism. Though the nationalist spirit had existed 
in Iran from earlier times, Reza Shah was the first leader 
to unify the facets of Iranian nationalism into a single 
force; furthermore, Reza Shah's nationalism was driven by 
his pride in the pre-Islamic glory of Iran, and his belief 
that the Iranian people would achieve such glory again. 1 
1Ramesh Sanghvi, Aryamehr: The Shah of Iran (New York: 
Stein and Day, 1968), p .  5 0 .  
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Reza Shah's nationalist ideal set forth the goal of 
ending Iran's dependence upon foreign states, as well as 
ending foreign interference in Iran. In the modernization 
of his country, however, Reza Shah realized that Iran needed 
to adopt certain aspects of Western technology and material 
progress; therefore, 1 he planned to incorporate those 
aspects. 2 However, ln order to obtain Western technology 
and material progress, Iran needed to rely on foreign 
advisors and technicians, and their presence allowed for 
renewed foreign interference in Iran. Therefore, in his 
determination to make Iran truly independent of foreign 
powers, Reza Shah made it clear that the foreign advisors 
and technicians were only assistants in the country. 
Reza Shah decided to use the foreign assistants only until 
Iranians had acquired the technical and administrative 
abilities to maintain a modernized country. 
Reza Shah sought to modernize Iran through a vast series 
of reforms which he initiated during his reign . The first 
major reform initiated by Reza Shah was the establishment of 
a unified national army, for he viewed this as a prerequisite 
to the achievement of his other main goals . Reza Shah had 
started to reform the army while he was Minister of War, and 
2Amin Banani, The Modernization of Iran, 1921-1941 
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1961), 
p. 49. 
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the maintenance of the army remained a priority project 
throughout his reign as Shah. Reza Shah corrected the 
inadequacies of the former system of separate armed units by 
uniting the forces under one national system, and by 
regulating supply and payment of the troops which had 
formerly been unorganized. Reza Shah realized that a modern 
national army would be needed in modernizing Iran; in this 
regard, modern training was needed for the army; thus, 
Western professionals were employed to train an officer 
corps, and a number of officer trainees were sent to Western 
military academies. 3 In 1925, Reza Shah initiated the 
Military Conscription Law ; which required a set number of 
years of service to the state by all males over twenty-one. 
One major effect of universal military service was to 
introduce young men from the tribes and rural areas to urban 
4 
ways and to the nationalist plans of Reza Shah. The reformed 
military became important in Reza Shah's program of 
centralizing and unifying the country. The military provided 
the security needed, for, as a political and military 
element, Reza Shah's army was able to maintain the central 
government's authority throughout the country. 5 Th�s, in 
3John Marlowe, Iran (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 
1963), p. 60. 
4B anani, The Modernization of Iran, 1921-1941, p. 56 . 
5Ibid. , p. 57. 
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time, the military became a stabilizing element in the 
country. In creating the unified national army, Reza Shah 
had disbanded the separate armed units and thereby eliminated 
the influence which Russia and Britain had exerted over 
particular armed units, namely, the Persian Cossack Brigade 
and the South Persian Rifles. With the establishment of the 
national army, Reza Shah turned his attention to the reform 
and modernization of other facets of political, economic 
and social life in Iran. 
Following the establishment of a national army, 
Reza Shah attended to the reform of the civil administration. 
The reorganization of the civil administration at the local, 
provincial, and central government levels, was vital to the 
management of the country, and to reviving the country from 
the administrative chaos of the Qajar regimes. Administrative 
reforms were first initiated in 1922 (while the Qajars were 
still nominally on the Throne, but the nationalists were in 
control of the government), with the reorganization of the 
Civil Service. The new Civil Service required an - entrance 
00 
examination and specific qualifications, and regulated 
promotions and salaries. The revised Civil Service was an 
improvement over the former arbitrarily run system, for the 
reforms helped to reduce the inefficiency of the Civil 
Service and favoritism in employment . Other administrative 
revisions included the 193 0 reform of the functions and 
' 
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sources of revenue for the administration and municipal 
governments, with the stipulation that city revenue was for 
use on local projects.6 In addition, the impractical 
geographic and administrative divisions of the country were 
reorganized in 1937, providing for more orderly management 
of the country. Traditionally, the country had been divided 
into four large sections (ayalat-ha), which were subdivided 
into many small sections (valayat-ha). The reform provided 
a more manageable division, for it created ten main sections 
(ostan-ha) of the country, whic h were each divided into 
several smaller sections (shahrestan-ha), and each shahrestan 
was divided into a number of small sections (bakhsh-ha) •7 
Another aspect of reform concerned the conditions of 
political parties, for at that time, there were no real 
political parties with defined programs. There were small 
groups of Majlis (national representative assembly) deputies 
who held a common interest, but these were short term 
interest groups, not actual political partiess8 Reza Shah 
realized that in order to reach the people.with his 
nationalist ideas, an organized political party would be 
needed; thus, Reza Shah helped to establish political parties 
6Ibid., pp. 59-60. 7 Ibid. , p. 6 0 • 
8Peter Avery, Modern Iran (London: Ernest Benn, 1965), 
p. 271. 
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and designated several high governmental officials to direct 
them. 
By 1927, there were four active political parties; 
however, they survived only several months. In 1939, 
however, the Society to Guide Public Opinion (Sazoman 
Parvarish-i-Afkar) was founded as a means of informing the 
people about the government's plans, gaining support for the 
government, and promotin·g nationalism. The Society to Guide 
Public Opinion had conunittees throughout the country which 
distributed materials and talked to the people about the 
government ' s  plans. The Society told the people to become 
involved with the interests of the country. The Society 
promoted favorable public opinion toward the government and 
was successful in reaching the people with the ideals of 
reform and modernization. 9 Familiarizing the people with 
the goals of reform facilitated the implementation of 
modernization, for the plans were made understandable, and 
hence more acceptable to the people. In this regard, the 
Society served a stabilizing function, by helping to reduce 
misunderstandings during the modernization period. 
One major aspect of Reza Shah's program was the reform 
of the judicial system, which replaced the traditional 
system with modern judicial concepts. In this regard, the 
9oonald N. Wilber, Contemporary Iran (New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 76. 
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main areas dealt with were the secularization of the Law, 
the creation of civil courts, and the abolition of 
capitulations. The reform of the traditional system of 
jurisdiction was vital in the modernization of Iran, for 
Iran's system of Law was that of the Shiite sect of Islam; 
consequently, the traditional legal system was dominated by 
the clergy. The reactionary clergy hindered the progress of 
Iran due to their rigid interpretation of Islamic dogma, 
which conflicted with modern trends and practices. Thus, 
Reza · Shah's judicial reforms were motivated by two goals: 
first, to institute a modern and efficient legal system 
organized according to modern standards, and second, to 
weaken the powerful influence of the clergy. 
Reducing the influence of the clergy in the judicial 
system was a difficult task. The Islamic system of Law was 
based upon the code of Holy Law (Shariat) in the Koran, which 
dealt with personal and community matters. The Shariat was 
considered to be Divine Revelations ; consequently, religious 
scholars were required to interpret the codes and make legal 
decisions, and the clergy were, therefore, the traditional 
legal authorities. During the constitutional movement in 
Iran, eyen those members of the clergy who favored the 
introduction of a constitution nevertheless protected the 
position of the Shariat, and their own legal authority, by 
using their influence to include in the constitution a 
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provision stating that all new laws were to be in accord 
with Islam, and to be approved by the · ulema (respected 
theologians) •10 The position of the clergy was further 
protected by the Fundamental Law of 1906, for it stipulated 
that the authority of the clergy in legal matters was to be 
maintained � Although the constitutionalists attempted to 
reform the judicial system by creating a civil code during 
the latter part of the Qajar period, they were not successful 
in practice, due to the ineffectiveness of the government, 
the strong opposition of the clergy, and the lack of persons 
qualified to tend a modernized legal system. 11 
In view of the predominant legal authority of the 
clergy, an effective modernization of the legal system would 
have been possible only under a strong government capable of 
defeating the religious opposition. Reza Shah possessed the 
strength and determination to modernize Iran's judicial 
system, particularly by dislodging the clergy from the legal 
arena, and by abolishing the system of capitulations. 
Defeating the clergy was difficult, in view of their 
influence and the justification of their legal authority in 
the constitution. Thus, in order to reduce the legal 
influence of the clergy, the government modified the 
10Banani, The Modernization of Iran , 1921-1941, p. 70. 
11Ibid. 
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constitution such that the government was given " greater 
freedom in _the rotation and removal of judges. " 12 This 
action enabled the government to exert greater control over 
the personnel of the legal system, and hence to limit the 
role of the clergy in the system. 
Reza Shah was increasingly successful in affecting 
legal reforms. For example, state courts, not shariat 
courts, were given the dominant position in legal authority, 
and in 1926, a new Penal Code further decreased the legal 
role of the Shariat. In 1927, a new Ministry of Justice was 
established with a number of European educated officials 
1 3  assuming positions formerly held by the clergy. 
One of the most important enactments of the period was 
the new Civil Code, for it was established to effectively 
break the influence of the Shariat courts, and to abolish 
the system of capitulations, whid1 Reza Shah 'regarded as 
insulting to the sovereignty of Iran. In preparing the new 
!�; , ·, 
Civil Code of Iran, a translation of the Civil Code of 
France supplied a modern system of jurisprudence. However, 
in religious matters, or those concerning personal status, 
such as marriage, divorce, and family life, a secularized 
version of the principles of the Shariat was used. 14 In 
May, 1928, the first volume of the new Civil Code was 
12 Ibid . , p • 7 6 • 1 3 Ibid. , p. 7 0 . 
14 b' d 71 I 1 . ,  p .  • 
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enacted. · The new Civil Code modernized and secularized the 
legal system of Iran, thereby serving two main functions: 
first, breaking the influence of the clergy and Shariat 
courts in legal matters, and second, abolishing the system 
of capitulations, thus rendering foreign nationals in Iran 
subject to Iranian jurisdiction. Indeed, this served to 
assert Iran ' s  position before foreign states. 
The remnants of clerical influence in Iran's judicial 
system were removed in 1936, for an enactment of the Majlis 
required judges to have a degree from Tehran Faculty of 
Law, or a foreign university with at least three years of 
legal study. 15 Since most of the ulema {theologians) did 
not hold these qualifications, the clergy was effectively 
removed from the legal arena. It must be noted that 
Reza Shah was determined to terminate the clergy's control 
of the legal system because the clergy's reactionary 
interpretation of the Islamic system of beliefs prevented 
the introduction of a modern legal system. Moreover, Iran 
needed a modern secularized judicial system to provide for 
the legal needs of modern day Iranians and to provide a basis 
upon which the system of capitulations could be abolished, 
for foreign powers · had insisted that their nationals in Iran 
could not be subject to Iran ' s  traditional Islamic legal 
15 Ibid. , p. 73. 
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system. Thus, Reza Shah and his reformists were not opposed 
to religion, as such, but they were opposed to the 
interference of religious authorities in legal and political 
matters. 
In this respect, Reza Shah had been successful in 
overcoming the strong influence of the clergy by approaching 
the matter from different angles; that is, he weakened the 
position of the clergy in several areas. Reza Shah's 
dislodgement of the clergy from the legal arena has been 
described above. A second area in which Reza Shah effectively 
weakened the position of the clergy was their financial 
situation. Reza Shah secularized the religious endowments 
(waqfs) which traditionally had provided the clergy with a 
considerable amount of land and wealth. Thus, the clergy 
lost the wealth and power formerly provided by the waqfs, 
and many clerics needed to obtain lay positions, or state 
aid.16 Reza Shah used the wealth of the secularized waqfs 
for reforming the educational system of Iran. The position 
of the clergy was also weakened by the modernization of the 
educational system, for the clergy had controlled the 
traditional system of education in Iran, but they were not 
qualified to maintain a position in the reformed system. 
16william s. Hass, Iran (New York: Columbia University 
·Press, 1946; rpt.· New York: AMS Press, 1966), p. 157. 
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The reform of Ira�'s educational system was a vital area 
of Reza Shah's modernization program. Reza Shah realized 
that in order for the efforts toward modernization to be 
appreciated by the Iranians, the Iranian masses would have 
to be educated. The people needed the fundamentals of 
education in order to function in the modernized societye 
The situation of education in Iran was an obstacle, for the 
illiteracy rate was high, and the traditional system of 
education in the country was rudimentary. Traditionally, 
basic education was ' controlled by the clergy, and was limited 
to bright boys, thus eliminating females and less talented 
boys. In order to receive a higher level of education 
students needed to go to a private tutor, and beyond this 
level there were only seminaries for those studying for the 
clergy. 17 Modern systems of education were introduced to 
Iran in - the nineteenth century by foreign religious 
missionaries and founders of military schools. The presence 
of these schools did inspire the establishment of such 
schools by Iranians. The country was in political and 
economic decline at that time, however, and major reforms 
I d t •  d.1.' d t t k 1 d I th Q I 
O d 18 1.n e uca 1.on no a e p ace ur.1.ng e aJar per.1.0 . 
As a result, the clergy, who protested the introduction of 
17aanani, The Modernization of Iran, 1921-1941, P o  66. 
18Ibid. , p. 89. 
Western educational methods, maintained their control over 
education, and the income which it provided for them. 
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With the accession of Reza Shah, the reform of the 
educational system, including the establishment of a state 
school system throughout the country, became a major project. 
Under Reza Shah a reorganized Ministry of Education brought 
about such reforms as the organization of the various school 
facilities into one educational system, increased educational 
funds, establishment of teachers' trai�ing colleges, and 
employment benefits for teachers. 19 Organizing one 
educational system included bringing the foreign missionary 
schools and Iranian private schools under the supervision of 
the Ministry of Education. This action served to provide a 
uniform school program, as well as a unified educational 
system. In addition, it allowed Reza Shah to assert the 
sovereignty of Iran by regulating foreign schools in the 
20 country. 
Another important aspect of educational reform during 
Reza Shah's reign was the introduction of adult education 
programs in 1936. Reza Shah recognized the importance of 
the education of the population to the modernization of the 
country, for education was a means of reaching the population 
19Avery, Modern Iran, p. 275 : and Banani, The 
Modernization of Iran, 1921-1941, p. 94. 
20 Avery, Modern Iran, p. 278. 
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with· the ideals of modernization and nationalism. The first 
year of the adult education program included courses in 
reading, writing, the history and geography of Iran, hygiene, 
and ethics, and the second year included arithmetic, poetry, 
and practical studies, such as agricultural machinery and 
electricity. 21 By instituting adult education programs, 
Reza Shah was able to reach a substantial segment of the 
population. 
Reza Shah's educational reforms also included the 
establishment· of technical colleges, founded by the various 
ministries of the government, and the establishment of the 
provision that any foreign concessionaire must assist Iranian 
citizens in ·acquiring the education needed for the operation 
of that concession. 22 In this manner, Reza Shah was assuring 
the preparation of Iranians for the independent development 
and maintenance of their country, which would progressively 
eliminate the reliance upon foreigners for technical and 
scientific innovations. In addition, a number of students 
were annually sent abroad to acquire Western training and 
concepts. Upon their return home, these students were 
helpful in spreading ·a knowledge of Western technology and 
21Banani, The Modernization of Iran, 1921-1941, p. 104 $ 
22Avery, Modern Iran, p. 279 ; and Banani, The 
Modernization of Iran, 1921-1941, p. 98. 
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customs through their exposure to other Iranians who had not 
gone abroad. Another high point in the · modernization of 
education was the establishment of the University of Tehran 
in 1935 . The university provided a modern education for 
students within Iran, and these students further spread the 
ideas of modernization and nationalism among their fellow 
Iranians, often by speaking at community meetings. 23 The 
educational reforms were Reza Shah's method of providing the 
Iranian people with modern concepts; moreover, the expansion 
of education brought the ideas of nationalism to the 
population, thereby instilling a sense of unity in the 
Iranian people. In addition, the education of the people 
made them more capable of managing the various matters of the 
country, which reduced the dependence on foreign personnel 
and provided a stabilizing force against the interference of 
foreign states. 
One of the areas which greatly benefited from the 
reforms of Reza Shah's reign was the condition of public 
health in Iran. Before Reza Shah, only the foreign 
missionaries . tended to matters of public health . In their 
indifference toward concepts of public health, the Qajar 
authorities did not enforce laws dealing with it. Moreover, 
the lack of physicians and medical facilities, as well as 
23Banani, The Modernization of Iran, 1921-1941, p .. 105. 
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superstitions instilled by the · reactionary clergy, were 
obstacles to suitable public health conditions during the 
Qajar per�od. Under Reza Shah, decisive reforms in public 
health conditions were· made and enforced. For example, the 
Pasteur Institute was established to carry out research and 
public health projects. In addition, meat and food 
production were regulated ; also, standards for licensing 
physicians were enforced, and a medical school was 
established in Tehran. Moreover, by weakening the influence 
of the clergy, some of the superstitious obstacles to public 
health treatment were overcome ; and programs for treating 
and controlling communicable diseases were established. 24 
The reforms in public health were important in improving 
the standards of health and hygiene in the country. In 
addition, the people were reached with modern concepts on 
personal and community health care ; the medical facilities 
were improved, and the quality and number of physicians 
increased. These reforms were important aspects of the 
modernization of Iran, for a chronically unhealthy population 
would have been unable to contribute to the overall operation 
of a modernized state. 
Another vital area which was reformed during Reza Shah's 
reign was the economic situation of the country. Ira�'s 
24Ibid. , pp. 62-64. 
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economy was one of the country's weakest points at the time 
of Reza Shah's accession, for the inefficient Qajar rulers 
had not developed the economic administration of Iran, and 
they had allowed . the foreign powers to take advantage of 
Iran's economic resources. Reza Shah planned to revive the 
ailing economy. One of the first steps was employing the 
American team of financial experts led by Arthur Millspaugh, 
to reorganize Iran's economic situation by instituting a 
system for tax collection, centralizing the treasury, 
attracting foreign capital to Iran, and creating viable 
legislation dealing with the revival of Iran's economy. 
Millspaugh's programs raised the revenue which Reza Shah 
needed to carry out the reform of the military system and to 
establish internal security. Mil.lspaugh' s programs succeeded 
in nearly balancing Iran's budget for the year 1923-1924, by 
implementing an effective system of taxation, which was his 
most memorable achievement in Iran e 25 After Millspaugh's 
mission ended in 1927, other financial advisors from foreign 
states were employed by Iran ; however, none held the 
influence of Millspaugh and his team. 26 
One far reaching aspect of economic reform was the 
founding of the Bank Melli Iran (National Bank of Iran) in 
25 Avery, Modern Iran, p. 262. 
�6Banani, The Modernization of Iran, 1921-1941, p . 117. 
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1927, for up to that time the banks in Iran had been British 
or Russian concessions • . Thus, establishing the Bank Melli 
Iran was another means of decreasing foreign dominance in 
the country. Another achievement- was the establishment of 
an Economic Committee which encouraged· economic advancement 
through governmental and private projects in communications 
and transportation. In addition, attempts were made to 
reach the Iranian people with modern economic concepts 
concerning savings and investments, for most of the people 
tended to hoard any ·savings, rather than put their money into 
circulation. Some people, however, did put their money into 
buying land, the symbol of secure wealth. Taking this into 
conside�ation, the government began selling state lands to 
the people, and in· this way, acquired revenue for the state e
27 
The . economic reforms concerning foreign trade, such as 
Iran's declaration of tariff autonomy and the introduction 
of state control on foreign trade and foreign exchange, 
favorably affected the economy of Iran, and also served to 
increase Iran's freedom from the economic interference of 
foreign powers. The declaration of tariff autonomy also 
served to assert Iran's position internationally. Formerly, 
Iran did not control its own tariff duties, for the 1828 
Treaty of Turkomanchai had imposed upon Iran a near free 
2 7  Avery, Modern Iran, pp. 307-09. 
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trade·policy regarding Russian goods ; that is, Iran could 
levy only a nominal customs tariff on Russian imports. In 
addition, in the early 1900s, the Qajar regime granted a 
concession to Russia in which the Russians receive� the 
revenue from Iran's customs. These arrangements prevented 
Iran from controlling its tariff policies and from receiving 
the customs revenue. In 1928, however, the declaration of 
tariff autonomy asserted Iran's independence of foreign 
domination and provided an important source · of revenue for 
28 Iran. 
Additional improvements in Iran's position in foreign 
trade · were introduced in 1931. Formerly, Iran was 
disadvantaged by the fact that Britain exported a great deal 
to Iran but imported little from Iran, and from the fact that 
Iran depended upon the Soviet Union as the main importer of 
Iranian produce. Thus, the Soviet Union was able to dictate 
trade policies with· which Iran was required to comply in 
order to avoid losing the Soviet market. In 1920, the 
Soviet Union had established a state foreign trade monopoly 
(the state acted as the controlling agent in foreign trade) ; 
however, countries bordering the Soviet Union from the 
Black Sea to Mongolia were exempt from this restriction. 
As a result, Iranian merchants had direct access to Soviet 
28Banani, The Modernization of Iran, 1921-1941, p. 116. 
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markets. The Soviet Union, however, ended this privilege 
for Eastern merchants in 1930. In order to adjust to the 
new Soviet policy, and to initiate government management of 
trade , Iran established its own foreign trade monopoly in 
the form of governmental regulation through control of 
quantities and requiring import and export licenses. At the 
same time, Iran established foreign exchange controls. 29 
It was hoped that state control of foreign exchange would 
foster economic independence and a favorable balance of 
trade for Iran. 30 
Reforming Iran's economic situation was an integral 
part of the modernization program of . Reza Shah's period. 
The economic solvency achieved by Millspaugh's financial 
reforms provided revenue for internal reforms. Moreover, 
Iran was able to eliminate British and Russian domination 
of the country through establishing governmental control over 
vital economic functions, such as tariff administration, 
foreign trade and foreign exchange. 
One of the areas in which reforms were initiated during 
Reza Shah's reign was agriculture. Such reforms were 
primarily in the introduction of modern agricultural 
techniques, and the development of agricultural land. The 
agricultural reforms of the 1930s, however, affected only a 
29Ibid. , pp. 129- 31� 
3oibid. , pp. 130- 31. 
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small percentage of the agricultural sector and mainly 
benefited the landowners. Agricultural improvements resulted 
from the use of modern machinery and· modern methods of pest 
control, animal breeding, and soil conservation. Assistance 
in agricultural projects was provided by the Industrial and 
Agricultural Bank, founded in 1937. Agricultural and veterinary 
advancements were encouraged, from 1929 on, by the 
Agricultural College at Karaj, and the Veterinary Institute 
founded at Hisarak in 1939. 31 
Despite the introduction of modern agricultural methods, 
one important aspect of agriculture which was not reformed 
during Reza Shah's reign was the traditional land tenure 
system. The traditional land tenure system was a type of 
feudalism in which most of the peasants lived o n  the land 
which they cultivated for the landowner, and the peasants 
received a share of the crops from the land. Reza Shah 
proposed certain reforms in the structure of land tenure, 
in particular, with respect to landlord-tenant relationships 
and distribution of shares of crops. However, such proposals 
were · opposed by the powerful influence of the landlords, 
especially those in the Majlis. Indeed, in view of their 
profitable position in the landlord-tenant relationship, the 
31 Avery, ·Modern Iran, p. 312. 
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landlords did not want to disrupt the status quo. 32 While 
the introduction of modern agricultural methods provided a 
number of improvements, the basic problem in the agricultural 
system, the traditional land tenure system, remained 
unchanged. In their serf-like position, the peasant 
cultivators were the last to benefit materially from the 
agricultural reforms, while they were the group most in need 
of improved conditions. The main achievement of the 
agricultural improvements was to stimulate greater 
agricultural production, for domestic use as well as export, 
which aided Iran internally as well as in foreign trade. 
Regarding the agricultural population, the agricultural 
improvements had little effect upon the position of the 
landowners or the peasants. In view of the fact that the 
system of land tenure was not reformed, the landowners 
retained their power and influence in the country, and the 
peasants remained subservient to the landowners. 
During the reign of Reza Shah, efforts were directed 
toward reforming and modernizing industry and construction. 
One of the major projects was the construction of the 
Trans-Iranian Railway. Reza Shah financed the railway 
without foreign funds by establishing, in 1925, a government 
tax on tea and sugar, and using the tax revenue to finance 
32Banani, The Modernization of Iran, 1921-1941, p. 21. 
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the construction of the railway. While Iran needed the 
technology of Western countries in the construction of the 
railway, Reza Shah designated that firms of several countries 
should be employed, thereby avoiding the preponderant 
influence of .any one country in the project.
33 The 
Trans-Iranian Railway was completed in August, 1938, and 
was viewed with nationalistic pride by Reza Shah, for the 
completion of the railway was accomplished through the use 
of Iranian revenues, not foreign loans. 
In terms of industrial improvements, the government 
encouraged industrialization and the establislunent of private 
industry, primarily through · industrial bank loans and low 
tariff rates for the importation of such capital goods as 
industrial machinery, as well as a five-year tax exemption 
for private factories. Despite such governmental 
encouragements, private industry did not greatly expand, 
mainly because the people did not want to invest in such 
projects. State involvement in industrialization, however, 
did promote ' industry, primarily in textiles, sugar refining, 
and food production, with the intention of developing the 
country and improving the welfare of the population. By 
1936, light industry had been expanded in state and private 
factories, primarily through the organizational work of the 
33 Avery, Modern Iran, p. 303. 
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Department of Industry and Mines. The goal was to decrease 
Iran's need for import� and to increase the country's exports, 
thereby, furthering Iran's independent and self-reliant 
. . 34 position. 
One area possessing great potential for development in 
Iran was the oil industry. During Reza Shah's reign, the 
oil resources remained under the control of the Anglo-Iranian 
Oil Company (AIOC), as it had been from Qajar times. The 
presence of the AIOC provided some benefits to Iran, such as 
the introduction of Western technology and training programs 
for Iranians in the·technical and managerial aspects of the 
oil industry. However, the preponderance of a foreign power 
. h ·1 . d ' ·t d b f t' 1· t 3 5  in t e 01 in ustry 1rr1 ate a num er o na iona is s. 
Reza Shah, although eager for freedom from the presence of 
foreign powers in Iran, concluded that Iranians needed more 
time to develop the operational expertise in the oil 
industry, and that the AIOC was adequately developing the 
oil industry in Iran. Therefore, he decided that the AIOC 
would remain until Iran was technologically and politically 
prepared to assume full control of the oil industry at some 
indefinite point in the future. 
34Banani, The Modernization of Iran, 1921-1941, 
pp. 138-39. 
35  b"d 142 I 1 ., p. • 
In striving for the modernization of his country, 
Reza Shah instituted a number of reforms which were not 
oriented toward production, but served to modernize the 
social structure of Iranian society. One such reform was 
the abolition · of traditional titles, in June, 1925. With 
the. abolition of titles, the use of family names was 
initiated. Reza Shah, at that time Reza Khan, assumed the 
family name "Pahlavi" in recognition of the pre-Islamic 
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glory of Iran, for "Pahlavi" refers to "Ancient Iranian. 1136 
Reza Shah abolished the use of titles as a means of fostering 
a sense of social equality in Iran. In . following through 
with modernization and the theme of equality, in 1928, 
Reza Shah initiated reforms in dress, in which men were to 
wear Western style clothes. This reform ignored the protests 
of the clergy, who did not favor Western style clothing. 
Another important social reform was the change in the 
status of women. In bringing his country into the modern 
world, Reza Shah realized that the women must be freed of 
the restrictions placed upon females by traditional Islamic 
standards. This was necessary because the traditional 
practices prevented one-half of the population from actively 
participating in the society, a situation whioh not only 
denied the women of their rights, but also robbed the 
36Ale�sandro Bausani, The Persians, trans. , J. B. Donne· 
{New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971), p. 176 a 
country of their contribution to the society. One of the 
first steps was banning the veil, for the veil represented 
the exclusion of women and their exclusion from the rights 
d ' b " l " t ' f ' t 37 I 1934 f 1 h 1 an responsi 1 1 ies o socie y. n , ema e sc oo 
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teachers were required to abandon their veils . By 1935, most 
of the women, . with the exception of the older women, were not 
wearing the veil, and Reza Shah instituted reforms which 
provided Iranian women with Western style clothing, education, 
and the rights and responsibilities of society. Reza Shah 
encouraged the socialization of women into society and 
reminded the women that along with ' their newly acquired rights, 
they must accept the responsibil�ti�s of sociJ;y. � �-
Reza Shah intended to bring about a feeling of equality and 
unity ; therein lay his reasons for abolishing titles, 
introducing Western style clothing and reforming the status 
of women in Iran. 
Of great importance in Reza Shah's modernization program 
were· the changes in foreign relations, for they served to 
establish Iran ' s  position internationally as well as 
internally. Reza Shah was determined to rid Iran of 
interference by foreign powers, which had weakened the 
37 Hass, Iran, p. 105. 
38
wilber, Contemporary Iran, p. 75. 
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position of Iran over the decades. Early in his reign, 
Reza Shah declared that through technical education and 
specialization, Iranians would obtain freedom from the need 
for foreign advisors. One of the first actions taken to 
establish Iran's position vis-a-vis foreign powers, was the 
abolition of the capitulations; moreover, other changes 
revealed that the foreign powers would lose their special 
privileges in Iran. For example, foreign legations were 
limited in the display of their flags; restrictions were 
placed upon foreign businesses in Iran; and members of the 
Iranian foreign service were restricted f�om marrying 
foreigners. Another indication of Reza Shah's establishing 
Iran's position, was the required use of the ancient name 
"Iran" for the country, rather than Persia, as well as the 
required use of the Persian language on official 
39 correspondence. 
In modernizing Iran, Reza Shah realized that the use of 
Western technical advisors would be necessary for a while. 
In this regard, Belgians were used in reforming the customs 
administration; French experts were ·used in reforming the 
legal system; Americans were used to reform the economy; 
Swedish and Italian officers were used in training the army 
and navy, respectively; and Germans were used in technical 
39Ibid. , pp. 72-73. 
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fields.
40 Reza Shah refused to employ British or Russian 
advisors, for these countries had exerted the type of 
dominance in Iran which Reza Shah was determined to . end. 
In reforming foreign relations, Reza Shah was concerned 
about existing foreign concessions in Iran, which he intended 
to do away with . In this sense, one of the major concerns 
was the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). The AIOC. held a 
monopoly over Iran's oil industry, which deprived Iran. of 
the control of the oil in the country, and provided Britain 
W1. th pr1· v1' leges 1' n Iran. 41 C tl R Sh h h d t onsequen y, eza a a wo 
purposes in reforming the position of the AICO; first, to 
gain for Iran the country's ri ghtful share of revenue from 
the oil industry; second, to reduce the influence of Britain 
in Iran. 
By 1932, Iran's concern about the AIOC's control of the 
Iranian oil industry had peaked. At that point, Iran 
presented the problem to the League of Nations. Following 
Iran's presentation, which maintained that the AIOC did not · 
give Iran a fair share of the oil revenue, Iran's royalties 
were increased somewhat; however, the increase was not 
ff I O t 
42 
su 1c1en . In order for Iran to establish its integrity, 
and to receive a fair revenue from the oil industry, the 
40 Marlowe, Iran, p. 52. 41 b ' d 55 I 1 . ,  p .  • 
42Banani, The Modernization of Iran, 1921-1941, p. 142. 
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country's only recourse was to cancel the 1901 concession 
agreement of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, maintaining that 
the present Iranian government could not be held to an 
agreement· made before the constitutional regime·. The Iranian 
government proposed negotiating a new agreement with the 
AIOC, which would provide· terms more favorable to Iran, as 
· ·43 well as a greater share of the oil revenue. 
Following the conclusion of the new agreement with the 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1933, Iranian nationalists 
resented.the government's allowing the AIOC to remain in 
Iran. Reza Shah, however, had considered the needs of his 
cou�try and he realized that in the operation of the oil 
industry, Iran needed the technology and expertise of the 
AIOC. Moreover, Reza Shah i,ntended to assure the training 
and preparation of Iranians in the operation of the oil 
industry before considering the nationalization of
.
the oil 
industry in Iran. 44 �isagreements concerning the oil 
industry continued, and in 1940, Iran presented to the AIOC 
grievances concerning payment of royalties, with an 
ultimatum threatening cancellation of the AIOC's oil 
concession. In 1941, the AIOC agreed to Iran's demands; 
43 Marlowe, Iran, p. 57. 
44wilber, Contemporary Iran, . pp. 79-80. 
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however, the issue raised British resentment toward Iran at 
a crucial point in time, that is, during World War II. 45 
Regarding the attitude toward the Soviet Union during 
Reza Shah's reign, Soviet Russia initially appeared to be 
a more favorable neighbor than Tsarist . Russia had been, f6r 
Soviet Russia had renounced the concessions in . Iran acquired 
by Tsarist Russia, and ��is had been confirmed in the 
Soviet-Persian Agreement of 1921. There were, however, a 
number of disquieting issues between Soviet Russia and 
Iran. For example, while the Soviets had renounced Russian 
concessions in Iran, the Soviet-Persian Agreement stated 
that those concessions should not be given to any other 
prospective concessionaire. Also, by the Soviet-Persian 
Agreement, Soviet Russia established the right to send troops 
into Iran in the event that another power emanating from 
within Iran, threatened Russia. 46 
Another issue between Soviet Russia and Iran concerned 
the fis�eries on the Caspian Sea, for these were important 
to both countries. In 1924, the Soviets suggested that a 
company should lease the fisheries, and that the Soviet and 
Iranian governments should receive equal shares in the 
shares in the company. Such a suggestion was initially 
45Ibid. , p. 80. 
46Elgin Groseclose, Introduction to Iran (New York: 
Oxford University Press� . 1,17) , p .  135 . 
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rejected by Iran, upon the insistence of Arthur Millspaugh, 
the financial advisor of Iran. However, after the Soviets 
exerted pressure upon Iran, and following the resignation of 
Millspaugh in 1927, Iran accepted the Soviet proposal of 
leasing the fisheries. 47 
The issue of trade was also a contested matter between 
Soviet Russia and Iran, for, as Iran depended upon the Soviet 
market to buy Iran's agricultural produce, the Soviet Union 
imposed trade policies which favored . the Soviet Union, but 
Iran was unable to reject them without risking the loss of 
its main export market. Iran, however, released itself from 
the trade relationship, and by 1938, Germany became an 
important trade partner of Iran • . During the major portion 
of Reza Shah's reign, Soviet Russia did not appear to be a 
political or military threat to Iran, for the Soviets were 
preoccupied with other political matters, including the rise 
of Germany, rather than with prospects of expansion in the 
Middle East. 48 Germany had become a major trade partner and 
technical advisor to Iran. Moreover, Reza Shah viewed such 
a relationship as a means of breaking Iran's connections with 
Britain and Russia. 49 
47 48 · Ibid. , p. 137. Marlowe, Iran, p. 57. 
49J. c .  Hurewitz, Middle East Politics (New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), p .  273 . 
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With the outbreak of World War II, Reza Shah declared 
Iran's neutrality in a war that seemed to be remote from his 
country. The Iranians reacted with a general favor toward· 
Germany, for the Iranians resented the decades of British 
and Russian preponderance in Iran, as well as the remaining 
position of Britain in southern Iran and the shadow of 
Russia on Iran ' s  northern border. Indeed, the Iranians 
considered Germany to be their "enemy's enemy. 11 5 0  
Iran's sense of remoteness from the war ended in May, 
1945, with the occupation of Iraq by Britain, due to a revolt 
of Iraq's Prime Minister Rashid Ali, who was an anti-British 
nationalist. Reza Shah then became concerned about Iran's 
neutrality, for the war was close to Iran at that point e At 
the same time, Britain was concerned about German nationals 
in Iran who might collaborate with Iraqi rebels and sabotage 
British oil fields in Iraq. Indeed, Britain and Russia both 
asked Iran to reduce the number of German technicians and 
other German nationals in Iran. 51 
Iran's neutrality was further threatened by Germany's 
invasion of Russia on June 22, 1941, for at that point, the 
viability of using Iran as a supply route to the Soviet Union 
was recognized. Indeed, Prime Minister Churchill had 
declared that Britain would aid Russia, as President Roosevelt 
5 0sanghvi, Aryamehr: The Shah of Iran, p. 58. 
51 Marlowe, Iran, p. 65. 
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had stated for the United States . Of three possible supply 
routes to the Soviet Union, only the route through Iran was 
feasible. The Murmansk route, passing through the North 
Atlantic and North Sea, was dangerous because Germans occupied 
the Norwegian coast . Passing through Turkey was unlikely, 
because Turkey, as a neutral state, had refused passage of 
supplies to Russia, and Turkey was able to maintain its 
neutrality . In addition, passing through the Bosphorous was 
dangerous. because Germans were in the area . 52 
Thus, Iran was chosen as the supply route, and despite 
the country's neutrality, Britain and Russia planned to 
invade Iran . During this period, Britain and Russia 
maintained thit they were concerned about the presence of 
Germans in . Iran, and the two powers sent several Notes to 
Iran requesting the expulsion of German nationals. However, 
the two powers did not mention their need of Iran as a supply 
t t 
. 5 3  rou e o Russia . In this sense, Britain and Russia had not 
presented the full situation to Reza Shah. Therefore, it was 
difficult for him to evaluate the necessary course of action, 
but Reza Shah had decided to expel the German nationals from 
Iran . 54 Considering the Allies' need for the route over 
52 h ' h Th Sh h f I 61 Sang vi, Aryame r: e a o ran, p .  
5 3  b ' d . 66 I 1 . , p .  • 
54Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, Mission for My Country, 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), p .  72. 
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Iran, it appears that Britain and Russia would have carried 
out their planned invasion of Iran, even if the Iranian 
government had reacted more readily to the Allies' demand of 
expulsion of the German nationals, for the apparent reasoning 
behind the Allies' invasion was primarily to use Iran as a 
supply route, not as a reaction to the presence of German 
nationals. Thus, on August 25, 1941, Britain and Russia 
invaded Iran, with Russia coming from the· north and Britain 
, coming from the west and southwest. Iranian forces presented 
resistance ; however, \ Reza Shah's army was prepared only for 
maintaining internal security, not for _ matching those of 
Britain and Russia. � 5 Thus, Iran's resistance ceased on 
August 27, 1941. 
During his reign, Reza Shah had been preparing his son, 
Crown Prince Mohammad Reza, for the time when he would assume 
the Throne. Thus, the Crown Prince was familiar with his 
father's political philosophy. Crown Prince Mohammad Reza 
felt that the invasion of his country was unjustified, and 
that the Allies should have presented their need for a route 
through Ir�n to Reza Shah. Moreover, the Crown Prince 
reasoned that if Reza Shah decided not to comply with the 
Allies' request, he probably would have resigned the Throne . 
to his son and allowed Mohammad Reza to accept the Allies' 
5 5sanghvi, Aryamehr: The Shah of Iran, pp. 68-69. 
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plans, because as a strong central figure, Reza Shah could 
not compromise his position to the Allies' plans. However, 
in the interest of Iran, he could have allowed the young 
Mohanunad Reza to assume the Throne and to comply with ·the 
·Allies.
56 
Iran signed an armistice agreement with the two powers 
by which the northern section of Iran came under Soviet 
supervision, . and the southern section . came under the British. 
Moreover, Iran was to expel the nationals of states at war 
with Britain and.Russia, and Iran was to facilitate the 
t t .  f l "  t R . 57 At th t· transpor a ion o supp ies o ussia. e same ime, 
the remaining German nationals in Iran were being rounded up. 
A number of the Germans escaped. Britain and Russia blamed 
this on the Iranian government, and the two powers sent 
troops into Tehran. 
Britain and Russia assumed that sending troops into 
Tehran would force Reza Shah out of power. Indeed, Reza Shah 
decided to abdicate the Throne in favor of his son, 
Mohanunad Reza, for, as he told his son, the· people had always 
regarded Reza Shah as an independent and powerful king who 
56Pahlavi, Mission for My Country, pp. 72-73. 
57sanghvi, Aryamehr: The Shah of Iran, p. 71. 
would protect their interests. Therefore, he could not be 
the nominal leader of an occupied country. 58 
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Thus, Reza Shah abdicated the Throne on September 16, 
1941, and went into exile, first to Mauritius. As the 
climate was not suitable for him, he was taken to 
Johannesburg, South Africa, where he corresponded with his 
son but did not advise him on political matters. 59 Reza Shah 
died in July, 1944, and in May, 1950, Iran honored him in a 
state funeral. 
In accordance with Iran's constitution, Mohanunad Reza 
had become Shah as soon as Reza Shah - had abdicated. However, 
he was required to ·read and sign the oath of loyalty, which 
was accomplished in a simple ceremony ·. 60 
In summarizing the situation of Iran during Reza Shah's 
reign, it may be said that Iran was coming of age in terms 
of modernization and stabilization under Reza Shah. 
Reza Shah's program of modernization included the elements 
necessary in modernizing a country, and these elements in 
combination served as a stabilizing force in Iran. Reza Shah 
built upon each accomplished reform to aid him in revising 
other aspects of the country. For example, Reza Shah acted 
58Pahlavi, Mission for My Country, p. 74. 
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upon the first problem of the country's unstable situation 
by establishing a unified national army. Next, Reza Shah 
used the national army to quell the tribal revolts and raids, 
which had contributed to internal insecurity. With the 
settling of the tribes, a major source of instability had 
been eliminated .  Indeed, the national army aided in unifying 
and centralizing the country, by which the various regions 
of the country came to recognize the authority of the central 
government. This was a major stabilizing achievement of 
Reza Shah, for with the effective centralization of the 
country, Reza Shah was then able to spread his plans for 
modernization and his ideals of nationalism. 
Reza Shah was also successful in reforming the civil 
administration of the country, which had been chaotic under 
the previous regime. Through the reorganization of the 
country into more manageable political divisions, and through 
the reorganization of the administrative branches of 
government, Reza Shah brought about a more orderly and 
efficient management of the country ' �  affairs, which 
contributed further to the stabilization process. 
Reza Shah's reform of the Civil Code, the judicial system, 
the Civil Service, and municipal administration made these 
facets of the bureaucracy contribute to more efficient 
management of the civil administration. The bureaucracy 
became more important in . the overall administration of the 
country. 
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Regarding the position of the Majlis during the period . 
of Reza Shah's reforms, the Majlis complied with Reza Shah's 
wish for the adoption of legislation which would make the 
reforms possible. On the topic of land reform, however, the 
Majlis would not comply, for most of the Majlis deputies 
were · either landowners or were under the . influence of large 
landowners who did not want the system of land tenure to be 
changed. Thus, on this matter, the will of the Majlis 
prevailed during Reza Shah's reign. The format of the 
Majlis, that is, the practice of deputies forming unorganized 
political factions, remained basically unchanged, despite 
Reza Shah's attempts to introduce organized parties into the 
Majlis. 
Another major reform which modernized Iran was the 
secularization of the judicial system, for this reform 
weakened the influence of the reactionary clergy,. and 
provided Iran with a modern legal . system, as well as a basis 
upon which to abolish the system of capitulations, thereby 
establishing the position of Iran before foreign states. 
Reza Shah also promoted the modernization · and stabilization 
of his country by reaching the people with the ideals of 
the reform, and providing them with : an understanding of the 
government's goals. Reza Shah reached the people with his 
plans through the Society to Guide Public Opinion, as well 
as the expansion and modernization of the educational system. 
.. 
• ,. 
• • 
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Through the introduction of technical education and 
specialization there were increased career opportunities for 
students returning from abroad, and Iranian students began 
to have the opportunity for technical education and training 
at home. Politically, this was an important step in freeing 
Iranians from the need for foreign advisors and from having 
to employ foreigners to operate Iranian indus.tries. Reforms 
in the· area of education and public health, . served to improve 
and modernize the conditions of the people, thereby 
contributing to the stability of the country. The social 
improvements in the conditions of the people were ·particularly 
evident in the reformed status of women, which provided for 
a larger segment of the population participating in the 
modernizing functions of the country. 
An important series of reforms which was essential to 
the stabilization of Iran, was the reorganization of the 
national economy, for during Reza Shah's reign, the economy 
and the financial situation of the country were developed 
and became productive. In this respect, the reforms in . 
agriculture, industry, and banking, as well as foreign trade, 
revived the economy of Iran. Reza Shah had been determined 
to reform the . conditions of Iran's foreign relations, and in 
this goal he succeeded in gaining. international recognition 
for Iran's position. 
7 8  
Regarding the political aspects of Reza Shah's reforms, 
Reza Shah had emerged as the first strong central political 
figure for quite some time. Reza Shah's reign reorganized 
and centralized a country that had been administratively 
chaotic for decades. Reza Shah and his reformed army and 
administration brought internal security and modernization 
to Iran. Of great political significance was Reza Shah's 
having raised the position of Iran internationally. 
Reza Shah prepared Iran for independent development and 
eliminated foreign interference and domination of the 
country. Through such achievements as the abolition of 
capitulations, Reza Shah made· it possible for Iran to deal 
on an equal basis with other countries. 
In retrospect, the modernization and stabilization of 
Iran had been effective throughout Reza Shah's reign. 
However, the Second World War was a major destabilizing 
force in Iran, for Britain and Russia were determined to 
occupy Iran and to use the country for· their own stategic 
needs. As a result, the stability achieved in the country 
by Reza Shah was interrupted by the British and Russian 
invasion and occupation of Iran in 1941. 
CHAPTER III 
THE EARLY YEARS OF THE REIGN OF MOHAMMAD REZA SHAH, 
1941-1953 
The invasion of Iran by the Allied Powers and the 
I 
subsequent abdication of Reza Shah had thrust �ohammad Reza 
Pahlavi into the position· of Shah of Iran. The dominant 
presence of the occupying powers, however, made it seem as 
though the Allied Power� were actually the center of 
authority. 1 Mohammad Reza Shah cooperated with the Allies, 
in the best interest of Iran. The legal basis for the 
Allied presence in Iran, as well as the expectations of both 
Iran and the Allied Powers, were negotiated, culminating in 
the · Tripartite Treaty of 1942. The Treaty stated that the 
purpose of the Allied presence in Iran was for transporting 
troops and supplies into the Soviet Union, and the Treaty 
stipulated that Iran was to cooperate in every way to provide 
the necessary facilities and labor. Furthermore, tQe Treaty . 
stipulated that the Allied forces were· to be withdrawn within 
six months following the end of World War II. 2 
1Ramesh Sanghvi, Aryamehr : The Shah of Iran (New York: 
Stein and Day, 196 8), p .  91. 
2Ibid. , pp. 83-85 . 
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Ironically, the Treaty stated that the presence of 
Allied forces in Iran was not an occupation; furthermore,. it 
was declared that the " territorial integrity, the sovereignty 
and the political independence. of Iran"
3 would be respected 
by Great Britain and the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Treaty 
stated that the administration of and life in Iran would be 
disturbed as little as possible. 4 The activities of the 
occupying powers, however, violated the provisions of the 
Treaty, for the Allied Powers overstepped the rights they 
. 5 .  had gained and treated Iran as a defeated enemy. Britain 
and the Soviet Union interfered in Iran's internal matters 
and dominated the workings of the country. 
The Allied Powers were· able to dominate internal matters 
such as legislation, communications, and transportation, 
primarily because of the absence of a strong indigenous 
leader or group, for initially, twenty-two year old 
Mohammad Reza Shah was yet inexperienced . in maintaining 
control over the country. Although the young Shah gradually 
gained such expertise, the situation in occupied Iran was 
similar to that following the · l907 Anglo-Russian Agreement, 
for the Soviet Union occupied the.northern provinces of Iran, 
3Ibid. , p. 83. 4 Ibid. , p. 8 5. 
5sepehr Zabih, The Communist Movement in Iran {Berkeley : 
University of California Press, 196 6) ,  � - 86. 
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and Britain occupied the southern area, while there was a 
neutral area containing Tehran between the two zones. The 
occupying powers carried on activities typical of wartime 
occupation, such as spreading propaganda, bribing officials 
and politicians, and interfering in internal matters in 
order to further their respective interests. These 
activities were carried on in the occupied zones as well as 
in the neutral area of Tehran. As Britain and the Soviet 
Union were traditional rivals in Iran, and each held 
traditional interests in the . country, their interference 
and �anipulation in Iranian matters were · intense. Each of 
the Allied Powers sought to further its respective interests 
in Iran during the occupation. 6 
Considering the political and social instability which 
prevailed following the abdication of Reza Shah, the Allied 
Powers were concerned with the security of their interests. 
During the occupation, one of the primary interests of the 
Allied Powers in Iran was the security of the transportation 
of supplies to the Soviet Union. Britain and the Soviet 
Union, and later the United States, were anxious for the 
prevalence of enough internal stability in Iran to· ensure 
the delivery of supplies to the Soviet Union. Beyond this 
6John Marlowe, Iran (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 
1963), p. 68. 
common cause, however, the Allied Powers held different 
concerns in Iran, and employed different methods to secure 
their interests. 
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Concerning Britain's interests and activities in Iran 
during the occupation, Britain was concerned �bout long-term 
stability for Iran . Although Britain and the Soviet Union 
were wartime allies, they were ideological rivals, and 
Britain wanted a stable postwar Iran capable of standing 
firm before the Soviet Union. Britain did interfere in 
Iran's internal matters, such as influencing the choice of 
parliamentary deputies, and censoring the mail and news in 
Iran, and Britain was concerned with political control in 
Iran. Britain, however, was not interested in permanently 
dividing Iran, as was the Soviet Union. Britain considered 
its presence as temporary, and envisioned postwar Iran as 
independent, but sympathetic to Western interests. 7 Britain 
was concerned about the integrity and stability of Iran 
mainly in terms of preventing the growth of pro-Soviet 
communist forces, as well as Soviet designs, in Iran. · For 
this reason, Britain tended to support the conservative 
elements in Iran, such as the Muslim clergy, for the British 
believed that strong conservative elements would forestall 
the growth of pro-Soviet · communist forces. Britain also 
7Ibid . ,  p. ·70. 
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sponsored the return of pro-British political exiles, the 
release of pro-British political · prisoners, and the 
establishment of the anticommunist, pro-British, National 
Will (Eradeh Melli} Party, led by the returned political 
exile, Sayyed Zia al-Din Tabatabai. 8 While the Soviet Union 
had designs on the northern section of Iran, Britain 
considered the strengthening of the Iranian government as 
a means to ward off the Soviet Union. 
Regarding British propaganda releases in Iran, Britain 
maintained information services such as the Public Relations 
Bureau, as well as an information program on Radio Tehran, 
and an English newspaper. In these information services � 
Britain - publicized achievements of the Allies, particularly 
Britain; however, despite the rivalry between Britain and 
the Soviet Union, British propaganda did not criticize the 
Soviet Union. On the contrary, Bri'tish policy was· aimed at 
convincing the Iranians that there was complete unity among 
the Allied Powers. 9 Such a line of propaganda did not 
convince the politically aware Iranians that complete unity 
existed among the Allies, for Soviet propaganda was critical 
of Britain. As a result, the Iranians viewed Britain as 
8Ibid. , p. 74. 
9G�orge Lenczowski, Russia and the West in . Iran, 
1918-1948 (Ithaca, New York : Cornell University Press, 1949} , 
p. 258. 
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weaker and more· defensive than the Soviet Union ; -therefore, 
the Iranians concluded that Britain was· mainly interested in 
a smooth relationship with the . Soviet Union, and that Britain 
might o_btain such a relationship through political compromise 
with the Soviet Union.
10 In essence, the Iranians feared 
the Soviet Union and tended to distrust Britain. The 
distrustful attitude toward Britain existed, despite the more 
open atmosphere which existed in the southern zone, compared 
to that in the Soviet occupied zone. 
Regarding the differences between ,the respective British 
and Soviet zones, · Britain considered its presence in Iran as 
temporary, necessary only for the conditions of war, while 
the Soviet Union revealed a tendency to remain �n.its zone . 
Britain did not control the local civil administration in 
the southern area as the Soviet Union did in the northern 
area. Within the British zone, people traveled freely, while 
in the Soviet zone travel was restricted. In addition, 
Britain, as well as the Unit�d _ States, shipped in s_upplies 
of grain which were needed in Iran to cope with a food · 
shortage - caused by war conditions. The food shortage was 
particularly severe · in southern Iran, for the Soviets had 
placed a ban on transporting foo4, especially grain, from 
the northern provinces, where it was grown, . to the south, 
lOibid. , pp. 260-61. 
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where it was needed. The British shipment was not well 
publicized, and the situation was twisted by the Soviets and 
the press, who labeled as a "gift, " shipments of grain which 
the Soviets finally released to the southern area of Iran. 11 
Britain was concerned that stability prevail in Iran, 
in order to ensure the delivery of military supplies to the , 
Soviet Union. In addition, Britain was concerned about the 
security of British oil installations in the southern area. 
Tribal raids and rebellions were a major threat to the 
security of the supply lines a rtd t he British o il 
installations. Britain, therefore, aided the Iranian 
government in. negotiating a settlement with the rebellious 
tribes who wanted land which they considered to be tribal 
property, to be restored to tribal ownership. The tribal 
rebellions in the southern area were quelied by 1943, which 
helped to bring about internal security. 12 
,The presence of British forces in Iran was indeed 
motivated by military needs, as Britain claimed, and not by 
intentions to remain in Iran. This was evidenced by the 
willingness · of Britain to withdraw its troops in May, 1945, 
following a favorable turn in the war. · Britain ' s  intentions 
to withdraw at that early date was dampened, . . however, 
11Ibid. , pp. 194-95. 
12Ibid., p. 248. 
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because of the Soviet Union's refusal to leave Iran earlier 
than six months after the end of the war, as designated in 
the · l942 Treaty. Britain did not wish to allow the Soviet 
Union the greater freedom in Iran which British withdrawal 
would have provided. · Britain, however, did take the initial 
steps of terminating its censorship and information programs 
in Iran, . and of� gradually withdrawing British troops and 
completing the move before March, 1946, as designated . in the 
Treaty, which was not the case with the Soviet Union . 13 
As has been stated, both Britain and the Soviet Union . 
interfered in the Iranian · political sphere during the 
occupation, and both exerted a degree of domination over 
their respective zones. The intentions and maneuvers- of the 
Soviet Union, however, exhibited a much greater degree of 
domination and control by the Soviets in the - northern zone, 
as compared to the British in the southern zone. The 
Soviet Union actually held plans for postwar interests in 
Iran. Such ambitious intentions were revealed in the 1940 
Four Power Pact which was secretly concluded by the 
Soviet Union, Germany, Italy, and Japan. In the Four Power 
Pact, the Soviet Union declared that the area south of the 
Soviet Union, toward the Persian Gulf, was within the realm 
13Elgin Groseclose, An Introduction to Iran (New York: . 
Oxford University Press, 1947) , p. l85 . 
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f S ' t ' t t 14 o ovie in eres s. Thus, Soviet intentions to cultivate 
its interests in Iran were facilitated by the wartime 
occupation of ·the country. The occupation of the northern 
zone of Iran provided the Soviet Union with the opportunity 
to exert political, military, and economic domination in the 
area. In this regard, the Soviets assumed full ·control in 
the area by ignoring the Iranian government's sovereignty 
(despite · the 1942 Treaty), undermining the local Iranian 
authorities, and taking over the administration of the 
zone. 15 Indeed, the control which the Soviets held in the · 
northern zone of Iran indicated the Soviet- union's intention 
to influence changes in the . social, political, and economic 
modes in the area, and eventually to absorb the northern zone 
of Iran into the Soviet system. 
In addition to Soviet plans for future interests in 
Iran, the Soviets, like the British, wanted a degree of 
internal stability in Iran sufficient for the security of 
the military supply lines to the Soviet · Union. Unlike the 
British, however, the Soviets wished for an Iranian 
government which . was weak enough to be dissolved for the 
future fulfillment of Soviet plans in Iran.
16 In this 
14Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-1948, 
p. 193. 
15  Marlowe, Iran, p. 70. 
16Peter Avery, Modern Iran (London: Ernest Benn, 1965), 
p. 34. 
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regard, . the Soviets were· adept at undermining the solvency 
and authority of the Iranian government, and they employed a 
variety of methods in doing so. For example, the Soviets 
disregarded Iranian customs duties at the northern border; 
the Soviets required the Iranian government to provide the 
Soviets with materials and facilities at a reduced cost; in 
addition, the · soviets made the Iranian government pay for 
any materials provided by the Soviets in the name of 
protecting Iran's security. Moreover, the Soviets abused 
a number of Iran's economic resources, such as copper �ines, 
the Caspian fisheries, and the grains, foodstuffs, and 
livestock of the northern provinces. 17 
Regarding the food situation, the occupation - of Iran 
had brought about a food shortage in the country; however, 
grains and foodstuffs were grown and available in the 
northern provinces. The Soviets, however, had confiscated 
the grains and food supplies for the use of Soviet soldiers 
and would not allow foodstuffs to be sent to the southern 
area, where it was needed. This action aggravated the food 
shortage in Iran, which led to bread riots and heightened 
the general sense of instability. The Soviets eventually 
allowed shipments of grain to the southern area, thereby 
17Groseclose, An Introduction to Iran, p. 185. 
89 
creating a favorable image· of · the Soviets before the Iranian 
people. 18 
Another method used by the Soviets to increase their 
influence in Iran, . and to weaken the authority of the central 
government, . was to support the return of political exiles 
and the release of political prisoners who would be useful 
in Soviet plans. In this regard, in September, 1941 a 
group of Marxist sympathizers who had been imprisoned in 
1937 on the · basis of the 1931 anticommunist act, was released. 
Although this group, led by Taghi Erani and referred to as 
"the 53" because. of the number arrested, did not openly 
refer to Communism in its program, the group initiated the 
growth of a well organized party, later identified as a 
communist party, called the Party of the Iranian Masses 
(Hizb-i Tudah-i Iran), and commonly �eferred to as the 
Tudah Party. 19 By early 1945, the Tudah Party had effectively 
organized its leadership, membership, secret meetings, and 
clandestine publications o By that point, the Soviets were · 
using the Tudah Party to organize · demonstrations and riots 
against the Iranian government, and to infiltrate the Majlis. 
Such tactics stimulated a degree of chaos and instability. 
18Avery, Modern Iran, p. 354. 
19Ervand · Abrahamian, "Communism and Communalism in Iran: 
the Tudah and the Firqah-i Dimukrat," International Journal 
of Middle East Studies, I, N o. 4 (1970) , 299 . 
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Soviet antagonism toward . Iran was intensified in ­
September, 1944, for the Soviet Union wanted to obtain an oil 
concession in northern Iran. Except for Tudah members, the 
Iranians were against such a concession, and the Majlis 
declared that no concessions would be given to any country 
dur.ing the wartime occupation. In addition, a Majlis 
leader, Mohammad Mossadegh, encouraged the Majlis to prohibit 
any government official or minister from negotiating oil 
concessions with any foreign country, without Majlis 
approvai. 20 Although official discussions about oil 
concessions were quieted for a while, the issue had irritated 
the Soviets. As a result, the Soviets initiated further 
antigovernment demonstrations through the Tudah Party. In 
addition, the Soviets criticized Britain and the United 
States for having influenced Iran's decision on the oil 
concession . Such criticism may have resulted because 
Britain did not openly oppose Iran's negative decision on 
the concession, and the American Ambassador · to Tehran stated 
that Iran had the right to refuse to grant such a 
concession. 21 Indeed, the Soviets certainly disproved the 
myth of Allied unity, through the Soviet s' anti-British 
20Yahya Armanjani, Iran (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall, 1972), p. 156. 
21Marlowe, Iran, p .  76. 
and anti-American propaganda. The issue of the oil 
concession did not disappear, and it became important 
immediately following World War II. 
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Indeed, the Soviets wielded great power in their occupied 
zone ,through political and _ military control. The · Iranians 
of the northern area feared the strength of the Soviet 
occupiers. Consequently, the Soviets attempted to win - some 
degree of approval through propaganda. For example j in 
Tehran, the Soviet Embassy utilized press conferences · to 
promote a favorable image· of the Soviet Union. In addition, 
the · Soviets sponsored radio broadcasts, theatrical 
performances, literature, and a hospital. Furthermore, the 
Soviets enforced good behavior and performance of good . deeds 
on the part of Soviet soldiers in Iran. Such tactics were in 
the interest of enhancing the image of the Soviet Union in · 
Iran. · Alert Iranians were aware, however, that such ploys 
were elements of Soviet propaganda, and fear of the Soviet 
· 1  d 22 power prevai e .  
Despite Soviet attempts · to elicit a favorable response 
from the Iranians toward the Soviet Union, anti-Soviet · 
feelings surfaced in the Iranian government·, the Royal Court, 
the Army, the Muslim clergy, and the anticommunist National 
Will Party. Under the 1931 anticommunist act, the Tudah 
22L k .  ' d t' h W t '  I 1918 194 8  enczows 1, Russia an e es in ran, - ; , 
p . 2 0 4 . 
92 
Party activities were illegal. · T.hus, the government had the 
right to suppress Tudah activities . In Tehran and the 
southern region , the . Iranian government was able to dampen 
communist activities through military or police action 
against the Tudah Party, . such as dispersing their 
demonstrations, raiding Tudah headquarters, or suspending 
their press • . In the northern zone, the authority of the 
central governme�t was ignored, however, and the local police 
had no power, for the Soviets controlled the northern 
provinces and supported the growth of Tudah activities. 23 
In addition to the - Soviet and British occupation of 
Iran, the United States also sent forces, supplies, and food 
to Iran, . after the initial Anglo-Soviet occupation of the 
country. Although the Soviet · Union and Britain formalized 
their. presence in Iran through the Tripartite Treaty of 
1942, th� United States did not sign the Treaty, perhaps 
because the United States preferred to be disassociated with 
Britain and the Soviet Union, for these two countries were 
disliked and distrusted by Iranians. 24 In May, 1942, the 
United States sent supplies to Iran under the Lend Lease Act, 
and by 1943, basically noncombatant American troops ·were 
sent to Iran as the Persian Gulf Command, and those troops · 
23rpid. , p. 235. 
24 Avery, Modern Iran, p. 352. 
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were · �o aid in the transportation of supplies to the Soviet 
Union. Although the United Stat�s . was not party to the 1942 
Treaty, . the presence of the American forces in Irqn was 
j ustified, for they were· under the "overall British 
command. 11 25 
The United States was concerned that internal stability 
prevail in Iran, in order to ensure the supply line.to the 
Soviet Union. Moreover, the United States was concerned 
about the postwar independence of Iran, . in terms. of the 
country's ability to withstand conununist maneuvers. This 
concern became increasingly apparent after the 1944 oil 
concession decision, f�r the United States then became more 
involved in Iran's internal affairs, in order to counter 
the. intense pressure of the Soviet Union. Indeed, the 
United States felt that Britain was not doing enough to 
bolster Iran's resistance to Soviet pressure. 26 For example, 
while Britain did not openly oppose · Iran's refusal to grant 
the Soviet Union an oil concession, Britain did not campaign 
strongly against the Soviet request, for Britain felt that 
if Iran felt . strong enough to refuse a Soviet concession, 
Iran might one day cancel the British oil concession in 
southern Iran. 
25Joseph M. · Upton, The History of Modern Iran 
(Cambridge: Ha�vard· U�iversity Press, 1970) , p. 82. 
26 Marlowe, Iran, p. 76. 
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American interest in Iran . prompted Iranians to feel 
that the introduction of a third power in Iran would break 
the traditional Anglo-Soviet rivalry . for· control in Iran . 
The Iranians also saw the United States as a source of 
economic and military aid. For its part, the United States . 
provided financial aid as well as expert advisors to help 
Iran stabilize its economy and society. The presence of 
American troops and advisors was more· palatable to Iranians 
than was the presence of the other two powers. Although the 
American Office of War Information did provide some American 
propaganda in the form of an American.newspaper and general 
information, such devices were on a smaller scale than those 
f . . h . . 
27 
o Britain or t e Soviet. Union. · 
Indeed, the receptive attitude of Iranians toward 
American . operations and personnel provided a basis for 
favorable relations between the United States and Iran. 
Further, the United States seemed to have no long term 
designs on Iran, which made Iranians more comfortable with 
America's wartime presence in their country. Indeed, the 
main concerns of the United States in Iran were maintaining 
Iran's security and stability and thwarting communist 
encroachment. 
27 k' R ' d th W t ' I 1918 1948 Lenczows 1, ussia an e es in ran, . - , 
pp. 278-79 . 
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Concerning the interference of the occupying powers in 
domestic Iranian matters, one of the · important methods by 
which they wielded control was through influencing the Majlis 
(the national representative assembly). Such a practice 
included influencing the selection of candidates and 
officials who suited the respective interests of the 
occupying powers, and the dismissal of some other officials. 
For example, in the election of the Fourteenth Majlis in 
1944, the Soviet · Union exerted great influence in the choice 
of candidates from the north. Although nine Tudah 
candidates were elected to the Majlis, the Majlis .was 
composed mainly of conservative elements of society. The 
Majlis, in fact, rejected the credentials of a major Tudah 
figure, Jaafar Pishevari, who had been elected to the . Majlis 
from Tabriz. The remaining eight Tudah· members resented this 
action; consequently, the Tudah deputies exhibited their 
discontent by opposing every cabinet until the spring of 
1945,· when the Soviets approved of the proposed cabinet. 28 
With the added irritation of the 1944 oil concession dispute, 
the Tudah members, and the Soviets, exerted troublesome 
pressure in the Majlis and the country.· 
The Majlis was typically made up of many factions 
rather than true· political parties. However, as the Tudah 
28zabih, The Cormnunist Movement in Iran, pp. 87-88 D · 
Party became more well organized, the other members of the 
Majlis realized that the communist movement was growing in 
strength , and that the only way to counter the communist 
movement would be organization. Thus, the pro-British 
National Will Party became more· cohesive in its policies. 
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As it were·, the political parties actually identified with 
one of the occupying powers. The British and Soviets had 
influence over members of the Maj_lis mainly because such 
deputies traditionally offered their allegiance to the 
center of power, and while in Reza Shah's time they had been . 
" loyal" to Reza Shah, during the occupation, the Allied 
Powers were the apparent sources of power. 29 
Iq essence, the Majlis was not a strong or cohesive 
body during the wartime occupation . The selection of 
candidates was influenced by the Allied Powers, as was the 
action taken by certain deputies as members of the Majlis. 
The Majlis, as well as the ministries, were characterized 
by frequent turnovers, which reflected the instability of 
the political arena in Iran. 
In view of the interference and domination on the · part 
of the Allied Powers, the Allied Powers clearly acted as 
though they had occupied a defeated country, despite the 
terms of the Tripartite Treaty of 1942. Furthermore, such 
attitudes and actions prevailed . despite the promises made 
29sanghvi, Aryamehr: The Shah of Iran, . p. 91. 
, 
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by the· Allied Powers at the Tehran Conference in November, 
1943, at which Chruchill, Stalin, and Roosevelt reiterated 
their acknowledgment of Iran's sovereignty, . integrity, and 
independence. Moreover, Britain, the Soviet Union, and the 
United States acknowledged Iran's contribution to the war 
effort against the enemy. The Allied Powers also promised 
to compensate Iran for the economic problems caused by the 
·occupation. These promises encouraged Mohammad Reza Shah's 
belief that Iran's effective independence would be 
restored. 3° Furthermore, Mohammad Reza Shah was emphatic 
in his · stand that the Allied Powers · withdraw within six 
months after the war. 
· Depsite the conditions of occupation, Mohammad Reza 
Shah maintained his position as constitutional Mona
.
rch. In 
the · best interest of the independence of his country, 
however, the Shah cooperated with the Allied Powers� . In 
addition, the experience gained by Mohammad Reza Shah during 
the wartime occupation brought a deeper understanding to the 
young Shah. In particular, he came to the conclusion that 
the traditional neutrality was not a viable . policy for 
maintaining Iran's independence. Furthermore, the attitudes 
and actions of the Allied Powers· during the occupation 
reinforced Mohammed Reza Shah's awareness that the 
30Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Mission for My Country (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, ·1960), pp. 8 0- 81. 
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Soviet · Union harbored ambitious plans . toward Iran, and that 
positive · alliance with the other powers was perhaps one of 
Iran's best barriers against Soviet aggression. 31 
The effects of the Allied Occupation in Iran were 
basically destabilizing. Initially, the absence of Reza 
Shah left a gap in the central authority of the country, for 
there was no strong figure or cohesive group capable of 
maintaining control. Many of the people · reverted to 
practices which were .common before the reforms of Reza Shah 
took place, such as wearing traditional clothing and the 
veil, and engaging in . superstitious practices. 32 More 
importantly, the administration and legislation reverted to 
the weak and disorganized conditions typical in pre-Reza Shah 
times, such as the _ prevalence of clerical influence in 
political matters and the decline in the effective authority 
of the government. 33 As in other occupied countries, 
bribery and corrupt · activities spread . The majority of 
Iranians, however, resented the occupation · of their country 
by Britain and the Soviet Union, particularly because of 
the traditional Anglo-Soviet rivalry for control in· Iran. 
From such resentment grew the strong, though unorganized, 
31oonald N. Wilber, Contemporary Iran (New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, 1963) , p .  109. 
32Armanjani, Iran, p. 151. 
33wilber, Contemporary Iran, p. 107. 
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nationalistic feelings of the Iranians, which were to prevail 
after the · war. In addition, the unstable atmosphere in Iran 
was heightened by the anti-West and antigovernment 
demonstrations incited by the Tudah Party. 
In addition · to the degeneration of political life as 
a result of the occupation, the economy also deteriorated, 
as evidenced by the great decline in industrial output and 
the high rate.of inflation. Elements contributing to the 
economic decline were the monopoly of the transportation 
system by the · Allied Powers, the printing of excess paper 
currency, great rise in prices, and expenses imposed upon 
Iran by the · occupation. 34 In addition, the needs of the 
Allied troops and the Soviet ban on sending food to the 
southern provinces aggravated the food shortage and led to 
bread riots, which further reflected the instability of the 
period. In essence, the occupation was characterized by 
Anglo-Soviet domination of the country, . with the indigenous 
officials lacking coherent organization and leadership . 
Moreover, the frequent turnover of officials reflected the 
prevalent instability in the land. 
Thus, in terms· of stability and instability, the 
occupation · of Iran by Britain and the Soviet Union marked a 
period of political, economic, and social instability in the 
34Groseclose, - Introduction to Iran, . PPe 174, 180. 
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country. · Internally, there was little organized leadership 
in the Majlis or the ministries. The collapse of the economy 
intensified the unsta.ble situation, in which the people 
resented the· violation of their land by the occupying powers. 
Regarding the attitudes of the latter, the Soviet Union 
held ambitions toward Iran, which were apparent in the 
far-reaching control which the Soviets wielded i n  the 
northern zone, having ignored Iranian authority. With such 
intentions, the Sovi'ets sought to weaken the Iranian 
government, and the Tudah Party served as the domestic agent 
of the Soviet government. Although the Soviets realized 
fhat a degree of internal stability was necessary. in Iran, 
in order for supplies to reach the Soviet Union, the Soviets 
felt that such stability could be limited, thereby making 
Iran a potentially easy target for Soviet plans. 
Regarding such Soviet plans, Britain recognized Soviet 
intentions. Therefore, Britain was mainly concerned about 
maintaining stabiiity in Iran as a barrier against Soviet 
moves in the country. Britain did not want Iran to become a 
Soviet satellite. In addition, Britain was concerned about 
the security of the supply line to the - Soviet Union, as well · 
as the security of British oil installations in southern 
Iran. Britain was concerned about internal stability for 
these two reasons. Britain attempted to support internal 
stability in Iran _by supporting the conservative and 
nationalist elements, and the National · Will Party. 
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Regarding the position of the United States as a third 
ally present in Iran, . the United States was also concerned 
about the security of the supply line to the Soviet Union . 
Moreover, the United States wanted the stability of Iran to 
be firm enough to withstand . Soviet · ambitions toward the 
country. In time, the United States came to replace Britain 
as the Western power most actively involved in maintaining 
Iran's stability through economic, . military, and advisory 
aid. 
With the ending of World War II in August, 1945, the 
Allied troops were, according to the Tripartite T�eaty of 
1942, to be withdrawn from Iran by March, 1946. The British 
and Americans readily complied with the Treaty ; in fact, 
those two powers had begun gradually withdrawing their troops 
at a much earlier date . The Soviet Union, however, refused 
to withdraw its troops by the designated date, and this 
action was entangled with a significant occurrence in Iran, 
namely, the uprising of separatist movements in the northern 
province of Azarbayjan. The uprising reflected the political 
instability in Iran, as well as the Soviet Union's role in 
promoting that instability. 
In August, 1945, armed ·Tudah supporters backed by 
Soviet troops occupied governmental buildings in Tabriz, the 
capital of Azarbayjan. The Tudah rebels, intending to 
control Tabriz and the area, then issued a manifesto 
·-
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demanding provincial autonomy and recognition of , Azari-Turki 
as the official language of the province. The revolutionaries 
demanded such recognition on the - ground that the people of 
Azarbayjan formed a separate .. "nationality" with a distinct 
heritage, language, and lifestyle, and, as such, the 
Azarbayjanies had the right to local self-determination. 
Although · the rebellion was quelled within . several weeks, and 
the local Iranian governor officially regained control, this 
incident was a preview of the intensified revolution to 
35 come. 
The leader of the Azarbayjan separatist movement was 
Jaafar Pis
.
hevari, a communist who had formerly lived in the 
36 Soviet Union for a number of years. It was more than 
coincidental that the leader of this movement was a Soviet 
inspired communist, for the Soviet Union was the force which 
agitated the Azarbayjani revolutionaries to rebel against 
the central Iranian government for the autonomy of the 
province of Azarbayjan. The Soviets incited the separatist 
movement because they believed that an autonomous Azarbayjan, 
under a Soviet supported regime, would provide a base for 
Soviet· interests in Iran. Moreover, the Soviets believed 
35Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-1948, 
pp. 286-87. 
36Pahlavi, Mission for My Country, p. 115. 
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that, eventually, an· autonomous Azarbayjan could be absorbed 
into the· Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as part of the 
Azarbayjan Soviet Socialist Republic. 
In September, 1945, Pishevari dissolved the local Tudah 
Party in Azarbayjan and reorganized the members into the 
newly formed Democratic Party of Azarbayjan (Firqah-i 
Dimukrat-i Azarbayjan) • Pishevari explained that he dissolved 
the local Tudah· Party because he felt that the Tudah Party 
did · not represent the needs of Azarbayjan. 37 A more probable 
explanation is that the Soviet· Union directed Pishevari to 
dissolve the local Tudah Party and to organize the Democratic 
Party of Azarbayjan, because the connections of the Tudah 
Party with Soviet interests were well known, and, since the 
Soviet Union did not want to be openly associated with the 
Azarbayjan insurrection, the Tudah Party could not have 
directed the separatist movement. 
The revolutionary leadership in Tabriz presented its 
program to the central Iranian government, and negotiated 
for provincial autonomy within the state of Iran, as well as 
the use of Azari-Turki as the official language. In 
addition, the Democratic Party of Azarbayjan called . for . 
additional representatives in .the . Tehran Majlis, and for the 
37Abrahamian, " Communism and Communalism in Iran: the 
Tudah and the Firqah-i Dimukrat, " p. 291. 
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formation of a Provincial Council.38 The central Iranian 
government would not agree to the demand of autonomy, nor 
the recognition· of Azari-Turki· as the official language , on 
the basis that such a move· would make a multinational system 
in Iran, which contrasted the unitary system in the Iranian 
Constitution. 39 With the rejection of their demands, the 
revolutionaries rebelled and gained control of Azarbayjan. 
On December 12, 1945, the rebels proclaimed the "Autonomous 
Republic of Azarbayjan," with· a legislative assembly and · 
Pishevari as Prime Minister. · 
The apparent success · of the rebellion in - Tabriz 
encouraged an uprising among separatist Kurds of western 
Azarbayjan. The Kurds regarded themselves as distinct from 
Azarbayjanies of Turkish heritage. · Consequently, the Kurdish 
separatists felt no loyalty to the revolutionary gov�rnment 
in �abriz. Thus, on December 15, 1945, the independence of 
a Kurdish peoples' republic was declared, with the town of 
· 40 Mahabad as its center. In January, 1946, a Mahabad Chief, 
Qazi Mohammad, . was elected president. 
38L. P e Elwell-Sutton, "Political Parties in Iran, . 
1941-1948, " Middle East Journal, . III, No. 1 (1949), 56. 
39zabih, The . Communist Movement in.Iran, p. 102. 
40Archie Roosevelt, Jr. , . "The Kurdish Republic of 
Mahabad, " Middle East Journal, I, No. 3 (1947), 257. 
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The separatist movements were initially successful in 
declaring autonomy for the Azarbayjan and Kurdish regions. 
While it is true· that there was a small amount of support 
for autonomy within the proYince, apparently, the success 
of the rebellion could not have 'f:Bnaen achieved by the· militant 
separatists alone, for the level . of indigenous support for 
the move was not great enough, nor was the supply of arms. 
The rebellion initially achieved its goal of autonomy 
because the Soviet Union. supported the move · and protected 
the rebels. The Soviet Union· intended to eventually absorb 
Iranian Azarbayjan into the U. S. S. R. , and, had there been 
other indications of Iranian Azarbayjan's willingness to 
join the U. S . S. R. ,  the linguistic ties between the · Iranian 
Province of Azarbayjan and the Azarbayjan .soviet Socialist 
Republic would have been an additional element facilitating 
the absorption of Iranian Azarbayjan. The Soviet Union 
was further encouraged in its plan by the spark of separatist 
feelings and the conununist groups in · the prov�nce of 
Azarbayjan. 41 The Soviet troops backed the insurrection by 
preventing Iranian troops from entering Azarbayjan, and the 
Soviet Union protected the puppet regime in Azarbayjan by 
maintaining the - Soviet troops in the province. The presence 
41Richard W. Cottam, Nationalism in Iran (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964) , pp. 118, 125. 
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of the Soviet troops aided the rebel regime in instilling a 
• f , I 42' reign o fear over the province. 
Soviet interference in the province of Azarbayjan·was 
protested by the Iranian government, for such actions on the 
part of the Soviet Union were clearly contrary to the terms 
of the Tripartite Treaty of 1942. Britain and the United 
States joined Iran in protesting the Soviet· Union's action 
of p reventing Iranian troops from entering Tabriz in order 
to quell the December, 1945, rebellion. The two Western 
powers and Iran also protested the Soviet support of the 
rebel regimes of Azarbayjan· and the Kui-dish "republic." In 
January, .1946, the Iranian government protested before the 
Security Council of the United Nations, where an intense 
debate followed. 
While the debate continued in the United Nations the 
Iranian Prime Minister, Ahmad Qavam, went to Moscow to 
negotiate with the Soviet leaders, Stalin.and Molotov. 
The goal of Iran was to make the Soviet Union.terminate its 
support of the rebellious regimes and to make the Soviet 
Union abide by the date set for evacuation of troops 
(March 2, 1946). Through heated negotiations, an agreement 
was finally reached on April 4, 1946, .in which the Soviet 
Union agreed that the situation in.Azarbayjan was an internal 
42sanghvi, Aryamehr: The Shah of Iran, p. 129. 
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Iranian matter, and that the Soviet troops would be evacuated 
from Iran by May 9, 1946. Iran, through Prime Minister Qavam, 
agreed to discuss an oil concession in the north, to be 
formed as an . Iranian-Soviet company ; however, this agreement 
was tentative, and was to be finalized by action of the 
Fifteenth Majlis (which at that point had not been elected). 
Iran also agreed to consider the program of the Democratic 
· 43 Party of Azarbayjan. Thus, the Soviet Union promised 
before the Security Council . that Soviet troops would be 
withdrawn, . and, indeed, by May 9, 1946, Soviet troops had 
been evacuated. Consequently, the Pishevari regime and the 
Kurdish "republic" were· abandoned by their Soviet sponsors. 
Such a conclusion to . an initially enthusiastic Soviet· 
intervention implies that the Soviets realized that they had 
little to gain by continued support of the regimes, or by 
maintaining Soviet troops in Iran. On the other hand, the 
Soviets felt that the situation could be used in pressuring 
Iran into agreeing to the long aw�ited oil concession in the 
northern area of Iran. 
Another major factor which prompted the Soviets to 
withdraw their support from Azarbayjan was that the Pishevari 
regime had lost its initial popularity, for many of those 
who originally backed the separatist movement . had become 
43washington Post, April 6, 1946, p. 2, col. 2. 
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dissatisfied with the rebel regime, for they realized that 
the Pishevari regime did not fulfill the early promises, 
such as introducing social and land reforms. 44 The Soviets 
then realized that maintaining an autonomous region 
sympathetic to Soviet interests, would be difficult, due to 
the lack of any real indigenous support for the rebel 
regimes. Thus � the Soviets withdrew, realizing that they 
had more· to gain in the. promised oil concession than in 
maintaining Soviet troops and a precarious autonomous region 
in Iran . 
With the Soviet withdrawal, the way was clear for the 
Iranian government to regain control of the Azarbayjan 
region . In preparing for the recovery of Azarbayjan, the 
Iranian · goverriment announced that the upcoming elections 
would be held throughout Iran, including Azarbayjan Province, 
and the Mahabad region , and that in order to supervise the 
elections and maintain order, Iranian troops would be sent 
to Azarbayjan . On December 10, 1946, Iranian . troops entered 
Azarbayjan. Pishevari and his followers· attempted to resist, 
but without Soviet backing the Pishevari regime was totally 
weakened. Moreover, the people of Azarbayjan welcomed the 
Iranian . troops and actually attacked the leaders and members 
of the Democratic Party of Azarbayjan. 45 In the incident, 
4 4cottam, Nationalism in Iran, . p .  128. 
45Ibid. , 
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some of the Party leaders, including Pishevari, escaped to 
the Soviet Union. · Following the recovery of Azarbayjan, the 
Iranian Army regained control of the Mahabad region. In 
this case, the three main· Kurdish leaders were hanged by 
Iranian authorities and others were arrested. The Kurdish 
tribes did not resist the Iranian Army, for they had . not 
been enthusiastic about the Soviet supported puppet regime. 
Nor were the tribes particularly loyal to the central Iranian 
government, for they preferred to be left to their own tribal 
governing, unhampered by any centralized government. 
The Democratic Party of Azarbayjan explained that it 
had retreated, resulting in the collapse of the regime, 
because it seemed that engaging in armed resistance would 
arouse Anglo-American intervention on the Soviet border. 
The Party said that it would be more reasonable to retreat 
and to return when conditions were more suitable, that is, 
when the peasants and laborers could be organized into a 
revolutionary force. 46 The Democratic Party of Azarbayjan, 
in effect, admitted that the majority of the population of 
Azarbayjan had not been behind the separatist movement. The 
lack of indigenous support for the· Pishevari regime was 
related to the fact that the interests and goals of the 
majority of the population of Azarbayjan conflicted with the 
46zabih, The Communist Movement · in Iran, pp. 117-18. 
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policies and goals · of the Soviet inspired separatist 
movement. Although the people of Azarbayjan were · proud of 
their cultural - heritage, and had always wanted recognition 
of their distinct background and dialect, as opposed to 
blending with all other Persians, the majority of the 
population of Azarbayjan did not support the movement for 
autonomy. While initially a segment of the population of 
Azarbayjan was impressed with· Pishevari's promises of social 
and land reforms, and had backed him, many . of his original 
supporters soon became aware of the superficiality of his 
promises, withdrew their support, and joined the majority 
of Azarbayjanies in welcoming the troops of the central 
Iranian government. 
Thus, with· the collapse of the Democratic Party of 
Azarbayjan, the Tudah Party was the only effective communist 
party in Iran. Following the Soviet · defeat in Aza�bayjan 
however, the Soviet Union . had temporarily stopped using the 
Tudah Party as an active Soviet agent; that is, for a while, 
the Tudah Party did not actively sponsor Soviet interests in 
Iran. In addition, an ideological split in the Tudah Party 
47 developed. 
The Azarbayjan insurrection reflects the political 
instability prevalent in Iran at the end of World War II . 
47Elwell-Sutton, "Political Parties in Iran, 1941-
19 4 8, " p. 60. 
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Support for establishing regional autonomy existed among 
Azarbayjan activists who, above all, wanted recognition of 
their distinct heritage and culture. This movement was 
fanned without difficulty by Soviet agitation and the 
reorganization of the local Tudah Party into the · Democratic 
Party of Azarbayjan. The relative ease with which a region 
of a country could be agitated and led into a rebellion. in 
the name of autonomy was an indication of the prevailing 
political instability. Furthermore, the fact that the 
Soviet Union was able, at least in the short run, to prevent 
the central Iranian government from quelling the rebellion , 
and that the Soviet Union blatantly interfered and maintained 
puppet regimes in Tabriz and Mahabad, reflected the 
preponderance of the Soviet Union and the apparent lack of 
authoritative power on the part of the Iranian government. 
The situation did alter, however, for, despite the fact that 
the Soviet Union was the dominant power in the north, and 
that Iran was a small, occupied country, Iran did manage to 
maintain sufficient internal stability and · rally support from 
the West to secure Soviet withdrawal from northern Iran. 
Thus, the ability of Iran to prompt the withdrawal of Soviet 
support · from the rebel regimes, and the evacuation of Soviet 
troops from Iran, reflected sources of stability and strength 
in Iran. 
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One of Iran's sources of strength was British and 
American support of Moharrunad Reza Shah in his protest against 
the Soviets. Second, Iran exhibited a degree of internal 
strength with its bargaining power, for the tentative 
promise of an oil agreement . by Prime Minister Qavam, to be 
finalized by the Majlis, gave an advantage to Iran. This 
advantage resulted from the Fifteenth Majlis' refusal to 
ratify the oil agreement . made by Prime Minister Qavam, for 
the Majlis maintained that the Prime Minister had no legal 
right to conclude any such agreement. Furthermore, the 
American Ambassador to Tehran, George V .  Allen, had said that 
the American people would support Iran's right to sell or to 
refuse to sell Iranian resources. The Majlis, encouraged by 
apparent American support, confidently rejected the oil 
4 8  agreement. The Soviets had wanted the oil concession 
enough to abandon their puppet regimes, . yet, the Iranians 
had managed to insert a condition that the concession would 
be final only upon ratification by the Majlis. Thus, Iran's 
ability to prompt the Soviets to withdraw revealed that Iran 
had a degree of strength and stability enabling it to deal 
with a power such as the Soviet Union. Those elements of 
strength were Iran's Western allies and its bargaining power. 
4 8  Marlowe, Iran, p. 83. 
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Another pocket of stability, which was to prove of 
great value in the future, was the loyalty of the Iranian 
Army to Mohammad Reza Shah. Mohammad Reza Shah was able to 
recover Azarbayjan through the use of the Army, . which 
followed the Shah's directions, entered Tabriz, fought the 
resisting separatists, and regained control of the province 
of Azarb�yjan for the central Iranian government. Thus, 
Iran in the post World War II years exhibited instability; 
however, the country had elements of stability which could 
be relied upon. 
Of great significance to the matter of stability in 
Iran was the situation of the communist movement in the 
country. The movement dated back to 1918. With the . rise of 
Reza Shah the communist movement went underground, and in 
1931 communist activities were banned by law. Many communist 
t rnb . . d d th t ' t · 1  49  par y me ers were 1mpr1sone , an o ers wen in o exi e. 
Important were the arrest and imprisonment in 1937 of Taghi 
Erani and his followers, for when his group was released 
from prison in 1941 (minus Erani, who had died in prison), 
it was they who formed the Tudah Party. Indeed, the record 
of the Tudah activities between 1941 and 1946, revealed the 
trend of the communist movement in Iran. Although the party 
initially disclaimed any connection with the Soviet Union, 
49wilber, Contemporary Iran, pp. 135--36. 
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and avoided mentioning Communism in party policies, the true 
nature of the Tudah Party was gradually revealed, and the 
identity with Soviet interests became more apparent by 
1943-44. Moreover, the connection between Soviet interests 
and the Tudah Party (and its offshoot the Democratic Party 
of Azarbayjan) wis openly apparent in the Azarbayjan 
insurrection of 1945, which was a high point in ·the communist 
movement in Iran, despite the 1931 ban on communist 
activities which was legally in effect at · that period. The 
Azarbayjan insurrection was due to Soviet agitation, for the 
Soviets wanted an autonomous Azarbayjan to be the Soviet 
foothold in postwar Iran; moreover, the Soviets were planning 
to absorb the Azarbayjan region into the u . s . s . R .  Thus, 
during that period, the communist movement was "a  serious 
threat. to the political stability 11 5 0  of Iran. 
While the Soviet occupation of northern Iran . had 
revived communist activity in Iran, . the withdrawal of Soviet 
support from the Azarbayjan regime and the evacuation of 
Soviet troops.from Iran had the reverse effect. The Tudah 
Party declined. The Tudah Party's active campaign of 
supporting Soviet interests in Iran temporarily ceased, and 
this coincided with an ideological factioning within the 
party, which was mainly over the degree to which the Tudah 
5 0  Ibid. , p. 140. 
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Party should be involved with Soviet interests. The 
Democratic Party of Azarbayjan was still in existence, but 
for all practical purposes, the party had collapsed. The 
Tudah Party managed to stay alive, despite · the defeat, and 
in one respect, the withdrawal of Soviet· troops had aided 
the Tudah Party, for anticommunists could not continue to 
proclaim that the Tudah Party was merely a tool of the 
Soviet Union, surviving only by the· protection of Soviet 
troops. Indeed, this· situation prompted the Tudah Party 
to attempt to convince the Iranian people that the Tudah 
Party was purely an indigenous Iranian organization and was 
not connected with the Soviet Union. 51 This policy became 
an important element in the post 1946 tevival of the Tudah 
Party. The Tudah · Party made great efforts to revise its 
organization, in terms of its leaders, members, and 
activities, in order to remedy the decline it had 
experienced, and to solve the party £actioning. 
The revived Tudah Party · became more active. The 
postoccupation period was ripe for Tudah activities, because 
the party preached social reforms and appealed to the 
working class, weary of the economic and social burdens with 
which they were burdened . Iran's political and economic 
instability, which followed the withdrawal of the Allied 
51zabih, The Communist Movement in Iran, pp. 123-24. 
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forces, was used by the Tudah to promote support for the 
party, for· the Tudah · Party called for the nationalization of 
Iran's industries and the division of large agricultural 
holdings in its appeal for followers. 52 Such methods gained 
the support of workers and students for the Tudah Party 
until 1949. 
In February, 1949, an unsuccessful attempt was made to 
assassinate Mohammad Reza Shah. This incident prompted the 
government to prohibit communist and other antimonarchical 
activities. Thus, the Tudah Party, and its organ, the 
United Central Council of Unified Trade Unions of Iranian 
Workers (the United Council), were · banned. Such a move was 
justified because the would-be assassin was a· member of a 
union affiliated with the United Council. Martial law was 
proclaimed, and Tudah· members were arrested ; however, the 
main party leaders fled to communist countries. 53 The 
government was concerned with suppressing the extremists 
and strengthening the stability of Iran. Thus, an era of 
underground activities by the communist movement began. The 
Tudah Party and its publications were clandestine until 
1951, when restraints were somewhat relaxed . 
52 Marlowe, Iran, p. 87. 
53
zabih, The Conununist Movement in Iran, pp. 164-65. 
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The relationship of the communist movement in Iran to 
the situation of stability in the country is significant. 
One of the most destabilizing actions inspired by the 
communist movement in· Iran was the Azarbayjan separatist 
movement of 1945. The ties of the Tudah Party to the Soviet 
Union were a great threat, for the success of the insurrection 
would have provided the Soviet Union with a permanent 
foothold in Iran. While the communist .movement was defeated 
by the withdrawal of Soviet· troops from Azarbayjan and the 
recovery of the province by the central Iranian government, 
the Tudah Party revived its activities by 1948. 
Indeed, the revival of the Tudah·at that time was a 
special threat to Iran's stability, for the Tudah Party 
attempted to promote itself as an indigenous force, unaligned 
with the Soviet Union, and as a proponent of prosperity and 
social equality for the Iranian.masses. The Tudah Party 
became well organized and was gaining strength in the 
unstable postwar period. In 1949, the renewed ban on 
communist activities effectively dispersed the Tudah Party, 
sending the party underground, while the leaders were· 
arrested or went into exile. The Tudah Party rose again, 
however, because during the period of Prime Minister Mohammad 
Mossadegh, the communist party took advantage of the 
relaxation of restraints on communist activities. During 
the Mossadegh period, the Tudah Party used a number of 
\ 
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front organizations on · the surface, and continued its 
involvement in demonstrations and riots with the intention 
of undermining Iran's stability and the Monarch's authority. 
The period of Prime Minister Mossadegh, the early 1950s, 
was the most trying period for Iran in terms of stability 
and instability. The issues and political figures who arose 
during that period led to the climax of a 1953 coup d'etat i 
which marked the turning point in Iran. An analysis of the 
issues which led to the 1953 coup d'etat reveals that there 
were a number of interwoven issues involved. 
Firstly, in the aftermath of World War II, Iran was an 
economically and politically exhausted country. Despite the 
problems brought to Iran by the Allied occupation, the 
withdrawal of the troops also brought economic problems, such 
as unemployment, and consequently frustration. The situation 
was ripe for the growth of extremist groups of the left and 
the right . The most notable leftist group was the Tudah · 
Party, and the most notable rightist group was the Devotees 
of Islam (Fidayan-i-Islam) • 54 
In the deteriorated economic conditions of postwar Iran, 
definite economic planning was necessary. Mohanunad Reza Shah 
54 ' ' 160 ArmanJan1, Iran, p. 
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felt that increased oil revenues would provide funds for 
economic development. American advisors drafted a national 
development program for Iran designed to promote the 
development of industry, oil production, agriculture, and 
other fields. This program was adopted by the Iranian 
government in July, 1949, as the First Seven Year Plan, to 
be directed by the Seven Year Plan Organization, and to be 
financed by government revenues from the oil industry. 55 In 
addition, Mohanunad Reza Shah hoped to receive increased 
financial assistance from the United States. At that time, 
however, the United States would not increase the financial 
aid it was already supplying under the Truman Doctrine. Such 
a rejection initiated anti-American feelings, and strengthened 
the position of the Majlis coalition of nonconununist 
nationalists known as the "National Front ·."  In addition, 
the rejection prompted agitation for an increase in oil 
revenues, since this would be the source of finance for the 
Seven Year . Plan . • 
By 1948, there began negotiations to revise the 1933 
oil agreement, between the Iranian government and the 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). There arose great 
controversy over the oil situation with both leftists and 
rightists exerting pressure on the Majlis. Even 
55Pahlavi, Mission for My Country, p. 138. 
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Mohammad Reza Shah, whose concern was for the development of 
his country, was criticized by extremists. Emotions were 
heightened throughout the country. In February, 1949, an 
attempt . was made· on the life of Mohammad Reza Shah. This 
shocked the people into realizing that, had Mohammad Reza Shah 
been assassinated, Iran would have plunged into a state of 
anarchy. 56 Because extremists were connected with the 
attempted assassination, the Tudah Party and all 
antimonarchist activities were ba nned. In consideration of 
the political conditions, the Majlis voted to strengthen 
Mohammad Reza Shah's constitutional powers. In this regard , 
a Senate was established, to which Mohammad Reza Shah 
appointed one-half of the members. In addition, 
Mohammad Reza Shah gained the right to dissolve the Majlis 
and order new elections. 
The main controversy of the period was the revision of 
the oil agreement with the AIOC, and most visible in the 
controversy were the member groups of the National Front, 
whose articulate leader was Mohannnad Mossadegh. Mossadegh 
himself was of a wealthy landowning family, and he had been 
involved in political life from his early adult years. The 
nationalists within the National Front were · from many 
56Hassan Arfa, Under Five Shahs (New York: William 
Morrow, 1965), p. 388. 
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different segments of Iranian society, and they included 
religious clerics, merchants, professionals, and students, 
who were of various political and economic backgrounds, such 
ps nonconununist leftists of the intelligentsia, members of 
the working class and of the upper class. The National Front 
was a conglomeration of various groups loosely labeled as a 
coalition because of their avowed hatred for the foreign 
influence in Iran. The coalition, however, lacked any real 
cohesion. There was no well defined policy, aside from 
ousting the foreigners, especially the British. Although 
there was no formal organization within the National Front, 
there were political groupings which made up a Left Wing, 
center groups, and a conservative Right Wing, as well as 
Nati6nalist extremists. The center and conservative Right 
Wing was the focal point of the National Front, because 
Mossadegh was identified with this segment. 57 
Related to the National Front ' s  hatred of foreign 
influence was Mossadegh's proposal that Iran neither grant 
concessions to any country, nor allow the influence of any 
country in Iran. This would have created a situation in 
which all foreign countries would have been excluded from 
Iran. Therefore, this policy was referred to as "Negative 
57cottam, Nationalism in Iran, . pp. 265-66. 
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Equilibrium" or "Negative Neutrality.11 58 As a force 
attempting to eliminate foreign influence in Iran, .the format 
of the .. National Front was that of negative objectives. In 
this regard, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company became the target 
of the National Front, for, as the Soviet request for a 
northern oil concession had been rejected in 1947, a balance 
would exist only if the oil of Iran were nationalized and 
the British company expropriated. The time was ripe for 
the National Front's objectives, for Iranians were 
dissatisfied with the unequal treatment, and the unequal oil 
returns, imposed upon Iran by the AIOC. Indeed, the National 
Front grasped the opportunity to agitate against the AIOC, 
and to champion Iranian nationalism through.the call for the 
nationalization of IranJs oil. 
Aside from the National Front's aversion to foreign 
influence, the National Front groups had other reasons for 
initiating agitation against the AIOC. For example, groups 
of conservative landlords and clerics who maintained 
religious endowments (waqfs) were opposed to Mohammad Reza 
Shah's plan to distribute the Royal Estates to the peasants, 
and such groups, interested in maintaining the feudal system, 
turned the attention of the people from land reform to the 
emotional issue of the nationalization of oii.59 In 
58Pahlavi, Mission for My Country, p. 84. 
59sanghvi, Aryamehr: The Shah of Iran, p. 172. 
addition, members of the Majlis managed to escape an 
anticorruption inquiry, which was being waged by 
Prime Minister Ali Razmara, by focusing attention·on oil 
d. . 60 1scuss1ons. 
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Moreover, it has been stated that Mossadegh used the 
emotional issue of the nationalization of oil and the 
ousting of the British as a means of propelling himself ·into 
a position of popularity and power.61 Mossadegh and the 
National Front easily directed the attention of the Iranian 
people toward the oil issue because the Iranians disliked 
the British. The Iranian people were willing to back a 
leader or group who would rid Iran of the British co�pany, 
and secure for Iran its rightful oil revenues. Indeed, such 
feelings explain the support which the Iranian population 
initially gave to Mossadegh, for he promised them a more 
prosperous life, free of the British overseers. 
Negotiations between the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and 
Iran were carried out in order to revise the 1933 oil 
agreement. A Supplemental Agreement, which proposed a 
fifty-fifty sharing of the oil profits, was drawn up by the 
AIOC, and was submitted to the Majlis in February, 1951. 
The Majlis Oil Commission, .of which Mossadegh was the 
60Avery, Modern Iran, p. 417. 
61Marlowe, Iran, p. 92. 
chairman, was to consider the Supplemental Agreement and 
offer its recommendations to the Majlis. Mossadegh could 
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not argue for the nationalization of oil on the basis of the 
benefits that might be derived from such a move, for 
nationalization would not have been an economic asset at that 
time, due to Iran's inability to operate the oil industry at 
that time. Indeed, Mohammad Reza Shah, who did not oppose 
the principle of nationalization as such, realized that Iran 
did not then have the financial or technical ability to 
operate the oil industry. 62 The views of Mohammad Reza Shah 
on the situation revealed the Shah's concern about the 
economic development of Iran. Mossadegh, on the other hand, 
championed the nationalization of oil on an emotiona·l basis, 
for he wanted to expropriate the British and to gain personal 
popularity . . 
Due to the emotions of the time, the Supplemental 
Agreement was rejected, and the Majlis Oil Commission 
proposed the nationalization of the oil industry. 
Prime Minister Razmara opposed the move, for he realized 
that Iran was not then capable of operating the oil industry. 
On March 7, 1951, Razmara was murdered by a member of the 
religious fanatical group, the Devotees of Islam. Shocked 
by the action, the Majlis quickly approved the nationalization 
62sanghvi, Aryamehr: The Shah of Iran, p. 179. 
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proposal, which a number of Majlis deputies actually 
opposed.
63 The . deputies had been intimidated, however, by 
rioting mobs which had been incited . by Mossadegh, and, in 
order to appease the extremists, ·the deputies approved the 
nationalization. 
The Nationalization Law was not recognized as legitimate 
by Britain. In an attempt to ensure the continued production 
of the oil industry, the new Prime Minister, Hossein Ala, 
suggested that a compromise be arranged, in which the 
foreign technicians would operate the nationalized industry. 
Mossadegh would not accept any compromise. Mohammad Reza Shah 
had approved the Nationalization Law, because Iran could not 
remain under the unequal treatment of the AIOC; however, 
Mohammad Reza Shah intended that the foreign technicians 
should maintain the industry. Extremists opposed this, and 
rioted in the southern oil fields, after which Britain 
closed the oil operations on April 15, 1951. 64 
The postoccupation years had been characterized by 
instability, and this was reflected in the instability of 
the successive governments. Mohanunad Reza Shah·felt·that 
the popular support of Mossadegh would help to stabilize the 
government and to affect the changes related to the 
63 b ' d 179 I l. . ,  p .  • 
64 hl ' M '  ' f M C t 90 Pa avi, 1.ss1.on or y oun ry, p. 
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nationalization· of the oil industry. Mohammad Reza Shah 
decided to nominate Mossadegh as Prime.Minister, for Mossadegh 
had said that he would implement the important reforms needed 
to improve the lifestyle of Iranians. Thus, on April 29, 
1951, Mossadegh became Prime Minister, and asked for two 
months to enforce the Nationalization Law. 65 
In May, 1951, Britain was still willing _ to work out the 
oil problem and to recognize the principle of nationalization. 
However, Britain wanted AIOC personnel to operate the 
industry. Mossadegh, meanwhile, had devised a Nine Point 
Law, which provided for a Board to affect the nationalization 
of the oil industry and the expropriation of the AIOC. 
Britain maintained that the expropriation of the company 
conflicted with the terms of the 1933 oil agreement, for that 
concession was not to be broken by unilateral action; rather, 
disputed matters were to be arbitrated. 66 The Iranian 
government, however, declared that nationalization by law 
repealed any agreement with private concerns. 67 With 
determination to follow through with nationalization, Iran 
formed the National Iranian Oil Com P3-ny (NIOC), in June, 
1951; however, the NIOC could not maintain efficient 
65s h ' A h Th Sh h f I 180 ang vi, ryame r: e a o ran, p. 
66
Avery, Modern Iran, p. 418. 67Ibid. , pp. 420-21. 
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operations in the · oil industry, and the oil revenues 
dwindled. By July, 1951, severe- economic decline had begun. 
In July, 1951, the United States, concerned with the 
production of oil, encouraged Iran and Britain to negotiate 
and to devise a working formula. For this· purpose, 
Averell Harriman was sent as a special envoy to Iran, and 
Richard Stokes represented British interests. The 
negotiations floundered .on the point of the operation of 
the oil industry, for, although Britain had conceded the 
principle of nationalization and had agreed that AIOC should 
be an agent of the NIOC, the AIOC would not concede to the 
expropriation of the company's oil installations. Moreover, 
Britain did not want the British technicians · to work under 
a contract · with NIOC, for Britain wanted the employees' 
contracts with AIOC to remain in effect, with mainly Britons 
maintaining the operation of the oil industry. 68 
The negotiations failed, apparently, because Mossadegh 
would not agree to any terms, except complete control of the 
oil industry by the Iranian government, for Mossadegh was 
determined to crush Britain's position in Iran, despite · the 
adverse effects upon Iran's economy. Mossadegh wanted 
recognition of Iran's right to nationalize the oil industry 
and to expropriate, with compensation, the AIOC. Therefore, 
68Alan w. Ford, The An lo-Iranian Oil Dis ute of 1951-
1952 (Berkeley: The University o Ca i ornia Press, 1954 , 
p:g6, cited by Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, p. 214. 
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no compromise would have been acceptable to him, not even 
the fifty-fifty proposal offered by Britain, an agreement 
which probably would have prevented the economic collapse 
which followed. The July negotiations and the dispute 
inflamed heightened emotions and incited riotous 
demonstrations by National Front supporters as well as Tudah 
supporters. 
By September, 1951, there appeared to be no hope of 
reaching a compromise in the oil dispute. Therefore, the 
actual nationalization of the oil industry came into effect, 
with the expropriation of the AIOC. Although Mossadegh felt 
victorious over the assertion of Iran's position, Britain 
had not relinquished all hope of regaining its role in the 
Iranian oil industry. Following the breakdown of 
negotiations, Britain appealed to t�e International Court 
of Justice (ICJ) · on the basis of the provision for 
arbitration in the 1933 oil agreement. Mossadegh did not 
recognize the jurisdiction of the ICJ, however, and Britain 
then submitted the matter to the Security Council of the 
United Nations, where it was debated in October, 1951. 69 
For its part, the United Nations decided to await the 
International Court of Justice's decision on the position of 
an international organization in the oil dispute. Rather 
69Pahlavi, Mission for My Country, pp. 92-93. 
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than idly wait for a decision, Britain initiated several 
measures to apply economic pressure to Iran, such as freezing 
Iran's sterling balance, and canceling British licenses to 
export certain materials from the United Kingdom to Iran. 70 
While such measures were an inconvenience for Iran, they were 
somewhat alleviated by the Soviet Union's exporting items 
to Iran. 
The most drastic British technique, however, one which 
effectively crushed Iran's oil industry at that time, was 
Britain's cutting the market for Iranian oil. Britain had 
informed possible buyers of Iranian oil that anyone 
purchasing oil from NIOC would be sued for knowingly 
possessing stolen goods, for Britain had warned them that the 
oil belonged to the · AIOC. Since the oil tankers would not 
accept Iranian oil, and Iran owned no oil tankers, Iran could 
not export its oil. Consequently, Iran received no revenue 
f th · 1  . d t 71 h f th · 1  . d t rom e 01 in us ry. T e  revenue rom e 01 in us ry 
remained lost until 1954, after Mossadegh was no longer 
Prime Minister. Due to the loss of oil revenues, the Seven 
Year Plan for Development collapsed. 
The collapse of the oil industry adversely affected 
Mossadegh's position, for, as the situation worsened, the 
7o h . . h Th Sh h f I 191 Sang vi, Aryame r :  e a o ran, p. 
71 Marlowe, Iran, pp. 94-95. 
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members of the Majlis· became more open in their disapproval 
of Mossadegh's policies. In May, 1952, the Majlis rejected 
the National Front's candidate for its president. In July, 
1952, Mossadegh told Mohanunad Reza Shah that as Prime Minister, 
he could not maintain order unless he was given plenary 
powers for six months. Mossadegh wanted to rule by decree 
without consulting the Majlis, and he wanted the position 
of Minister of War, which would give him control of the 
armed forces. Mohanunad Reza Shah refused to grant Mossadegh 
such powers. Consequently, Mossadegh resigned on July 16, 
1952, and was replaced by Ahmad Qavam. Due to the 
demonstrations that occurred, however, the Shah asked Qavam 
to resign and Mossadegh was reappointed. The Majlis then 
went along with Mossadegh's request for plenary powers, as 
\ 
the deputies had been intimidated by the rioting crowds. At 
about the same time, the International Court of Justice 
returned its decision that it had no jurisdiction in the oil 
dispute between Iran and the AIOC, which Mossadegh regarded 
1 . t 72 as a persona vie ory. 
Nonetheless, Mossadegh's "victory" meant further 
political and economic decline for Iran, for no reversal in 
the oil shutdown would be forthcoming. Mossadegh's plenary 
powers were indeed wide-ranging, for he took charge of the 
72Pahlavi, Mission for My Country, p. 95. 
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Ministry of War, and he ruled by decree in such areas as 
banning strikes by government workers, placing restrictions 
on newspapers, and declaring martial law. In October, 1952, 
Mossadegh cut Iran's relations with Britain, while in 
January, 1953, he directed the Majlis to dissolve the Senate. 
In addition, Mossadegh obtained a six month renewal of his 
plenary powers, and he dissolved the Supreme Court. Next, 
Mossadegh initiated a referendum on the question of 
dissolving the Majlis, during which the people were 
· t ·  ' d t d · t t ·  
· 
f d '  1 t ·  73 in imi a e in o vo ing or isso u ion. 
Real support for Mossadegh was dwindling, however, and 
by spring, 1953, a split had occurred in the National Front. 
A number of former Mossadegh supporters, notably Ho�sein Maki, 
Mozaffar Baqai, and Abolqassem Kashani, defected from the 
National Front. With the defection of these leaders, a 
number of their followers became anti-Mossadegh. Indeed, in 
February, 1953, a crowd rioted before Mossadegh's house, 
causing him to take refuge in the Majlis building. 74 
Mossadegh was not completely abandoned, however, for those 
who naively thought that Mossadegh's prime concern was 
73 Marlowe, Iran, p. 98. 
74cottam, Nationalism in Iran, pp. 277 , 280. 
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ridding Iran of foreign imperialists, continued to s�pport 
h. 75 1m. 
As opposition to Mossadegh grew, and support for him 
declined, the role of the Tudah Party in relation to Mossadegh 
became significant. Mossadegh and the Tudah Party shared 
mutually ambivalent feelings toward each other. The 
initial relationship between the Tudah· Party and Mossadegh 
was one of animosity. The National Front had adopted an 
anticommunist policy in order to attract American aid, a 
policy which turned the Soviets and the Tudah Party against 
Mossadegh and the National Front.76 For its parti the 
United States had told Mossadegh to amend the oil dispute 
before increased aid would be given. This rejection 
strained America's relationship with Mossadegh, and as that 
relationship became increasingly strained, Mossadegh's 
relationship with the Tudah Party became less so. By July, 
1952, Mossadegh had relaxed the restraints on the banned 
Tudah Party, and the government reduced the ban on,communist 
activities. In a like manner, t�e Tudah press had eased its 
criticism of Mossadegh following July, 1952. 
Although the legal ban on conununist activities still 
existed, it was �ot enforcied, and the Tudah Party took 
advantage of the relaxed restraints. The Tudah Party 
75 b'd I 1 . ,  p. 280. 7
6Ibid., p. 222. 
utilized front organizations for open activityj while the 
party itself worked underground. 77 The Tudah Party then 
adopted a more revolutionary program, which included the 
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.increased training of military cadres, for the Tudah leaders 
had ultimate plans of usurping power, and the military 
network of the party was to play a vital role. 78. The Tudah 
had actually infiltrated the Iranian military, and maintained 
an organized milit�ry network until the fall of Mossadegh. 
In order to gain influence in Iran, the Tudah Party pretended 
to support Mossadegh's nationalist policies; however, the 
Tudah Party did not actually acknowledge the National Front 
as an ideological partner. The Tudah was only using Mossadegh 
as a step to reach its own goals. The Tudah Party wanted to 
destroy Iran's Western ties and to have Iran aligned with 
the Soviet Union. To do so, the Tudah Party intended to take 
advantage of the chaotic conditions in the government, and 
the anti-Western aspects of Mossadegh's nationalism.
79 
Indeed, Mossadegh's relaxation .of anticommunist restraints 
had facilitated the expansion of the communist organization, 
and had allowed the Tudah Party to advance closer to its 
goal. 
77zabih, The Communist Movement in Iran, . p. 167. 
78Ibid. , p. 177. 
79 Ibid. , p. 190. 
1 34 
One of the main reasons for Mossadegh's relaxation of 
restraints on communis.t activity was his belief that greater 
freedom for communist activities in Iran would prompt the 
United States into providing more aid to Iran in an effort 
to prevent Mossadegh from turning to the communists. On 
May 28, 1953, Mossadegh implied, in a letter to 
President Eisenhower, that without increased American aid, 
Mossadegh would have to turn to the.communists for aid. 
Mossadegh was unsuccessful in his attempt to alter the policy 
of.the United States, for, in a return letter of June 29, 
1953, President Eisenhower rejected his request, and declared 
that Iran must determine its own foreign and domestic 
80 policies in.the best interest of the country. Eisenhower's 
reply resulted in a further decline of Mossadegh's popularity, 
for the Prime Minister's inability to acquire funds for Iran 
was exposed. Mossadegh became increasingly dictatorial, and 
somewhat paranoid, as exhibited by his living in the Majlis 
building for refuge, for he feared that.he might be . 
. t d 81 assassina e .  
One of Mossadegh's goals had been to undermine the 
authority of the Shah. In this regard, Mossadegh had 
designated a committee in the Majlis to determine ways to 
80 , Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, pp. 223-24. 
81 '. Avery, Modern Iran, p. 436. 
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limit the Shah's power as Commander in - Chief of the Armed 
Forces.· However, the Majlis would not consider such a 
tactic. 82 Mohammad Reza Shah realized that Mossadegh hoped 
to overthrow the Shah and to destroy the Pahlavi Dynasty. 
Iran was declining into greater political and economic 
instability and action was needed to prevent further decline 
at the hands of Mossadegh. The impetus to action came with 
the apparent illegality of a referendum initiated by 
Mossadegh to formalize the dissolution of the Majlis in 
August, 1953. 83 On August 13, Mohammad Reza Shah issued a 
decree dismissing Mossadegh and naming General Fazlollah 
Zahedi as Prime Minister. Mossadegh would not accept the 
decree, and he arrested the messenger who delivered it. Such 
actions initiated the coup d ' etat by the · Army and· the people 
against Mossadegh, and in support of Mohammad Reza Shah. 
Mohammad Reza Shah and the Queen left for Baghdad, then flew 
to Rome. Mohammad Reza Shah explained that it had been 
prearranged that if Mossadegh used force to resist the ' 
decree, Mohammad Reza Shah and the Queen would leave the 
country, in order to force Mossadegh and his force to "show 
their real allegiances, 11
84 
and thereby aid in defining the 
82 . Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, p. 281. 
83zabih, The Communist Movement in Iran, p. 199. 
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opinion of the Iranian people . It would, in effect, . give 
Iran an opportunity for a true referendum on the country's 
support for Mohammad Reza Shah . 
On August 16, 1953, General Zahedi led royalist retired 
Army officers against Mossadegh's tank-guarded estate. The 
attack was unsuccessful, and was followed by two days of 
demonstrations and riots, much of which was incited by the 
Tudah Party . At that point the Tudah was involved in 
pro-Mossadegh demonstrations . However, on August 19, the 
Tudah-inspired mobs turned against Mossadegh and the Tudah 
members were instructed not to be involved . 85 The communists 
had abandoned Mossadegh, for they realized that there was 
very little genuine support for Mossadegh, and that he would 
be defeated . 
The Army, loyal to Mohammad Reza Shah, resumed its 
fight, reclaimed areas of Tehran, and at the same time, 
segments of the Iranian people joined the Army in the fight 
against Mossadegh . The people wanted to depose the 
dictatorial Prime Minister- who had ruined Iran's economy and 
had allowed the communists to reorganize and gain influence 
in the country . The Iranian people wanted their Shah to 
rule Iran . For this goal they were willing to risk their 
lives and fight Mossadegh's forces . · The Army and the 
85 Avery, Modern Iran, p .  439 . 
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people captured Mossadegh, and on August 22, 1953, . 
Mohammad Reza Shah and the Queen returned to Tehran and to 
the rejoicing of the Iranian people. 86 
Mossadegh was tried, convicted, and imprisoned, and 
was then placed under village arrest. Through the trials, 
the inner nature of Mossadegh's period was revealed, 
including the infiltration of six hundred Tudah officers 
into the Iranian Armed Forces, as well as the Tudah plan to 
eliminate Mossadegh once he had overthrown the Pahlavi 
Dynasty and establish a communist regime. It has been noted 
that the communists deserted Mossadegh because of the uprising 
against him, for the determination of the Iranian people to 
fight against Mossadegh made the Tudah members realize that 
Iran was not a ripe target for a communist takeover. 87 With 
the ending of Mossadegh's period, the ban on the Tudah Party 
and communist activity was strictly enforced, with the 
imprisonment of many communist leaders and party members. 
The characterization of the August, 1953 , revolution 
as a coup d'etat of the Army and the people has been prefaced 
by some observers with a claim that the overthrow of 
Mossadegh was made possible by the · involvement of the 
United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). One widely 
86sanghvi, Aryamehr: The Shah of Iran, p. 210. 
87 hl ' M ' ' f M C t 105 Pa avi, 1ss1on or y oun ry, p. 
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circulated account of such alleged involvement was an article 
written by Richard Harkn�ss and Gladys Harkness in the 
. · 8 8  Saturday Evening Post. The article proposed that the 
overthrow of Mossadegh was initiated by CIA officials who 
paid local agents to induce Iranians to fight against 
Mossadegh. Although the alleged involvement of .the CIA was 
a controversial and unclear matter, a more careful observation 
of the events would reveal that the Harkness and Harkness 
article had distorted the facts, and was filled with · 
" puerile innuendoes. 11 89 
The allegations in the Harkness and Harkness article 
have been refuted, and, although it was possible that some 
local leaders may have been p�id to fight against Mossadegh, 
the great number of Iranian people who joined the fight 
surprised General Zahedi, and those people were not paid to 
fight. Those Iranians were determined to crush Mossadegh, 
a.long with any possibility of having a communist government 
in Iran. Moreover, the Harkness and Harkness article erred 
in no� recognizing the spontaneous development of the events 
of August 19, 1953, for, " Mossadegh could not have been 
8 8Richard Harkness and Gladys Hark�ess, " The Mysterious 
Doings of the CIA, " The Saturday Evening Post, November 6, 
1954, pp. 66-68, cited by Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, . 
pp. 2 2 7- 2 9 . 
89cottam, Nationalism in Iran, p. 229. 
13 9  
overthrown if significant elements of the population had not 
lost faith in his leadership . 11 9 0  Mohanunad Re za Shah dealt 
with the allegations by stating that .it was pos sible that 
payments could have been made in some cases . However , 
Mohanunad Reza Shah believed that the spontaneous participation 
of such a large number of Iranians in the fight against 
Mossadegh indicated that those who j oined the fight were not 
paid to do so . Mohanunad Reza Shah noted that loyal men , 
women , and children risked their lives to overturn Mossadegh , 
an_d that money could not have been an inducement to make · them 
risk their live s . The people were inspired by " indigenous 
nationalism . " 91 
The period of the Mossadegh premiership was overwhelmingly 
an unstable time in Iran . The political and economic 
instability was mainly the result of the disruptive policies 
of Prime Minister Mossadegh and his stubborn refusal to 
compromise , even in the interest of Iran . Mossadegh had 
brought about the nationalization of  oil , despite · the 
warnings of the Shah and oil experts that Iran was not then 
capable of maintaining the oil industry . The resultant 
economic deterioration affected the political and social 
situation , and brought about greater frustration and 
9 oibid . ,  pp . 2 27 , 2 2 9 . 
91p hl ' M '  . ' f M C t 106 a av1 , 1ss1on or y oun ry, p .  
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instability. Mossadegh had planned to use the world's need 
for Iranian oil ·as a bargaining weapon in inducing Britain 
to agree to his terms. However, Mossadegh had misj udged the 
situation, for the world soon adj usted to operating without 
Iran's oil. Moreover, Britain would . not agree to Mossadegh's 
terms, and retaliated against Mossadegh's nationalization 
through economic pressures. 
Mossadegh was mainly concerned with securing power for 
himself, and was not greatly occupied with the stabilization 
of Iran, although he had promised Mohammad Reza Shah that 
such would be his goal as Prime Minister. Mossadegh, 
however, adopted destructive policies in foreign and domestic 
matters. Mossadegh actually wanted dictatorial powers, and 
he used various tactics to attempt to undermine the authority 
of the Shah. In his quest for personal power, Mossadegh 
sought to make the Shah reign, not rule. Mossadegh's 
struggle for power adversely affected the stability of Iran. 
The intensity of Mossadegh's attempts to undermine the 
authority of the Shah and to gain personal power led to the 
collapse of political and social stability by August, 1953, 
at which point a revolution of the Army and the people 
removed Mossadegh from power and reestablished the stabilizing 
authority of Mohammad Reza Shah. 
Another trend in Mossadegh's policies which adversely 
affected the stability of Iran was the relaxation of 
· restraints on communist · activities. Because of the relaxed 
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conditions, the Tudah Party became well organized during 
Mossadegh's period, and it gained strength in the midst of 
the political and social chaos caused by the economic · decline 
and confusion following the nationalization of oii. 92 
Mossadegh's relaxation of restraints against communist 
activities made it possible for Tudah members to infiltrate 
the military, which brought the communists · closer to their 
ultimate goal of taking over the government of Iran. 
Although Mossadegh would not work openly with the Tudah 
Party, for he feared such an alliance would shatter his 
support, Mossadegh did deal with the Tudah and relax 
93 restraints upon them. The Tudah Party was thereby able 
to work more openly in demonstrations and riots against the 
political and social structure of Iran, thus, increasing the 
intensity of the un�table - situation in the country. Such 
activities were an added impetus for the people of Iran to 
fight against Mossadegh in August, 1953, for they feared the 
Tudah would become overly powerful, and the Iranian people 
were determined that they did not want a Tudah government 
coming into power. 
Mossa�egh hoped to use the scare of Communism as a 
bargaining tool to obtain more American aiq. Indeed, this 
9211Man of the Year: Challenge of the East, " Time, 
January 7, 1952, p. 20. 
9311Mossadegh.' s Role in the Events of 1951-3 in Persia, " 
Central Asian Review, IX, No. 3 ( 1961} , 305. 
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was a negative policy of " strength through weakness, 11
94 
characteristic of Mossadegh's term. Mossadegh's negative 
policies did not work, however, and the United States would 
not be prodded into fulfilling Mossadegh' s requests. This 
loss of bargaining power, along with the other fiascoes of 
Mossadegh's term caused the Prime· Minister to lose ·a good 
deal of support. The prime reasons for Mossadegh's fall, 
however, were his quest for personal power and his disregard 
for the interests of Iran. Mossadegh's power-seeking 
.policies caused economic collapse in Iran, as well as 
increased political and social instability. 
T.he return of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi on August 22, 
1953, was a joyful day for Iranians. A new era began for 
Iran, an era in which Mohanunad Reza Shah strengthened his 
position such that he was able to rule effectively and not 
merely reign. 
In sununary, the period between· 1941 and 1953 was 
characterized by political, economic, and social instability 
in Iran. The occupation of Iran by Allied forces in 1941 
marked the beginning of an era of instability in the 
country, for the actual independence of Iran was hampered by 
the domination of the country by Britain and the Soviet· Union. 
94 
· " Mossadegh-Prophet or Buffoon, " New York Times, 
September 28, 1952, Sec. VI, p. 16. 
14 3 
Furthermore, the economic and social problems brought to 
Iran with occupation were destabilizing elements of the war 
years. An additional threat to Iran's stability was 
exhibited in the Soviet influenced separatist movement of 
Azarbayjan in 194 5, which, if . it had lasted, would have 
resulted in Azarbayjan becoming a satellite of the Soviet 
Union, and in further Soviet domination over other provinces 
in Iran. Iran was able . to oust the Soviets in 1946 through 
effective bargaining and the support of Iran's Western 
allies, which revealed a degree of strength on the part of 
Iran. During the period 1941-1953, there were intermittent 
resurgences of communist activities, which comprised a major 
destabilizing force in Iran. Following the August, 1953, 
coup d'etat, however, the communist movement was quelled 
through , the strict . enforcement of the ban on communist 
activities. The climax of instability during that period 
arrived with the rise of Mossadegh, whose destructive 
policies, especially his policy on oil nationalization, 
brought increased economic collapse as well as political 
and social instability in Iran. With the fall of Moss�degh 
in August, 1953, Mohammad Reza Shah began an effective 
revival of political and economic stability in Iran. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE RULE OF MOHAMMAD REZA SHAH, 1953-1973 
The return of Mohammad Reza Shah on August 22, 1953, 
was a time of rejoicing in Iran; moreover, it marked a 
turning point in the country. Mohammad Reza Shah realized 
that, i� the interest of stabilizing his regime and the 
country , the Shah must effectively rule, not reign while 
other forces interfered with the control of the co�ntry. 
In order to establish himself as the undisputable ruler, 
Mohammad Reza Shah needed to strengthen his position such 
that his rule would not be challenged by the destabilizing 
forces of the communists and the National Front extremists . 
The Shah utilized a number of methods in strengthening and 
stabilizing his rule and the country between 1953 and 1962. 
By 1962, the gradual process of strengthening and stabilizing 
the Shah's rule was _ virtually completed with Mohanunad Reza 
Shah's success in launching and carrying out his land 
reform program, which had been opposed by several powerful 
elements in the country. In 1963, the "Revolution of the 
Shah and the People" was initiated, and the reforms brought 
about during the decade of the Revolution, . under the · 
stabilizing influence of Mohammad Reza Shah, served to 
stabilize the political, economic, and social spheres in Iran. 
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Mohammad Reza Shah built the strength of his rule with 
political, ec;:onomic, military, and social means. The support 
for the Shah was �trengthened in October, 1953, by the Shah's 
resumption of the distribution of the Royal Estates to the 
peasants who worked the land, a step which formerly had been 
1 disrupted by Prime Minister Mossadegh. The Royal Estates 
included about two thousand villages, all ·of which were to be 
redistributed to the peasant cultivators. Mohammad Reza Shah's 
distribution of the Royal Estates elicited a favorable 
response from the peasants and others favoring the 
redistribution of land to the peasant� who worked on the land. 
One of the methods used to increase the stability of the 
Shah ' s  regime was to weaken the destabilizing forces of 
opposition. In this regard, anticommunist (anti-Tudah) and 
anti-National Front campaigns were important in crushing the 
influence of those opponents of the Shah's regime. Following 
the August, 1953, coup d'etat, a number of National Front 
leaders were arrested and several were imprisoned ;2 
Regarding the anticommunist campaign, the prosecution of 
the illegal communist movement was intensified following 
the 1954 d iscovery of Tudah · infiltration in· the military. 
3 
1Peter Avery,, Modern Iran (London: Ernest Benn, 1965), 
p. 44 3. 
2 
Donald N. Wilber, . Contemporary Iran (New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, 1963) , p. 147. 
3sepehr Zabih, The Communist Movement in Iran (Berkeley: 
University o� California Press, 1966) , p. 209. 
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The s tability of the Shah's regime was h eightened ­
through the repression of subversive organizations which 
Mohammad Reza Shah noted, are restrained by other free 
nations also in the interest of security. 4 Through the 
suppression of the opposition forces, the organization of 
the National Front was scattered by the mid-1950s. However, 
the National Front supporters managed to form a secret 
organization called the National Resistance Movement. 5 Thus, 
the National Front, though weakened, survived and managed 
to carry on opposition to the Shah's regime, apparently 
because the government was more tolerant toward the National 
Front supporters than toward the Tudah members. 
By 1955, the organization of the Tudah Party was · 
effectively dispersed, for there was no tolerance for the 
outlawed communist movement. 6 Mohammad Reza Shah explained 
that in dealing with ex-communists, punishment was enforced 
for traitors and murderers, while other ex-communists "who 
have repented and begged to serve their country and king 11 7 
have been permitted to do so, for Mohammad Reza Shah 
4Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, Mis
.
sion for My Countri 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, . 1960), p. 209. 
5wilber, Contem12orary Iran, p. 148. 
6zabih, The Communist Movement in Iran, p. 208. 
7Pahlavi, Mission for My Country, p. 129. 
maintained that such a policy of social justice was the 
"fundamental key in combating internal communism. 11 8 
1 4 7  
Other effective instruments in suppressing the 
subversive opposition forces were the reorganized loyalist 
forces of the military and the Security and Information 
Organization (Sazeman Ettelat Va Amn�at Keshvar), referred 
to as SAVAK. 9 SAVAK was the special department for security 
in Iran. SAVAK functioned as one of the Shah ' s  instruments 
for maintaining internal security and stability by checking 
"any activities directed against the State, 11 1 0  whether such 
activities were by Iranians or
.
foreigners. SAVAK was 
responsible for monitoring and eliminating communist 
activities in the country. Mohammad Reza Shah explained 
that as long as subversive communist activities persisted 
in Iran, SAVAK would be necessary, for the Shah was 
determined to prevent destabilizing . activities by 
8Ibid., p. ·1 3 0 . 
9James A. Bill, The Politics of Iran {Columbus, Ohio·: 
Charles E. Merrill, 1 972) , p. 13 9 . ,:· 
1 0sAVAK is frequently compared to similar agencies 
in the United States and most other countries. 
Mohammad Reza Shah has explained that other countries have 
several organizations designed to check activities directed 
against the State (such as the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency in the 
United States). In Iran, the operation is more concentrated, 
for SAVAK is the main organization which perf9rms this role 
in the country. Ian McIntyre, "Men of Power: The Shah of 
Iran, " The . Listener, December 5, 1 9 7 4 , p. 7 2 3 . 
b . 
11 
su versives. SAVAK was effective in · rooting out many 
subversives, and continues its duties in Iran. 
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The military forces have been a viable in�trument in 
countering subversive activities, and a source of strength : 
and stability for Mohammad Reza Shah's regime.· The military 
has consistently supported Mohammad Reza Shah, enhancing and 
strengthening· his position. The military's support · added to 
Mohammad Reza Shah's confidence in his position as effective 
ruler. 12 
The military forces were expanded and better equipped 
during the 1950s to assist them in effectively maintaining 
internal security and defense. The expansion of the military 
was made possible by the improved financial situation brought 
about by American aid and by the resumption of revenues from 
the oil industry in 1954. Indeed, prospects for economic 
development depended upon settling the oil dispute with 
Britain and upon obtaining financial assistance from the 
United States. While aid had come to Iran in 1952 under 
President Truman's Point Four Program, . financial and 
technical assistance was increased after the · fall of 
Mossadegh. The increased assistance was significant 
1111 0il, Grandeur and a Challenge to the West, " Time, 
November 4, 1974, p. 34. 
12Hafez F. Farmayan, " Politics During the Sixties: A 
Historical Analysis, " Iran Faces the Seventies, ed. Ehsan 
Yar-Shater (New York: Praeger , 1971) , p. 89. 
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considering the earlier · rejection of Mossadegh's request for 
increased aid in. June, 1953. The continuation and increase 
of financial and military assistance was welcomed in Iran 
because such aid helped Iran to overcome its financial 
deterioration, caused by the oil dispute.
13 
The United States was willing to increase its aid to 
Iran in . order to encourage economic development and 
stability, and in this regard, to prevent the Soviet Union 
from promoting its influence in Iran. Indeed, the United 
States had been alarmed by the apparent communist influence 
during Mossadegh's period. Therefore, the U. S. government 
decided to provide· increased economic assistance to 
Mohammad Reza Shah's regime, for the assistance would 
strengthen Mohammad Reza Shah's regime and Iran's economic 
situation and thereby decrease communist influence. 14 In 
providing economic and military assistance, the United States 
had replaced Britain as the main adversary of Soviet 
interests toward Iran.
15 
Initially, the United States had 
intended to assist Iran in maintaining a military force · 
designed for keeping internal security in Iran; however, 
13 hl ' M ' ' f M C t 130 Pa avi, 1ss1on or y oun ry, p. · 
14John Marlowe, Iran (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 
1963), p. 102. 
15 · · Wilber, Contemporary Iran, p. 195. 
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Mohammad Reza Shah wanted to expand the armed forces into a 
large, well equipped military for stability and defense. 
Mohammad Reza Shah utilized the American financial aid, and 
military training and equipment, in developing the strength 
of Iran ' s  military. 
In addition, . Iran was able to utilize the resumed 
revenues f r om the oil industry. In August, 1953, Iran 
agreed to resume_ negotiations for the settlement of the oil 
dispute with Britain. The September, 1954, agreement 
replaced the former Anglo-Iranian Oil Company with· an 
international oil consortium composed of American, British, 
French, and Dutch companies, with the National Iranian Oil 
Company and the Iranian government as owner of the 
16 concessions and all oil produced. The agreement granted 
to the international oil consortium the rights of exploration 
and sale of oil from a limited zone, for a period of 
twenty-five years with the option for renewal for three 
five-year periods. Iran was to receive one-half of the oil 
income . before taxes. 17 The economy of Iran was revived 
through the oil - revenues, which were used, along with the 
American aid, for economic development and reorganization 
16Pahlavi, Mission for My Country, p. 107. 
17 Ramesh Sanghvi, Ar
;
amehr : The Shah of Iran (New York: 
Stein and Day, 1968), p. 44. 
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of the military forces. This provided for greater stability 
in Mohammad Reza Shah's rule, wh�ch was a cumulative ; 
ongoing process throughout the decade following the Shah's 
return in August, 1 9 53. 
The strengthening of Mohammad Reza Shah's position as 
the effective ruler of Iran during the 1 9 50s' corre�ponded 
with the Shah's building up the strength and stability of 
the country. One policy which served to enhance Iran's 
position was the Shah's policy of Positive Nationalism, 
which Mohammad Reza Shah developed gradually following 1 9 53. 
Mohammad Reza Shah's policy of Positive Nationalism, as 
opposed to Mossadegh's destructive policy of negative 
nationalism, was defined as, "devotion to, or advocacy of, 
national interests or national unity and independence. 11 18 
Mohammad Reza Shah explained that Positive Nationalism 
promotes "maxi�um political and economic independence 11 1 9  in 
accord with the interests of the country, including freedom 
to conclude alliances which support the interests of Iran. 
Mohammad Reza Shah realized that the traditional policy of 
passive neutrality would not suffice in the modern world , 
for Iran's experience in World War II proved that declared 
neutrality would · not necessarily protect Iran from world 
1 8Pahlavi, Mission for My Country, p. 125. 
1 9 Ibid • .. 
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conflicts. Consequently, Mohammad Reza Shah decided that 
the country must rely on true "nationalist sentiments, " 2 0 
that is, the true interest of the country, which included 
utilizing those foreign skills and services which would not 
impede Iran's independence or interests. 
The policy of Positive Nationalism was apparent in 
Iran's decision to join the Baghdad Pact (referred to as 
CENTO after 1958), in October, 1955. In this respect, the 
interest of Iran was served in the alliance with the 
neighboring countries and Britain against possible Soviet 
aggression. Iran deliberated over joining the regional 
pact ; however, several factors prompted Iran ' s  decision to 
join. Among them, Mohammad Reza Shah felt that the Baghdad 
Pact was one source · of protection against aggression, 
through . military and cooperative international security� 21 
The feeling that such security was needed was underscored by 
President Gama! Nasser's statement that were Turkey attacked 
by the Soviet Union, Nasser would allow the Suez Canal base 
to be reactivated ; however, he would not do so if Iran were 
attacked . This motivated Iran to join the Baghdad Pact. 22 
Another motivating force was the United States, which 
encouraged Iran to join the Baghdad Pact, for, althqugh the 
2 0 rbid. , p. 126. 21Ibid. , p. 306. 
22E. A. Bayne, Persian Kingship in Transition (New York: 
American Universities Field Staff, 1968) , pp. 210-11 . 
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United States was not a member of the Pact, the United States 
supported the concept of a regional defense pact. Moreover, 
the United States contributed to the financial support of 
the Pact. In this regard, military and civil advisors in 
Iran felt that Iran would receive ·increased economic and 
defense assistance from the United States if Iran joined the 
Baghdad Pact. 23 
Another factor which prompted Iran . to join the Baghdad 
Pact was Mohammad Reza Shah's realization that passive 
neutrality was not an effective means of defense. 24 In this 
regard, a nation could not expect to remain untouched by 
world issues and conflicts ; consequently, alliances would be 
needed to· guarantee assistance in the event of aggression 
on the part · of an enemy. The history of Soviet designs 
toward Iran presented . .  an image of a risk-filled future· and 
possible Soviet · interference. For its part, the Soviet Union 
protested that the Baghdad Pact was aggressive, and that 
Iran should not join. Iran did not wish to provoke the 
enmity of the Soviet Union, for that would have conflicted 
with Mohammad Reza Shah's policy of Positive Nationalism. 
Therefore, in a 1956 meeting with Nikita Krushchev in · 
Moscow, Mohammad Reza Shah explained that the · Bagh,dad Pact 
23 · · · Sanghvi, Aryamehr: The Shah of Iran, p. 249. 
24T. Cuyler Young, " Iran in Continuing Crisis, " Foreign 
Affairs, XL, No. 2 {1962), 291. 
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was a nonaggressive " collective defense against aggression .11 ·
25 
In addition, while Iran did hold a friendly attitude toward 
the Soviet Union, Iran could not dismiss the history of 
Soviet aggressive moves . · M9hammad Reza Shah, however, 
assured Krushchev that, as Shah, he would not allow Iran to 
k ' t d th S :' t ' 
26 ta e aggressive steps owar - e  ovie Union. 
In Iran the National Front supporters were · opposed to 
Iran's membership in the Bagq.dad Pact, for they considered 
the organization to be an . Anglo-American device for 
controlling Iran's government . · In addition, as· opponents of 
Mohammad Reza Shah's regime, the National Front supporters 
also opposed institutions or policies which strengthened the 
Shah's regime . In view of the strength which membership 
in the Baghdad Pact provided Mohammad Reza Shah's government·, 
the National Front supporters had an additional - reason for 
27 opposing Iran's membership in · the · Pact . The main issue 
concerning the Baghdad Pact was Mohammad Reza Shah's belief 
that, as a deterrent to Communism and aggression in the 
area, . the Baghdad Pact served Iran's interests . 2 8 Such a 
policy was in keeping with Positive Nationalism . In 
addition, Iran's membership in the Baghdad Pact served to 
25 
hl ' M '  ' f M C t 120 Pa avi, ission or y oun ry, p .  
26Ibid . 
27Richa�d W .  Cottam, Nationalism in Iran (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh· Pr�ss, 1964) , p .  31 . 
28 hl ' M ' ' f M C t 121 Pa . avi, · ission or y oun ry, p .  
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strengthen Mohammad Reza Shah's regime in Iran,.and Iran's 
position in the region. 
Another development which strengthened.Iran's position 
was the 1959 Mutual Aid Agreement between Iran and the 
United States. The Mutual Aid Agreement·also affected the 
attitude of the Soviet ·union. toward Iran. The Soviets were 
oppo�ed to Iran's concluding the agreement with the United 
States, as they had opposed the Baghdad Pact, for the Soviets 
said that such agreements appeared to be directed against 
the Soviet·Union. In order to counterbalance Iran's 
membership in the pacts, the Soviet Union projected a 
friendly attitude and suggested that Iran conclude a 
nonaggre�ion pact of thirty to fiftt years, with the Soviet· 
Union. Iran did not accept. However, the Soviet·Union 
eased the practice of broadcasting and publishing propaganda 
against Iran, in an effort to affect better relations between 
the two countries. In this regard, the Shah accepted the 
Soviets' invitations to visit the Soviet Union, and he did 
so in 1961 and 1965.29 While an.atmosphere of peacef�l 
coexistence prevailed between· Iran and the Soviet Union, 
there remained the traditional sense of distrust toward 
Soviet intentions, considering the Soviets' .former interes.t,, 
29Bayne, Persian Kingship in Transition, pp. 216-17. 
in Iran's oil fields, . as well as the Soviets' interest in 
30 warm water ports. 
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In the late 1950s, the Iranian government · was concerned 
about corruption in Iran's official circles. In order to 
eliminate corrupt activities, an anticorruption campaign 
was launched in 1958. The campaign tried to curtail 
practices in which Parliamentary deputies rendered decisions 
on issues solely on the.basis of their own personal interests 
or gains. In addition, the campaign tried to eliminate 
deputies.' acceptance of bribes by requiring government 
officials to file reports on their income and properties.
31 
A central concern in the stabilization of Iran was the 
economic development of the country. In this regard, the 
Seven Year Plans for Development under the Plan Organization 
were important. While the First Seven Year Plan had 
collapsed due to the lack of funds following the cessation 
of the oil industry in 1951, the resumption of the oil 
industry in 1954 brought the opportunity to implement a 
· Second Seven Year Plat>- for Development. In 1956, the -Second 
Seven Year Development Law gave the Plan Organization 
authority in developing agricultural and industrial 
production, mining, communications, and other fields. The 
30sepehr Zabih, " Iran Today, " Current History (February, 
1974), p. 66. 
31Avery, Modern Iran, pp. 476-78. 
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Second Seven Year Plan was not allocated all of the oil 
revenues, but was given 60 percent ; in 1959, . a set annual 
allocation · was established. There were a number of successful 
projects carried out by the Plan Organization between 1956 
and 1962, which raised the Gross National Product 6 percent 
a year. 32 In 1962, the Third Development Plan began with a 
goal of increasing economic growth · and social development. 
While the - Development Plans c�ntributed to the improvement 
of 1�hysical, social, and economic conditions in Iran, . the 
programs for development were possible only as a result of 
the resumption of oil production, for the revenue from the 
oil was the source of funding for the Plan Organization. 
The years following the resumption of the oil industry 
were prosperous for Iran, for the country benefited from 
the· oil - revenues, American·aid, economic development, and 
improved internal stability and security. Amidst the 
apparent prosperity, however, · arose a number of economic 
problems caused by the rapid economic growth. For example, 
a number of the economic problems of the late 1950s and 
early 1960s were: a high rate of inflation, high real estate 
prices due to land speculation, uncontrolled credit causing 
cases of bankruptcy, a great deal of imported luxury items 
affordabl� only by the wealthy, and continuous· tax evasion 
32wilber, Contemporary Iran, pp. 174, 177. 
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by many influential people. In addition, there was a deficit 
in foreign loans. The problems were largely the result of 
the lack of management and direction of the rapid economic 
growth, for the government needed to apply controls which 
would direct the · economic growth toward beneficial goals for 
the country. That is, the country needed an · economic 
stabilization program. 33 
The United States was concerned about Iran's economic 
situation. Therefore, the United States made· Iran's 
receiving additional aid conditional upon the country's 
implementation of an · effective economic stabilization 
34 program. In 1961, an economic stabilization program was 
introduced under the direction of Prime Minister Ali Amini. 
The program included steps to conserve foreign exchange, 
such as restrictions on importing luxury items and on travel. 
abroad. · Iran proved that it was capable of implementing 
financial stabilization, and the United States assisted Iran 
in . this endeavor with sizable loans . 35 By July, 1961, the 
' ' ' h d d 36 economic crisis a passe . 
33Young, "Iran in Continuing Crisis, " pp. 280-81. 
34 Avery, Modern Iran, . p. 491. 
35Young, "Iran in Continuing Crisis, " p. 281. 
36Avery, Modern Iran, p. 494. 
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While the economy was in . the. process of stabilization, 
there were other problems which needed to be dealt with in 
the · country. The main problem was the need for agricultural 
reform, for the landowners·had not followed Mohanunad Reza 
Shah's example of selling the land to the peasant cultivators. 
The central problem in Iran's agricultural system was the 
land tenure, which was similar to that of medieval feudal 
systems ; that is, the landowner controlled the land as well 
as the peasant cultivators who lived and worked on the · 
land. The reform of the agricultural system was to be of 
paramount importance. Moreover, �he process by which 
agricultural reform came about under Mohanunad Reza Shah's 
leadership, was to demonstrate clearly that Mohanunad Reza Shah 
had attained a position of strength as the effective leader 
of his country. 
Mohanunad Reza Shah
.
had always believed that in order 
for Iran to become a truly modern and developed country, the 
traditional system of land tenure, which had been in 
existence for many centuries, needed to be reformed. · In the 
traditional system, a relatively small number of landlords 
owned most· of the arable land. In this respect j 56 percent 
of the cultivated land was held by 1 percent of the 
population; of this land 33 percent was held by large . 
proprietors who compromised one-fifth of the agricultural 
population, while 10 to 12 percent of the cultivated land was 
I 
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held by small landholders. Moreover, the landlords also 
controlled the villages and the peasant cultivators. In 
addition, most large landowners did not live on their land; 
rather, the large absentee· landlords often lived in the 
towns and delegated the management of the property to village 
bailiffs. The absentee landlords had little interest in 
the welfare of the peasants or the development of agriculture. 
For their part, the peasant cultivators, who received a 
share of the crop for their livelihood, lived at subsistence 
level, and were unable to save due to low crop yield and 
their indebtedness to the landlords and others. 37 The 
traditional system of landownership benefited the large 
landowners, while the peasants suffered. The system . had 
persisted because the large landowners held not only wealth. 
and social prestige, but also political influence and power 
. 
38 in the country. The influence and power of the large 
landowners was possible because the Parliament was largely 
made up of landowners or deputies who were controlled by the 
landowners. In addition, the wealth of the large . landowners 
also provided them with prestige and influence. Thus, a 
strong force was required to alter the landownership system 
. 
37w. B • . Fisher, The Cambrid
�
e Histor¥ of Iran, Vol. I, 
The Land of Iran (Cambridge : Cam ridge University Press, 
1968), pp. 686-87. 
38Ann K. s .  Lambton, "Land Reform and the Rural 
Cooperative Societies, " Iran Faces the Seventies, . ed. 
Yar-Shater, p. 9. 
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which was detrimental to the majority of Iran's agricultural 
population. 
The force needed to reform the· system was 
Mohammad Reza Shah. The Shah had distributed his Royal 
Estates to the peasant cultivators, making them the owners 
of their own land. The Shah had hoped that other landowners 
would follow his example and sell their lands to the 
peasants. However, the landowners were not willing to sell 
their lands, which they considered a source of wealth and 
influence. In the interest of those living on the· land, and 
the modernization of Iran, Mohammad Reza Shah was determined 
to reform the agricultural sector.of the country. It has 
been observed that, "the transfer of ownership from the· 
landlords to sharecroppers is essential to the political 
stability and economic progress of underdeveloped 
countries. 11 39 Thus, the introduction of land reform would 
have been a step toward strengthening the framework of Iran's: 
agricultural society, because the peasant cultivators would 
become independent of the landlords' dominance.and they 
would be more productive citizens as owners of their own 
land. In another sense, simply redistributing the land would 
not, in itself, have been enough to improve the conditions 
of the peasants, for other reforms in the peasants' lifestyle 
39 'lb 180 Wi er, Contemporary Iran, p. 
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were also needed in order for the· peasants to learn to manage 
their own lives and the productivity of their land. �O For 
example, the peasants needed to be freed from the political 
·dominance of the landlords and from dependence upon the 
landlords for loans and material ·needs. 41 In this respect, 
Mohammad Reza Shah introduced a number of reforms·which not 
only affected the system of land tenure, but affected the 
economic, social, and political elements of Iranian society 
as well. 
Mohammad Reza Shah's first step was to secure the 
passage of a land reform bill. In December, 1959, the Shah's 
plan was formed into the Law on the·Limitation and Reform:of 
Landed Property, which was designed to limit landowners' 
estates to one village of farming area,. and to allow the· 
government to purchase the excess land and to sell it to the·. 
peasant cultivators. 42 The concept was opposed by the 
l�ndlords. Consequently, in May, 196p, the landlord 
dominated Majlis rendered the Bill meaningless through 
several· amendments which favored the landlords. For example, 
landlords were given the right to transfer their property 
40 Norman Jacobs, The Sociololl of Development (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 1 
41 b'd 145 I 1 . ,  p. • 
42 h · A h Th Sh h f I 266 Sang vi, ryame r: e a o ran,.p. 
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to their heirs within two years of the. enactment of the 
Land Reform Bill; also, the landlords were allowed to sell 
their land at their own price before the law came into 
effect. 43 With such amendments, . the purpose of the Land 
Reform Bill would not prevail ·. 
The situation was a test between the influence of the 
landlord dominated Majlis and the strength of the Shah. The 
outcome proved that the Shah was the strong leader needed by 
Iran, for the Shah exercised his constitutional powers to 
overcome the opposition. In accord with the constitution, 
Mohammad Reza Shah dissolved the Majlis on May 9, 1961. 
Following this, Prime Minister Amini's Cabinet approved the 
original Land Reform Bill in January, 1962. Minister of 
Agriculture Hassan Arsenjani was to direct t�e implementation 
of the land reform. Many of the opponents of the land refonn 
realized that the Shah's position was firm, and they 
surrendered their fight. · Others, however, maintained their 
opposition to the plan, while still others were skeptical 
about the government's ability or determination to implement 
44 the land reform program. 
The land reform was carried out in segments of the 
country during different time periods, not simultaneously 
43 I Ibid. , pp. 165-66. 
44
Ibid. , p. 267. 
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throughout the country, because of the shortage · of trained 
land reform personnel. Despite such operational problems, 
the first stage of the land reform was successfully carried 
out beginning in March, 1962. The success was possible 
because the plan for the redistribution of the land was 
uncomplicated; that is, the landowners could retain one 
whole village, or, since a village was traditionally divided 
into six units (dang) ,  a landowner could retain six separate 
dangs from different villages, and the excess land was to be 
bought by the goverrunent and sold to the peasants working 
and living on the land. Since the peasants became the 
owners of the same plot of land they had been living on, the 
complications of surveys were avoided. 
Large landowners and tribal landowners attempted to 
thwart the goverrunent's land reform program. In November, 
1962, a land reform official was murdered in the province of 
Fars, where there was resistance to the land reform. 
Consequently, the goverrunent accelerated the land reform 
program in Fars, and took action against the resisters. Such 
action made the opposition in the other districts less 
45  resistant to the land reform. Although many landowners 
attempted to evade· the land reform provisions, the program 
45Farmayan, "Politics During the Sixties :·A Historical 
Analysis, " p. 102. 
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was carried out with relatively few disruptions.
46 In 
January, 1962, the Land Reform Law initiated the breakdown 
of political and social power of large . landowners, because 
the landowners ' traditional symbol of wealth and power, their 
large land holdings, had been redistributed. Moreover, their 
influence in the Majlis had been cut . because the peasants, 
free of the dominance of the landlords, would no longer 
allow the former landlords to control the votes of the 
peasant population. Although the Land Reform Law would be 
submitted to the next Majlis, it was believed that no Majlis 
would revoke the Land Reform Law because the people would 
not elect those who stood for privileged treatment of the 
· 47 landed elite. Indeed, the Shah and his government, not . , 
the traditional landed class, were to receive the support 
of the masses • .. 
In retrospect, the period between 1953 and 1962 was a 
time during which Mohammed Reza Shah coo�dinated his sources 
of support and concentrated upon strengthening his position 
as the effecive ruler of Iran, steps which were taken - in the 
interest of his country. The Shah's position was strengthened 
through several means. To summarize, important among. these 
46Lambton, "Land Reform and the Rural Cooperative 
Societies, " p. 22. 
47wilber, Contemporary Iran, p. 188. 
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were the suppression of the subversive forces of the 
opposition, the reorganization and expansion of the Security 
and Information Organization (SAVAK) as an instrument for 
security and the elimination of subversive activities, and 
the expansion of the military, which was loyal to 
Mohammad Reza Shah. Another aid in stabilizing the Shah's 
regime was the increased revenues from the resumption of oil 
production, for these revenues improved the financial 
situation in Iran. In addition, aid from the·united States 
in the· form of finances, as well as military equipment and 
training, assisted Mohammad Reza Shah in strengthening the 
economic base and military forces which supported his regime. 
Throughout the 1950s, the Shah progressively strengthened 
his position as the effective ruler, such that by the end 
of the decade, Mohammad Reza Shah was undisputably the 
unchallenged ruler of Iran. The proof of Mohanunad Reza Shah's 
firm position was established in 1962, for the Shah overcame 
the opposition o·f landlords who opposed the land reform 
program. 
The process of strengthening Mohammad Reza Shah's rule 
was a source of stability for the country, for, as. the 
effective leadership of Mohammad Reza Shah became more 
apparent, a sense of security and stability began to emerge 
in the formerly unstable country. With the stabilization 
of the Shah's pos,ition, Mohammad Reza Shah was able to 
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introduce policies which contributed to the stabilization 
process in the country. For example·, the Shah's policy of 
Positive Nationalism enabled him to deal with other countries 
and carry out policies at the international level in the 
interest of Iran. In .this regard, Iran joined the Baghdad 
Pact in 1955. In 1959, Iran concluded a Mutual Aid Agreement 
with the United States, which provided additional security 
for Iran's position. Internally, Iran's position was improved 
and strengthened through the implementation of the 
Development Plans, which served to increase Iran's industrial 
and agricultural output. In addition, the 1961 economic 
stabilization program provided the necessary controls for 
management of Iran's economy, which had been in an 
inflationary, mismanaged condition. The most significant 
internal policy which initiated the effective reform and 
modernization of Iran was the land reform program of 1962. · 
The reform reversed the traditional agricultural · system in · 
which th� large landowners control4e�lthe land as well as 
the peasants, for the reform began the redistribution of 
the land. The agricultural ·system then developed into one 
of small landowners controlling their own land. The 
government aided the new peasant landowners through the 
establishment of agricultural cooperatives which provided 
credit for the new landowners, as well· as necessary materials. 
The beginning of land reform was the beg_inning of the 
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modernization of Iranian society, in particular, the 
traditional social structure, for it abolished the ancient 
system of landownership, . and provided the new peasant 
landowners 'with added incentive for increased agricultural 
productivity. 
One year after the Land Reform Law had initiated the 
first stage of land reform, a National Congress of Peasants 
was held in Tehran. At the Congress, on January 9, 1963, 
Mohammad Reza Shah announced that he would place these six 
reforms before the people in a referendum: redistribution 
of land among the peasants, nationalization of forests and 
pasturesj sale of shares in government factories, profit 
sharing for workers, the enfranchisement of women, and the 
formation of the Literacy Corps. 48 On January 26, 1963, 
the referendum was held, and over 99 percent of the votes 
. f f th f 1 ·  ' 49 · were in avor o e re orm po icies. Since 
Mohammad Reza Shah had gone to the people for the approval 
of the revolutionary reforms, the implementation of these 
reforms is· referred to as "The Revolution of the Shah and 
the People." In another sense, . it is called the "White 
Revolution, " "Revolution" because the programs wiped away 
the old ins ti tU:tions and brought in new ideals, and "Whi t·e 11 
48Gregory Lima and others, The.Revolutionizing of Iran 
(Tehran: International Communicators Iran, . 1973) , p. 17. 
49 Ibid. , p. 19. 
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because the programs were · carried out without bloodshed. so 
The reforms of the referendum were · indeed revolutionary for 
a developing country. The spirit of the Revolution 
inspired the Iranian government and people to such an extent 
that in 1964, three additional reforms were · introduced: the 
Health Corps, the Reconstruction and Development Corps, and 
the Courts of Equity. In 1967, three other reforms - were 
introduced: the nationalization of water, urban and rural 
reconstruction, and ·administrative and educational reforms. 
The enthusiastic and successful implementation of the reforms 
has gained the title the "Decade of the Revolution" for the 
period between 1963  and 1973. 
While the majority of the Iranian people backed the 
policies of the Revolution, there were continued segments of 
opposition. The main sources of opposition were large 
landowners, tribal leaders, religious leaders, and the 
National Front. Each group had its own reason for opposing 
the reforms. The large landowners did not wish to relinquish 
their large landholdings, nor the wealth and influence which 
land symbolized. The tribal leaders resented governmental 
authority, especially that of land reform personnel, . being 
exerted in tribal areas, for the tribal leaders felt that 
50 Central Insurance of Iran, . Decade of the Revolution, 
1963-1973 (Tehran : Central Insurance of Iran, 1973) , p. v. 
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they held exclusive authority over their tribal lands. The 
religious leaders did not want the land reform to apply to 
the religious endowments (waqfs) and they did not want 
women to have the right to vote. The National Front 
supporters and leftists who opposed the government opposed 
the government's land reform, and gave as their reason, 
disapproval of the way that the land reform had been 
legislated and carried out. 51 
The opposition demonstrated its disapproval of the 
government's reforms through riots following the January, 
1963, referendum. The most drastic steps taken by the 
opposition forces were in 1965. In January, 1965, Prime 
Minister Hasan Ali Mansur, who solidly supported the Shah's 
reforms, . was assassinated. The assassin was captured and 
he revealed the conspiracy of the Islamic Nations' Party 
(Hizb-i Melal-i Islami) for an uprising against the 
government. In April, 1965, another conspiracy resulted in 
an attempt to assassinate : the Shah by a guard of the Shah's 
Marble Palace; the guard was killed in the incident. The 
impact of the two occurrences resulted in a reorganization 
of the security system, with a determination to suppress 
subversive forces which were a threat to national security �2 
51rbid. , p. 22. 
52Farmayan, "Politics During the Sixties: A Historical 
Analysis, " pp. 111-12. 
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The opposition was unable to frustrate the "Revolution 
of the Shah and the People, " for the opposition had 
underestimated the strength of the government and 
Mohanunad Reza Shah's determination to carry out the reforms. 
In addition, the opposition had underestimated the mass 
support of the reforms. Moreover, the opposition had 
overestimated its own cohesive strength, . which in fact was 
53 not strong. 
Popular enthusiasm for the reform was exhibited in the 
September, 1963, Parliamentary elections, which for the first 
time were · held on the same day throughout the country. The 
popularity of the Shah's Revolution, and in effect, the 
defeat of the opposition, was proven by the nature of the 
elected deputies, for two female members were elected, in 
re-cognition of the revised status of women in Iran. 
Moreover, no great landlords and very · few· clerics were 
elected. 54 
Each of the reform measures contributed to the 
cumulative success of the "Revolution of the Shah and the 
People," in its strengthening and stabilization of Iranian 
economic, political, and social spheres. The land reform 
53Lima and others, The Revolutionizing of Iran, p. 29. 
54Farmayan, "Politics During the Sixties: A Historical 
Analysis, " p. 108. 
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policy was the first and most significant point, for the 
reform broke the traditional · landlord-peasant relationship· 
and gave the peasants a more · responsible place in the 
society. The second stage of the land reform program was 
passed· in January, ·. 19 6 3. The purpose of this stage was to 
provide for those peasants living on the land which the 
landlords had chosen to retain under the first stage of land 
reform. 55 The peasants appreciated the Shah's providing them 
with- ownership to their land. Indeed, the peasants felt as 
though they had been reborn, for they became their own 
masters. 56 The ownership of the land by the peasants 
provided a greater incentive ·to the peasants, and, with· the 
introduction of modern agricultural equipment, agricultural 
production increased. 
Another reform was the nationalization of the forests 
and pastures. Mohammad Reza Shah believed that through the 
nationalization of these resources, all Iranians would 
benefit from them. In· this · regard , the .government 
established conservation programs designed to develop the 
productive use - and preservation of the natural resources 
57 of forests and pastures. 
55central Insurance of Iran, .Decade of the Revolution, 
1963-1973, p. 10. 
56Lima and others, The Revolutionizing of Iran, p. 41. 
57Mohanunad Reza Shah Pahlavi, The White Revolution 
(Tehran: Kayhan Press . [n . d. ]  ) , pp. 46, 58 . 
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The Third reform of the January, 1963, referendum was 
the sale of shares in state owned factories. The main 
purpose· of this reform was to provide landowners, who sold 
their holdings in the course of land reform, with financial 
credits, for the landowners were· able to use their capital in 
industrial enterprises by buying the factory shares. 58 The 
sale of factory shares also aided the development of 
industries, and thereby improved Iran's economic base. 
An additional reform was profit sharing in industry for 
workers, and improvement · in conditions of labor. Profit 
sharing provided that employers provide a share of the net 
profit of the factory, or another reward, for the workers, 
based upon increased production or reduction in costs or 
waste. 59 In this regard, Mohammad Reza Shah wanted the 
industrial workers· to feel the same sense of having a part 
in, and a responsibility to, the economy and the society, 
as · the new landowning peasants felt.
60  With . this reform, 
the workers took a greater interest in the factories' 
production, and . there were improved labor relations. The 
interest which the government took in the conditions of the 
workers actua�ly helped to increase the support which . the 
58Ibid. , pp. 6 6-67. 
59 · · . Central Insurance of Iran, . Decade of the Revolution, 
1963-1973, p. 55. 
6 0Pahlavi, The White Revolution, pp. 79-80. 
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workers and trade unions gave to · the , Shah's government, . for 
they realized that the improvements were· brought about by 
Mohammad Reza Shah's government. 61 
Another far reaching reform of the referendum was that 
providing women with· the right to vote and to stand for 
Parliament. Mohammad Reza Shah felt that this was an 
important reform, for it provided women with equal status 
to men. Moreover, the enfranchisement and greater 
participation of women in social, political, and economic 
matters would contribute. grea·tly to the reconstruction of 
Iranian society. Greater participation of women in the 
society would be essential in the modernization and 
62 development of the country. 
Another of the reforms which was vital to the development 
of Iran was the· campaign to eliminate illiteracy, primarily 
through the creation of the Literacy Corps. The Literacy 
Corps was composed of high school graduates, eligible for 
the draft, who fulfilled their service· by teaching in remote· 
villages. In this way, villagers who were· otherwise out of 
the range of regular schools were ab�e to acquire primary 
education. As a result of the Literacy Corps, . the illiteracy 
t b t d 1 . 
' ' f '  tl 63 Th L ' t C ra e · egan o ec ine s1gn1 ican y. e 1 eracy orps 
61Ibid. , pp. 84-85. 
63Ibid. , . p. 108. 
62Ibid. , p. 100. 
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brought an educational revolution to the villagers and . 
introduced the desire to obtain additional education . The 
effectiveness of the Literacy Corps contributed _to the 
strengthening of Iran by bringing education to a greater 
percentage of the rural population . The Literacy Corps also 
inspired a greater sense of cooperation on the · part of the 
rural population toward the central government, for the rural 
people realized that the government in Tehran was concerned 
about the development of the rural society . 
The original six reforms were augmented in 1964 with 
three additional reforms . Two of these reforms created 
corps - similar to the·Literacy Corps . One such corps was the 
Health Corps, which was designed to extend improvements in 
public health to the rural villages . The other corps was 
the Reconstruction and Development Corps, which was 
responsible for completing the reforms introduced by land 
64 reform . In this regard, the Reconstruction and Development 
Corps was to assist the villagers with agricultural 
improvements, through mechanized and modernized methods . 
These two corps provided improvements in the living 
conditions and productivity of the villages, and the 
villagers came to feel enthusiastic support for the 
64Ibid . ,  pp . 126, 132-134 . 
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governmental corps · which had helped them to achieve these 
. t 65 improvemen s. 
The third reform of 1964, was the creation of Courts 
of Equity. These were special courts formed of local village 
leaders acting as judges in minor local cases. The Courts 
of Equity freed the villagers of the unnecessary and 
complicated procedure of taking their minor cases to the 
nearest town. In addition, town and city courts were 
relieved of minor cases, which aided in ligthening the 
overloaded judicial courts . This reform gave the villagers 
a greater sense of responsibility in their local matters. 
Indeed, the Courts of Equity had proven effective; therefore, 
similar courts, called Adjudication Courts, were established 
in the towns in order to relieve the burden of the judges 
in the towns. 66 
In 1967, three additional reforms were added to those 
in progress. One such reform was the nationalization of 
water resources in Iran. Since water was a scarce and 
precious resource , . it seemed appropriate for the government 
to create the Ministry of Water and Power, which was directed 
· 67 
to protect and conserve the natural resource of water. 
65Ibid. , p. 137. 
66central Insurance of Iran, Decade of the Revolution, 
1963-1973, pp. 119-22. 
67Ibid. , p. 133. 
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Another important reform was that of National 
Reconstruction for both . rural and urban development. This 
reform dealt with the problem of housing, as well as town 
planning, the development of rural areas, and urban renewal. 
It was also concerned with introducing modern amenities in 
Iran. 68 
The last reform of the Revolution was that of 
administrative and educational reform. Regarding the 
administration, the reform was aimed at promoting honesty 
and efficiency in government workers and officials by 
eliminating excess staff members, controlling the employment 
of new personnel on the basis of the applicant's qualifi­
catio�s, and guarding against malpractices. 69 In addition, 
less emphasis was to be placed on centralization, and greater 
responsibility was to be given to the provinces and cities 
for attending to local matters. In this regard, village, 
town, city, township, and provincial councils were created. 
The administrative reform was designed as a long term program 
to implement improved - and efficient procedures in civil 
administration. 70 The civil administration was revised in 
the spirit of better management and effectiveness. The 
reorganization of the administrative system was in keeping 
68Ibid. , p. 139. 
70Ibid., p. 159. 
69 b ' d  150 I 1 . ,  p .  • 
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with the government's role in leading social reform, and in 
aiming for economic prosperity, for " efficient administration 
of the social and economic programs requires an efficient 
administrative system. " 71 The administrative reform involved 
concentration on decentralization, which increased the 
cooperation of citizens and government in social and economic 
programs. Included was reform of the administrative 
organization and employment procedures. The reform of 
education was aimed at providing education for all Iranians, 
such that each might develop to fulfill his potential. Such 
aims were designed to produce well developed people capable . 
of providing Iran with the needed skilled and trained 
personnel. 
During the final stages of the introduction of the 
twelve reforms, the Fourth Development Plan was introduced. 
This Plan was directed toward economic growth as well as 
attaining social welfare programs for the people of Iran. 
The Plan Organization concentrated on urban reconstruction, 
housing, and family life, which corresponded with the reform 
policy of National Reconstruction. 72 
71shahpour Rassekh, "Planning for Social Change, " Iran 
Faces the Seventies, ed. Yar-Shater, p. 163. 
72Ibid. , pp. 144, 162. 
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Another development , which occurred in 1973, was the 
revision of the 1954 oil agreement with the oil consortium. 
Through the new agreement, Iran assumed the complete control 
of the· Iranian oil industry, for all oil reserves, as well 
as policy making in the industry, were · brought under Iran's 
control. According to Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveyda, 
the 1973 oil agreement represented the full implementation 
of the 1951 Oil Nationali�ation Act. 73 
In retrospect, the decade from 1963 to 1973 must be 
regarded as the period which completed the process of 
stabilization for Iran. The basic instrument for success in 
this endeavor was the " Revolution of the Shah and the People : 
for each of the reform policies was a step in · modernization 
and the majority of the reforms directly or indirectly 
improved the lifestyle of the Iranian people, especially 
that of the peasants who lived in the underdeveloped· rural 
areas of Iran. Moreover, the reform policies brought greater 
enthusiastic support for the regime of Mohanunad Reza Shah, 
the leader of the Revolution. The combined effects of the 
individual reforms delivered Iran from the ranks of the 
underdeveloped countries, and brought Iran into the role of 
a progressive and stabilized nation. The individual reforms 
of the Iranian Revolution combined to form a reform program . 
73zabih, "Iran Today, " pp. 68-69. 
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which affected the social, political, and economic modernization 
and stabilization in the country. 
In this regard, the nationalization of the natural 
resources of water, forests, and pastures provided 
conservation and development of these forms of national 
wealth. The sale of government factory shares and profit 
sharing plans for workers contributed to improved industrial 
production. The profit sharing program, as well as the 
establishment of Courts of Equity and Adjudication Courts, . 
and the land reform, provided a sense of responsibility and 
greater incentive to work productively to a greater segment . 
of the population. Moreover, these reforms instilled a 
greater enthusiasm in the rural and working classes' support 
for the Shah ' s  regime. The formation of the Literacy Corps 
extended the opportunity for educa�ion, as well as the spirit 
of the Revolution to a wide spectrum of the rural population. 
Moreover, the Health Corps, and the Reconstruction and· 
Development Corps assisted the rural population in the 
improvement of their health and living conditions, which 
also stimulated greater support for the Shah's regime. · The 
enfranchisement of women, . and the resultant changes in the 
status of women, provided Iran with a greater percentage of . 
citizens participating in the political, economic, and social 
processes of the country, which contributed to the development 
of Iran. The urban and rural reconstruction contributed to 
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the improvement of urban living conditions and to the 
development of rural areas . The development programs brought 
greater modernization to areas of Iran. The administrative 
reform initiated policies for increased efficiency and· less 
corruption in the administrative sphere, which are essential 
to the management of a stable and developed. country. The 
stabilizing effect of the " Revolution of the Shah and the 
People" was exhibited in the greater cooperation between the 
government and the population. The land reform and the other 
reforms dir�cted toward improving the lifestyle of the masses 
helped to make· the masses the greatest source · of support· for 
the Shah's regime, which reversed the traditional situation 
in , which the elite were· the strongest supporters of the 
regime. 
The successful , bloodless implementation of the reforms · 
,,, 
of the " Revolution of the Shah and the People" was possible 
mainly because of several characteristics of the Revolution 
which differentiated Iran's Revolution from those of other 
countries. Firstly, the Iranian Revolution was created by 
the Shah and approved by the people in a referendum. In 
this, as well as in other areas, the people placed their 
confidence . and support in the leadership of the Shah. 
Indeed, the Iranian people - looked to the Shah for " guidance , . 
.i 
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direction and protection. 11 74 This characteristic of Iranian 
life corresponded to the· fact that Mohammad Reza Shah was 
the stabilizing force throughout the Decade of the Revolution; 
moreover, Mohammad Reza Shah has been the stabilizer who 
holds together the . various segments of Ir anian society. 75 
Mohammad Reza Shah is .. the force which draws together the 
separate elements of stability, such as the military, the 
civil administration, the economy, the mass support, . and 
Western aid, thereby channeling the stabilizing effect of 
each element into the stabilization of the country as a 
·whole. 
Another distinguishing characteristic of the Iranian 
Revolution was that the Shah curtailed the power of the 
traditional landowning elite, and attended the situation of 
those traditionally powerless in the political sphere, that 
is, the rural and working classes, and women. Through such 
actions, the leader of the country received his most solid 
support from the masses, rather than from the traditional 
elite. Another distinct characteristic of Iran's Revolution 
was the many faceted nature of the Revolution, for the 
reforms , dealt with the modernization and improvement of 
l 
social, · political, and economic conditions in the country. 
74Mohammad Ali Toussi, A . Reflection upon the White 
Revolution of Iran. (Tehran: State Management Training Centre, 
1974) , p. 14 . 
75110il, Grandeur and a Challenge to the West, " p. 33. 
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Moreover, the Revolution was · an ongoing process of the 
decade, the spirit of which continues in - Iran's present-day 
1 0 I 76 po. 1c1es. 
According to Mohammad Reza Shah, . the initiator and 
leader of the Iranian Revolution, one of the most. important 
results of the Revolution - has been Iran's ability to "pursue: 
a completely independent foreign policy, based solely on 
Iran's legftimate · interests, while respecting the rights 
of other nations. 11 7 7  Such a development was possible because 
of the internal security and the stabilized position of 
Irari, which resulted ·from the suppression of subversive 
forces in the · society. Mohammad Reza Shah explained that 
political, social, . and economic instability were· eliminated , 
by the Iranian R evolution, thereby making Iran "a model of 
.- security and political stability. 11 78 The Shah noted that 
Iran's reformed condition and political and economic 
stabilization have provided Iran with an internationally 
prestigious and respected position. 79 · Such a conclusion has 
been attested to by political observers, who concede that Iran 
is one of the most reliable (stable) states in the 
76Toussi, A Reflection upon the White Revolution of° 
Iran, pp. 17 -18. 
7 7Pahlavi, The White Revolution, p .  151. 
78Ibid. , p. 152. 79Ibid. , p. 153. 
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80 · Middle East. Moreover, it has been noted that 
Mohammad Reza Shah is the most progressive leader of a 
Middle Eastern state in terms of planning for social and 
economic growth. In this regard, . the Shah has been directing 
Irari's oil revenues toward the development of an industrial 
foundation in the country, for Iranian estimations indicate 
that Iran's oil resources will be exhausted by 1990.
81 
In essence, the overall goal of the Iranian Revolution 
was social and economic development throughout the country, 
with an emphasis on the improvement of the position of the 
working class and the peasants, and an increase in the · 
effectiveness of the State. Political observers have 
concluded that the "Revolution of the Shah and the People, " 
has brought Iran a prospering ec�nomy, and social and 
l · t · ' 1 t b ' l ' t 82 · h d 1 t .  . ' f '  t po 1 ica s a 1 1 y. Sue eve .opmen is s1gn1 ican , 
for Iran's social and political stability is "considered 
exceptional in the Middle East region as a whole. 11 83 
80zabih, "Iran Today, �· p. 67. 
8111oil, Grandeur and a Challenge to the West, " p. 33. 
82rarmayan, "Politics During the Sixties: A Historical 
Analysis," p. 114. 
8 3 
Rassekh, "Planning for Social Change," p. 164. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
In reviewing the sources of political instability and 
stability which prevailed in Iran during the periods 
discussed in this thesis, it has been found that no period 
was characterized solely by elements af instability or solely 
by elements of stability, except the period of Mohammad 
Reza Shah's strengthened rule, from 1963 onward, which has 
been regarded as completely stabilized. In the preceding 
periods, however, the various elements of instabili�y and 
stability existed in combination, such that, if in . a given 
period, there existed a greater number of elements of 
instability, that period was basically unstable . On the 
other hand, during periods in which there existed a greater 
number of elements of stability, that period was basically 
stable. 
In retrospect, the period of the Qajar Dynasty, 
1779-1925, was basically unstable, for elements of instability 
prevailed during that· time. In this regard, the Qajar period 
was marked by a lack of strong leadership, administrative 
, chaos, · political influence by reactionary clergy, economic 
insolvency, and the practice of �elling concessions to 
foreigners for unfavorable returns to Iran. Moreover , the 
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period was characterized by the · interference of foreign 
powers in Iranian matters, and an overall domination of Iran 
by the· Big Powers of Britain and Russia. The Qajars did not 
have a unified army capable of maintaining internal security 
or defending Iran. Thus, in the Qajar period, Iran exhibited 
the traits of lack of viable leadership, economic insolvency, 
inability to maintain internal security, and largely 
unrespected sovereignty by the Big Powers . The existence .of 
the Big Power rivalry in Iran . did allow for a degree of 
stability in one respect, for neither Britain nor Russia 
would dare to take complete control of Iran while the other 
maintained its interest in the country. In addition, the 
concern which the Big Powers had for their interests in Iran 
promp�ed them into establishing internal security in their 
spheres of influence. 
The period of Reza Shah's rule, 1926-1941, was indeed 
basically a stable period in Iran, for the conditions of the 
time reflected mainly elements of stabili�y. In this 
regard, Reza Shah was a viable leader. He had established 
a unified army which was capable of bringing · about internal 
security throughout the · country : he · had rid . the country of 
foreign domination and . he had regained international respect 
for the sovereignty of the country. Reza Shah revived the 
economy of Iran by initiating economic reforms, by eliminating 
most of the foreign concessions, and by obtaining higher 
royalties for Iran from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. 
Although the period of Reza Shah .was primarily a stable 
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time, World War II produced a destabilizing effect upon Iran, 
for Iran did not have the military or diplomatic ability to 
defend its neutrality, and thereby uphold its independent 
sovereignty. 
The early reign of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, 1941-1953, 
was basically an unstable period, for under the inexperienced 
young Monarch, there was a lack of viable leadership. The 
continued occupation of Iran by the Allies slighted the 
sovereignty of Iran. Moreover, the breakdown · in the economy 
following World War II, the increased communist activities, 
the coming to power of Mohammad Mossadegh, and the decline 
of the economy following the 1951 .nationalization of the 
oil industry, were destabilizing elements. There were� 
however, elements of stability during this period, as 
evidenced by Iran's ability to prompt the evacuation of 
Allied forces, particularly Soviet forces, and the Iranian . 
government's recovery of the separatist province of 
Azarbayjan. Moreover, the British and American backing of 
Iran helped Iran to reassert its sovereignty. 
The period during which Mohammad Reza Shah began to 
strengthen his rule, 1953-1962, and in which he actually 
achieved an effective rule, 1963 onward, has been a stable 
period. The viability of Mohammad Reza Shah's rule has been . 
achieved through the use of the military, .which has been 
.. 
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consistently loyal to· him, through the revival of the economy 
with the resumption of oil production and American economic 
aid, . and through the suppression of the subversive opposition. 
Moreover, the reforms of the "White Revolution, " or the 
· "Revolution of the Shah and the People," have brought about 
political, economic, . and social improvements in Ir.�n, which 
reflect the permanency of the present period of st�bility 
in Iran, . and the stability of the rule of Mohammad Reza Shah. 
It is the conclusion of this thesis · that Mohanunad Reza. 
Shah is the principal stabilizing force who has·brought about 
and maintained stability in contemporary Iran by overcoming 
the sources of instability and by consolidating the various 
sources of stability into a single focus. Therefore, an 
analysis of the, nature of Mohanunad Reza Shah's leadership is 
appropriate. 
Leadership has been described by Dankwart A. Rustow as 
"a process of complex mediation between the leader's 
personality, the followers ' expectations, the circumstances 
. 1 and a set of goals ." A conunent on leadership by Max Weber 
proposed that · there are social problems that require a single 
individual to solve them. 2 These two observations on 
1 Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Study of Leadersh�p," 
Philosophers and Kings, . ed. Dankwart A. Rustow (New York: 
George Braziller, 1970), p. 20. 
2
Ibid. , p. 15. 
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leadership are relevant to an analysis of the nature of 
Mohanunad Reza Shah's leadership and to the conclusion that 
it was Mohanunad Reza Shah's leadership which brought about 
political, social, and economic reforms and stability in 
Iran. In accord with Max Weber's proposal on leadership·, 
Mohanunad Reza Shah was the single individual required to 
solve Iran's problems. 
Regarding the conclusion that Mohammad Reza Shah's 
leadership was required to solve Iran's problems and to 
bring about stability in Iran, . it should not be said that 
Mohanunad Reza Shah was absolutely the only person who 
possibly could have reformed Iran. On the other hand, it 
should not be said that the reforms were inevitable, that 
is, that any leader would or could have brought about the 
same results. 3 It should be established, however � that 
Mohanunad Reza Shah's distinct leadership abilities, coupled 
with the circumstances of the time, made the Shah's 
leadership vital to the successful implementation of reforms 
in the · country. A number of characteristics of 
Mohanunad Reza Shah's regime have designated the Shah's 
leadership as that needed by Iran. 
Max Weber proposed that political legitimacy is based 
in varying proportions on three elements: tradition, charisma, 
3Ibid. , p. 21. 
190 
and rational legality. 4 These criteria may be applied in 
the analysis of the leadership of Mohammad Reza Shah. 
Regarding tradition, the Iranian people revere and respect 
the tradition of the Monarchy which has been an - Iranian 
. . 
institution for 2500 years. The Iranian people not only 
respect the tradition of the Monarchy, but regard it as an 
integral part of their nation and a part of their Shiite 
Islamic tradition. This deep regard for the tradition of 
the Monarchy was exhibited in 1925 during discussions about 
the possible creation of a republic in Iran. The idea was 
discarded, for there was a great preference for retaining 
the Monarchy. The t�adition of the Monarchy was challenged 
a second time in 1953 by - Mohammad Mossadegh who hoped to 
establish a republic in Iran. The Iranian people's strong 
regard for the Monarchy was exhibited, however, in a 
coup d'etat by the· Army and the people which overthrew 
Mossadegh and championed the· tr
.
adition o� the Monarchy. 
The . people wanted the Shah to retain the �eadership of the 
country. Thus, the tradition of the Mo�archy provides a 
strong foundation for Monammad Reza Shah's leadership. 
The tradition· of the Monarchy encompasses more than -a 
simple, preference for a monarchical form of government, 
rather than a republic . The Iranian people have traditionally 
4Ibid. , p. 14·. 
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looked to their Shah for "guidance, . direction and 
protection. 11 5 Indeed, the Iranian people traditionally 
expected their Shah to create better systems and to improve 
the lifestyle of the people . 6 In this regard, Mohanunad· Reza 
Shah has fulfilled the traditional expectations of the 
people, and the tradition of the Monarchy has. provided the 
Shah with a well-founded basis for his rule. 
The awe-inspiring nature of the tradition of the 
· Monarchy, as well as the personal characteristics of 
Mohammad Reza Shah, have given, to some degree, a charismatic 
quality to the position of the Shah. " Charisma" is regarded 
by Max Weber as an extraordinary quality of a person whether 
7 it is actual, presumed, or alleged. In this sense, .charisma 
is viewed as a trait or quality that sets a person apart from 
ordinary people. In another sense, charisma is regarded not 
as a trait of the leader, but as a perception on the part 
of the people who follow him; that is, "a  leader's charisma 
is in the minds of the followers. " 8 Thus, it is the people's 
belief that the leader has special qualities, a form of hero 
�Mohanunad· Ali Toussi, A Reflection upon the White 
Revolution of Iran �Tehran: State Management Training Centre, 
1974) , p. 14. 
6Ibid. 
7Rustow, " The Study of Leadership, " p. 15. 
8Ibid. 
worship, that contributes to the charismatic nature of a 
given leader . 
1 9 2  
Regarding the leadership of Mohammad Reza Shah, the 
tradition of the Monarchy is awe-inspiring and charismatic 
vis-a-vis the Iranian people. However, it is not merely the 
tradition of the Monarchy which. inspires the people, for 
their traditional reverence for the Monarchy has, in the · 
past, been outweighed by their contempt for weak or corrupt 
monarchs . Regarding Mohammad Reza Shah, their is. an aura 
of charisma surrounding him as an individual Shah, for his 
personal traits and leadership abilities · have a charismatic 
effect upon his Iranian supporters . The Iranian people, 
especially the · peasants, view Mohammad Reza Shah as their 
deliverer . This feeling was particularly evident following· 
Mohammad Reza Shah's implementation of the land reform and 
the other reforms which improved the lifestyle of the people. 
In this regard, the charismatic aspect of the relationship 
between the Shah and the people exists because "the results 
of the leader's actions induce the followers' belief, and 
the followers' belief becomes the criterion for charismatic 
authority ." 9 
In this regard, . it is important to note · that the 
presence of a charismatic aspect in Mohammad Reza Shah ' s  
9Ibid . ,  p .  16. 
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leadership does not imply that the Shah's leadership rests 
mainly upon charismatic authority, for it does not. In 
accord with Weber's proposal that the elements contributing 
to leadership are in varying proportions, the charismatic 
element is of minor importance to the leadership of 
Mohanunad Reza Shah. Charismatic authority is not the element 
which gives the Shah his viability as a leader . In . this 
respect, charismatic leadership relies upon the perceptions 
of the leader's followers; therefore, such leadership is 
unstable. Mohanunad Reza Shah's leadership, on the other 
hand, has proven its stability during Mohanunad Reza Shah's 
reign of over thirty years. In essence, if the charismatic 
quality of Mohanunad Reza Shah's regime disappeared with· a 
change in the perceptions of the Iranian people, 
Mohanunad Reza Shah's rule would, prevail, for his rule is 
founded upon more stable elements than charismatic authority. 
In this regard, the strength and stability of 
Mohanunad Reza Shah's leadership emanates from the· element 
described by Weber as the rational legality of the rule. 
The legality of Mohanunad Reza Shah ' s  rule, · his legal right 
to rule, originates in the Iranian Constitution, which. 
provides for the succession of the Pahlavi Dynasty. 
Moreover, the Shah's legal right to rule is enhanced by his 
leadership in the hierarchy of the bureaucracy. Although 
there are a number of decision making members in the 
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bureaucratic system, such as cabinet members, members of 
parliament, and high civil servants, they a11· consistently 
defer to the leadership of Mohammad Reza Shah. 
It has been said that "authority must accomplish its 
10 proper task. " Mohammad Reza Shah has fulfilled this 
function of leadership. An essential point is that 
Mohammad Reza Shah does not merely reign, he rules. 
Moreover, he is not only a ruler, he is a great political 
and social innovator. In this regard, Mohammad Reza Shah 
has transformed the traditional political and social 
institutions into improved, modernized systems. The Shah, 
through his reforms, . has used military, political, economic, 
and social° means to bring about order and stability in Iran 
and to transform Iran's traditional institutions into systems 
which would benefit the Iranian people, especially those· who 
suffered under the traditional lifeways, such as rural 
peasants, . urban workers, and women. 
Mohammad Reza Shah developed the strength and stability 
of his leadership and used these qualities to strengthen and 
stabilize Iran. The Shah's strength and· . stability has come 
from his personal leadership abili�ies·, such as initiative, 
innovativeness, the ability to cormnunicate with · the people, 
.10oankwart A. Rust9w, . "Ataturk as Founder of a State, �· 
Philosophers and Kings, ed. Rustow, p. 236. 
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the ability to overcome the subversive forces of opposition, 
as well as his devotion to the · interests of Iran and the 
Iranian people. Furthermore, the Iranian people have 
realized that Mohammad Reza Shah has been concerned with 
their interests. This recognition by the people has provided 
the Shah with· wide · support, which . further· enabled the Shah 
to implement his reforms. Two other sources of strength and 
stability for Mohammad Reza Shah's regime were the support 
of the Army, as �ell as the financial and military aid which 
the Shah obtained for Iran from the United States. 
In essence, Mohammad Reza Shah's abilities strengthened 
and stabilized his leadership and · his reign, and the strength 
of his reign plus his innovations brought about stability 
and allowed the Shah to implement his reforms. The 
modernization and improvements which the reforms brought to 
the lifestyle of the Iranian people and to the economic 
and political situation of Iran served to further strengthen 
the Iranian people's support for Mohammad Reza Shah's 
leadership. The strength of the Shah's regime, coupled with 
the wide support for his rule, allowed for greater stability 
of Mohammad Reza Shah's leadership . Indeed, throughout· his 
reign, Mohammad Reza Shah acquired stronger leadership 
abilities. This fact, along with �he expectations . of the 
Iranian people and Mohammad Reza Shah's goals for modernizing 
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Iran and for bringing about social equality among the classes 
and between men and women, created the circumstances in 
· which Mohammad Reza Shah's leadership was the necessary 
force· in reforming and stabilizing Iran. 
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